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U.S.-NATO Relations Remain 'Close' Despite 'Strategic Differences'

90WC0019A Beijing GUOJI WENTI YANJIU [INTERNATIONAL STUDIES] in Chinese No 4, 13 Oct 89 pp 13-18

[Article by Wang Haihan (3769 3189 3211): "U.S.-West European Relations Seen in Terms of the Short-Range Missile Dispute"]

[Text] During 1989 a new conflict occurred between the United States and the countries of West Europe over European defense issues. This conflict was rooted in a markedly increased sense of sovereignty accompanying the improvement in West Europe's economic position. Faced with new circumstances, the United States revised its policy toward the USSR and made some compromises on the short-range missile issue, which played an important role in easing relations between the United States and Western Europe.

After more than 40 years of cold war between East and West, tremendous changes have taken place in both East-West relations and the European situation. A relaxation has occurred in relations between the United States and the USSR and in the overall international situation, confrontation is turning into dialogue and disarmament is beginning to make real advances. This new situation has produced an unprecedented impact on the foundation for the alliance between the United States and West Europe. The conflicts and disputes between them have become increasingly sharp and open, and these internal rifts are also likely to deepen and widen, and may be difficult to close. How the United States and the West European allies will readjust policies and harmonize their stands in order to deal with various internal and external challenges will be a major factor affecting U.S.-European relations and the development of East-West relations.

A. During 1989, new open disputes erupted between the United States and the FRG over the defense of Europe. Because both sides stuck to their positions, an internal crisis occurred between the United States and its West European allies.

At the end of 1987, the United States and the USSR signed a treaty for the abolition of intermediate-range nuclear forces, which provided for the complete elimination from Europe before 1992 of all guided missiles with a range of 500 kilometers or more. In addition, the 88 short-range "Lance" missiles with a range of 110 kilometers that NATO deployed in Europe were to be withdrawn in 1995. In view of this, the United States feared that a third zero-point policy might occur that would rob NATO's nuclear-threat strategy of its effectiveness. The United States believed it was necessary to develop highly accurate missiles with a range of under 500 kilometers in order for NATO to be able to continue to carry out a "flexible response" strategy toward the Warsaw Pact, and the United States proposed the renewed deployment of short-range missiles in the FRG.

Although the FRG, as the main party concerned, did not oppose in principle the modernization of short-range missiles, for various domestic political and diplomatic reasons it hoped to postpone a decision on this matter until after 1990. Since February 1989, the FRG and the United States have argued openly about the short-range missile modernization issue. On 10 February, an FRG government spokesman set forth the FRG's stand clearly and unmistakably, maintaining that NATO did not have to decide on the modernization of short-range missiles before 1991. This announcement made the United States feel extremely concerned. The United States immediately sent Secretary of State James Baker on a six-day "whirlwind" visit to 14 West European countries, including the NATO countries and France, in an effort to lobby the other members of the alliance to reach a consensus as a basis for getting the FRG to change its stand. However, Baker's European trip produced minuscule results. Except for the UK, which resolutely supported the United States, other countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway, continued to side with the FRG, and Italy and France maintained a lukewarm attitude in favor of the FRG. Next, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher personally visited the FRG and France during the end of February to urge the FRG to agree in principle to the modernization of the short-range missiles, leaving other specific issues for future discussion. Prime Minister Helmut Kohl reiterated his earlier position. Subsequently, claims circulated that NATO officials had reached a compromise on 22 March, unanimously agreeing to research and develop a new generation of short-range missiles, but not to deploy them for the time being. On 25 March, the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement categorically denying this report. On 21 April, Prime Minister Kohl announced in the Bundesrat that he was urging the United States and the USSR to hold talks as soon as possible on the reduction of short-range missiles in Europe. On 24 April, FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and FRG Minister of National Defense Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg held talks with U.S. Secretary of State Baker in which they again requested the United States to hold talks with the USSR as soon as possible on the short-range missile reduction issue. The United States was much irritated at the FRG for singing an opposition refrain publicly, and the United States stated openly that the proposal for talks between the United States and the USSR on the reduction of short-range missiles was "mistaken." On 5 May, President Bush and Prime Minister Kohl had a telephone conversation in which they discussed their differences on the short-range missile issue. They expressed the hope that a compromise solution could be found before the NATO heads of state meeting at the end of May. At the same time, Bush remained unwilling to back off from the United States' stand, insisting that substantive progress had to be made on conventional arms negotiations, and that agreement had to be reached and a beginning made before short-range missile negotiations could be conducted. On the eve of the NATO heads of state conference, FRG Minister of National Defense Stoltenberg

traveled to the United States again. Both the United States and Germany adopted a more flexible attitude. The United States declared that once "irreversible" progress had been made on conventional arms negotiations, consideration could be given to negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on short-range missiles. The FRG also yielded, agreeing with the U.S. proposal to "link" negotiations on short-range missiles and conventional weapons. Although this historical "short-range missile dispute" of several months created no greater crisis, it caused a subtle rift.

B. This unprecedented conflict over security strategy between the United States and its West European allies resulted from different U.S. and European assessments of the USSR now that major changes had occurred in the world situation, as well as from greater West European attention to and safeguarding of its own interests from a geopolitical standpoint.

1. The intermediate range missile treaty brought to an end the tense situation between the United States and the USSR in trying to deploy intermediate-range missiles on the European continent, and East-West relations began to ease. In order to get out of a serious economic predicament, the USSR dedicated itself to reform at home while attempting, through disarmament and cooperation, to promote a further easing of relations with the West in an effort to build a fine international environment. In pursuit of this goal, the USSR upgraded the position of West Europe in its overall diplomatic strategy, making the development of relations with West Europe a principal way in which to promote a relaxation. The USSR put forward the principle of "common security," with no pursuit of military dominance, in keeping with the demands of West Europe, and it repeatedly trotted out various suggestions to influence West Europe's attitude on disarmament in an effort to diminish or even eliminate a psychology of fear of the Soviet military threat on the part of the countries of West Europe. The USSR acknowledged the imbalance in conventional weapons between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and agreed to eliminate that imbalance. The USSR was prepared to compromise on the reduction of conventional weapons and on global prohibition of chemical weapons. After declaring a unilateral 500,000 cut in its armed forces, the USSR made substantial concessions at the continuation of the Vienna Security Conference, announcing the withdrawal from East Europe of 500 tactical nuclear weapons, and that it was prepared to withdraw all nuclear weapons from the territories of its allies from 1989 through 1991 on condition that the United States take similar steps. Subsequently, other Warsaw Pact countries also announced their own disarmament plans. In addition, the USSR actively launched an all-points diplomacy, proposing the idea of jointly building a "European Mansion," and improving both economic relations and technical cooperation with West Europe. All of this won a fairly positive reaction from West Europe, which believed that a qualitative change had taken place in the

USSR's diplomacy, and that although the Soviet Union still had powerful military forces, it had no military ambitions. Most of the countries of West Europe were in favor of using this historical opportunity to help the USSR politically and economically in suitable ways. They also proposed disarmament as a means of achieving military parity at a low level in order to safeguard the prevailing relaxed situation and to reduce the military threat against West Europe. Leaders of the West European countries confirmed in their speeches the enormous changes in Soviet policies, and they praised Mikhail Gorbachev as a modern man "in tune with the tide of history." They believed that reforms in the USSR would lead to arms reductions, would strengthen security, and would give impetus to a Soviet opening to the outside world and an accommodation with the West. During 1989, the UK, the FRG, and France invited Soviet leaders for visits. Acting out of their own economic interests, the countries of Western Europe contacted the USSR directly, thus setting off an upsurge in which numerous countries did business with and entered into joint partnerships with the USSR. They also provided huge loans to the USSR, and they considered further liberalization of restrictions on the export of high-technology products to the USSR.

Substantial differences existed between the assessment of the United States and the West European allies of the changes that had taken place in the USSR, and their prospects. The United States remained suspicious about the motivation and the long-range effects of Soviet reforms, emphasizing that the reforms in the USSR had yet to bring about a turn for the better in the Soviet economy, that political reform had given rise to quite a few serious problems, and that forces in the Soviet Union opposed to reform remained very strong. In addition, there were thorny nationalities problems. Gorbachev had too many matters to look after at the same time and he was in an extremely difficult situation. Some U.S. officials and statesmen predicted that "Soviet reforms will fail."¹ Thus, the United States emphasized that the West could not build its own strategy on an assessment that Soviet reforms would develop smoothly; it advocated adoption of a cautious and realistic attitude toward the USSR in order to keep pressure on the USSR. In February 1989, when Secretary of State Baker traveled all over West Europe, he urged the allied countries to regard with caution the changes brought about by Soviet reforms. Inasmuch as the USSR held superiority in both conventional weapons and short-range missiles, the United States persisted in maintaining that current talks with the USSR should concentrate on conventional weapons in an effort to achieve parity between East and West in conventional forces as quickly as possible. In addition, the elimination of intermediate-range missiles had already produced a gap in the NATO defense system. The United States persisted in wanting to improve NATO's weapons systems in order to improve NATO's power position for effective implementation of its "flexible response" to genuinely contain a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, in recent

years the United States maintained a high degree of vigilance toward Soviet attempts to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, and its nonnuclear tactics in Europe. Henry Kissinger said incisively that "If Soviet policy is not targeted at driving the United States completely out of Europe, it is bent on weakening our influence."² U.S. insistence on the earliest possible modernization of short-range missiles was also in order to avoid having the United States and its West European allies going separate ways on defense matters.

2. During a time of easing East-West relations, the West European allies increasingly considered their own interests in geopolitical terms. Such an increasingly strong sense of sovereignty weakened U.S. influence in West Europe. In recent years, the United States and the USSR held several summit meetings, and, on quite a few major issues affecting European security, the United States did not seek the views of its West European allies in advance. In October 1986, when the United States reached an agreement in principle on the intermediate-range missile issue, it bypassed its allies to engage in diplomacy over their heads. Such a cavalier way of doing things aroused universal dissatisfaction and indignation in West European countries, and it also made them realize that both the easing of tensions and the controversy between the United States and the USSR grew out of their strategic needs and served their own personal interests. The security and stability of the European region could not be entrusted entirely to the superpowers. European countries should play a greater role in international affairs; they should seek new ways to safeguard their own security and stability. For a long time, a longing for enduring peace existed universally among the peoples of all countries of West Europe, which had gone through the suffering of two world wars. Gorbachev's policy of withdrawal from abroad and his peace offensive happened to coincide with these feelings of the people of Europe. Furthermore, for various reasons, including geographic, historical, and cultural ones, as well as economic interests, West Europe always held a more positive attitude than the United States about developing relations with the USSR. On the short-range missile issue, the FRG Government, which was to hold a general election in 1990, decided that a decision now about the modernization issue would certainly not help the incumbent government's position in the general election, and it would also hurt progress toward the easing of relations with the USSR. If the short-range missile issue could be linked to a European reduction in conventional weapons, not only would it be possible to reduce to the minimum U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces in Europe, but the pressure that the FRG sustained from the Soviet military threat could also be reduced, while the confidence of the majority of the electorate could also be won. In view of the foregoing considerations, the FRG was first to oppose the United States openly. When Baker visited the FRG, Kohl announced publicly that the modernization of short-range missiles had to "take Germany's interests into account," and the United

States should not regard this matter as a test of the FRG's loyalty to NATO. Some other West European countries also came to adopt a stand in support of the FRG. The United States was very displeased with the ever stronger centrifugal tendencies that its West European allies, particularly the FRG, expressed toward Soviet policies. Secretary of State Baker stated clearly that the allies could strengthen the "European pillar" principle within NATO; however, the United States opposed starting all over again.

The fundamental reason for such a major change in mutual relations between the United States and the West European allies after going along together for 40 years of the cold war lay in a marked increase in West Europe's sense of sovereignty accompanying its steadily rising economic position. However, the West European allies usually proceeded from geopolitical interests with regard to issues having a bearing on Europe's security and defense, and they sought more right to speak out, and to change and increase gradually their strategic position and political influence, establishing a more equal relationship as a partner with the United States in NATO.

C. Under the new circumstances, the United States made attendant revisions in its policies toward the USSR, and it gained a basically common understanding about the USSR with the West European allies at the NATO chiefs-of-state conference on strategic issues. The United States also made some compromises on the short-range missile issue. All this played a major role in easing tense relations with its allies.

1. How to patch up its differences with the West European allies, strengthen unity, and decide on a strategy for the new circumstances was a stern challenge that the United States faced. Meeting this challenge required, first of all, a revision of its policy toward the USSR. It took four months for the Bush administration to review and consider U.S. foreign policy. On the basis of the changing international situation, it readjusted its policies and tactics toward the USSR, and its reevaluation of East-West relations narrowed its differences with its West European allies. The United States had been suspicious and undecided for some time about the important changes in the USSR's domestic and foreign affairs. When the Bush administration took office, while deliberating foreign policy, it continued to emphasize "seeking peace through strength." It maintained the need to be circumspect and realistic in handling relations with the USSR. It also urged its allies not to harbor illusions or take precipitate action with regard to the USSR. Following deliberations, U.S. policy toward the USSR was clarified, and the United States unequivocally called for a rather positive attitude in regarding the changes taking place in the USSR. It believed that the reforms being undertaken in the Soviet Union might not only lead the Soviet Union to a pluralistic path both politically and economically, but might simultaneously cause the USSR to loosen control over other East European countries. This was clearly in keeping with long-term U.S. strategic

objectives. In the course of deliberations, U.S. policy-makers naturally took into account the current state of Soviet-European relations, as well as the unfavorable consequences that might ensue should the United States not suitably readjust its policies. When U.S. Secretary of State Baker visited the USSR on 11 May 1989, he carried a letter from Bush to Gorbachev in which Bush praised the USSR's "changes of major significance that are even revolutionary," and he hoped that these reforms that promoted steady changes in the political climate would "continue and be successful." On 12 May, in a speech at Texas A&M University, Bush set forth a strategy that "goes beyond containment," no longer "simply containing Soviet expansionism," but calling for the application of Western value concepts and Western economic, scientific, and technical superiority to encourage and accelerate the Soviet Union's "increased openness and democratization," to bring the USSR gradually into the "world order." An official in the U.S. National Security Council believed that "going beyond containment is a positive reaction to Soviet reforms and a completely changed conception of U.S. postwar policy toward the USSR." The new policy toward the USSR that the United States espoused following the revision was fundamentally identical with the desire of most European countries to use the opportunity to develop relations with the USSR. Thus, it narrowed, to a considerable extent, differences between the United States and West Europe on this issue.

2. After entering the White House, Bush devoted more attention to improving the U.S.-European alliance. In U.S. foreign policy, relations between the United States and Europe occupied a "key position." The development of relations between West European nations and the USSR in recent years, particularly the enthusiasm West European nations demonstrated for trade and technical cooperation with the USSR, displeased the United States. The United States felt this could only help increase the USSR's overall strength and that it also hurt Western strategic security interests. It was for this reason that the United States urgently wanted to harmonize relations with its allies in order to safeguard U.S.-European unity and not give the USSR any opportunities it could use. Although the Bush administration had not been in power long, it sent the secretary of state and other officials shuttling back and forth to West Europe several times in order to listen more to the views of its West European allies on major issues regarding the USSR. In addition, it explained the U.S. position to the West Europeans, and offered assurances that the United States would do more to coordinate major problems with its allies and respect their views. The U.S. readjustment of policy toward the USSR, as well as its conciliatory posture toward its allies, mollified West Europe's dissatisfaction with the United States.

3. The United States made appropriate compromises at the NATO heads-of-state conference, which further assuaged the conflict between the United States and Europe on the short-range missile issue. On 29 and 30

May 1989, the heads of staff of the NATO countries gathered at NATO headquarters in Brussels to study the new situation in East-West relations, and to discuss NATO's future defense thinking and disarmament moves in light of the Soviet disarmament offensive. The contention over the short-range missile issue that existed on the eve of the conference between the United States and the UK on one side, and other members of the alliance headed by the FRG caused the conference to open under a cloud.

On the first day of the conference, Bush produced the first major proposal for conventional arms control since taking office, a four-point proposal which included the following: 1) NATO member states insist that the Warsaw Pact organization accept the principal ground-equipment limitations that the West has proposed, including the retention by both sides of 201,000 tanks, 28,000 armored personnel carriers, between 16,500 and 24,000 artillery pieces, and the destruction of all equipment eliminated. 2) For the first time, the West proposed inclusion in conventional arms control of land-based combat aircraft and helicopters in the region from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, each side being required to reduce the number of such weapons to 15 percent of the total number of such weapons currently held by NATO, and to destroy the eliminated equipment. 3) The United States would reduce by 20 percent the number of combat personnel stationed in Europe; the maximum number of ground and air units that the United States and the USSR maintained outside their own territory in the region between the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains would thus not exceed approximately 275,000 each. This maximum limit on personnel would require a Soviet reduction in forces of 325,000 in Eastern Europe. 4) Using the foregoing proposals as a basis, both the Warsaw Pact and NATO should reach an agreement as quickly as possible on conventional forces in Europe. The USSR should make 1997 its goal, and the United States hoped to reach agreement within a half to one year, and to complete arms reductions in 1992 or 1993.

This chiefs-of-state conference was the second gathering of NATO country leaders since the signing of the intermediate-range missile agreement, and it happened to occur on the 40th anniversary of the founding of NATO. In addition, it was here that President Bush made his first major foreign affairs statement since taking office. The United States made a timely new proposal for reducing conventional arms, expressing for the first time a willingness to reduce air power, in which the West enjoyed superiority. The U.S. proposal not only helped promote progress on negotiations for conventional arms reductions in Europe, but also conformed to popular sentiment in all the countries of Western Europe for arms reductions. For this reason, the U.S. proposal won the applause of its allies. Bush's courageous proposal and his initiative to move ahead changed the passive situation of the previous several months that resulted from preoccupation with a review of foreign policy and concentration on dealing with the Soviet peace offensive. At

the same time, it put the ball in the Soviet court, gained the initiative in foreign policy, and allayed great condemnation of Bush as a wimp in the United States. The United States scored the most points in this meeting. The French newspaper LE MONDE termed Bush's proposal an indication of renewed U.S. vigor. Even FRG Premier Helmut Kohl, who had been at odds with the United States for some time, also acknowledged that this "outstanding and extraordinary" proposal "once again clearly demonstrates the leading position of the United States."

In addition, in order to ease the tense relations between the United States and Europe, the United States also made corresponding compromises on the document that the conference passed, titled "Overall Conception of Arms Control and Disarmament," the United States agreeing to delay until after 1992 a further decision on the modernization of short-range missiles. The United States also abandoned its early stand of refusing to negotiate with the USSR on short-range missiles. At the conference Bush expressed approval for negotiations, but also attached several conditions as follows: First, negotiations on short-range missiles must be linked to talks on conventional weapons, and negotiations on short-range missiles should wait until after agreement was reached in negotiations on conventional weapons and action initiated. Second, if agreement was reached on short-range missiles, it was to be carried out only after negotiations on conventional weapons were completed. Third, the USSR should reduce the number of its short-range missiles to 88, that is, the same amount as for the West. This U.S. concession satisfied FRG requirements. It enabled a temporary abatement of the bilateral dispute over short-range missiles, allayed internal quarrels, and made NATO's position secure. When the conference concluded on 30 May, NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner announced that the conference had achieved "major successes," again demonstrating the unity of the alliance, as well as NATO's ability to meet current challenges.

D. The differences between the United States and Europe could not be eliminated totally, and frictions between them could break out from time to time in the future. However, long-range strategic interests of the allies working together would impel the United States and Europe to consult with each other and coordinate their positions in order to deal with the common threat.

Although marked progress was made on some major issues as a result of the efforts of the United States and the West European allies, this NATO heads-of-state conference that was hailed as "winning successes rarely seen in history," did not completely eradicate differences among individual countries over strategic security interests. One example was the "Third zero-point plan." Two of the documents that the conference passed avoided mention of this issue, foreshadowing the possibility that each country might interpret them differently in the future. After these documents were published, the FRG believed that this showed the possibility that the "third

zero-point plan" was not yet completely eradicated. As another example, the UK and France maintained reservations about the part of Bush's proposal for including combat aircraft in negotiations. On Bush's proposed timetable for completion of the Vienna disarmament negotiations within six to 12 months, Margaret Thatcher employed a rare disapproving tone to criticize this objective as "unrealistic," because, should negotiations bog down over complex technical details such as how to calculate weapons and nuclear inspection, "another disagreement will occur within NATO." Even more problematically, implementing Bush's disarmament proposals within a year and a half at the Vienna disarmament negotiations would also be no easy matter. Negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces differed, after all, from the destruction of intermediate-range missiles in that it not only involved the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, but also the security interests of the countries of Europe. Quite a few Western diplomats and defense experts believed that "many differences were covered up at Brussels." With the continued warming of the international climate, cries for disarmament and peace grew louder. Because of the different individual interests of the United States and its West European allies, controversies over NATO security strategy would occur from time to time, and the widening and deepening of internal rifts was possible.

In order to ensure smooth implementation of the overall strategy, the United States will continue to devote an extremely high degree of attention to harmonizing relations with its allies. The United States understands clearly that "unless the West can achieve new unanimity on strategy, the United States will become a bystander to the process of disintegration of the old European order."³ Consequently, on issues affecting Europe, particularly policy toward the USSR and defense, the Bush administration will listen to the views of its allies and will hold more political discussions and cooperate more closely with them in pursuit of a maximum degree of common understanding. Militarily, despite the need for West Europe to shoulder more responsibility and expenses because of internal U.S. economic difficulties, the United States will continue to reaffirm its defense obligations to West Europe. The United States will rely on this to maintain and expand U.S. influence on the allies, and bolster its position in disputes with the USSR. It will also guard against the USSR becoming a "third party" intervening between the United States and Europe.

Despite the important changes that have taken places in the position of West Europe, it must still maintain an alliance with the United States. The rapid strengthening of the economies, and of the scientific and technical strength of each of the countries of West Europe in recent years, as well as the unified market to be established within the European Common Market in 1992, will give each of the countries of West Europe a more solid economic foundation. In the future, they will express a stronger sense of sovereignty in international

affairs and greater independence from the United States. As for defense relations between the United States and Europe, the cry within the United States for a joint sharing of defense costs within the alliance is becoming increasingly loud. Furthermore, the United States is really no longer financially able to carry this burden; therefore, sooner or later, the United States will reduce its military presence in Europe. However, West Europe feels that, in the final analysis, the greatest threat it faces comes from the USSR. For a long time to come, in defense matters, West Europe will have to rely on the United States for joint resistance to the USSR. Moreover, in matters such as pressuring the USSR to make substantial concessions on disarmament, and promoting East European political and economic reforms, the United States and West Europe have numerous common interests. Similar strategic interests will enable the United States and its West European allies to weather the "short-range missile crisis." In the future, U.S. relations with West Europe will develop in the midst of more frequent frictions and conciliations, new changes occurring steadily that merit serious attention; however, there will be no fundamental change in the general pattern of the alliance.

Footnotes

1. Television speech by U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney on 29 April 1989.
2. NEWSWEEK Magazine, 19 September 1988.
3. See article in the summer 1989 issue of POLICY STUDIES by B. Paynes, deputy director of the U.S. Heritage Foundation, and concurrently director of the Foreign Policy Studies Department.

Outlook for Conventional Arms Reduction Talks

90WC0015A Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI [WORLD AFFAIRS] in Chinese No 21, 1 Nov 89 pp 16-18

[Article by Zhou Aiqun (0719 1947 5028): "European Conventional Arms Reduction Talks Which Are Entering a Key Period"]

[Excerpts] Beginning this year, the sky has begun to clear over the European conventional armed forces talks which have been overcast for a long time. The United States and the Soviet Union both have a positive attitude toward the third round of talks which resumed in Vienna on 7 September and the talks, which now have a foundation of solid results, are entering a critical stage. [passage omitted]

At the meeting of heads of state of the NATO member nations which convened at the end of May this year, U.S. President Bush expressed the hope that an agreement on conventional arms reductions in Europe would be reached in six months or a year. On 21 September at the White House, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze handed over to President Bush a letter from Chairman Gorbachev in which he reacted positively to reaching an

agreement on limiting conventional arms within a year. The Soviet foreign minister further proposed convening a meeting of all European heads of state and the United States and Canada in the last half of 1990 to sign a conventional arms reduction agreement. International public opinion holds that although it is premature to discuss signing an agreement, the heads of state of the Soviet Union and the United States have established a timetable for talks to achieve an agreement and this adds an even more optimistic atmosphere for these talks in which the positions of the two sides are already very close.

The Prospects Are Good

Nominally, the European conventional arms talks are talks between two large military blocs and 23 member countries, but in fact they can be divided into the Soviet Union, the United States and Eastern and Western Europe. Although their strategic interests are different or not entirely unified, all have the hope and the need to reach an agreement.

For the Soviet Union, the European conventional talks themselves are a strong item, but it took the initiative to give way, and lowered its sights as if to use the disarmament talks intentionally in foreign relations to establish its peaceful image and internationally to improve East-West relations to achieve a relatively stable international environment to accelerate growth domestically. Gorbachev's reforms are not at a critical point and scoring a success in foreign relations and using the money saved by disarmament for economic construction will undoubtedly be of benefit to a stable situation. As for the United States, since it hopes to weaken the Soviet Union's control of Eastern Europe through the disarmament talks, and economically also can reduce the burden of domestic military expenditures, wants even more to take advantage of the Soviet Union's current perestroika and its request for help and this "historical opportunity" to reduce the superiority of the Soviet Army's conventional forces, eliminate its ability to launch a sudden strike, and to adopt large-scale attacks, to realize a balance in low-level military preparedness and ensure the security of NATO.

As for Eastern and Western Europe, whether proceeding from the interests of their individual blocs or from considerations of extricating themselves from the control of the leader of their alliance, struggling for more independence and autonomy and unification for self-strengthening and establishing a new peaceful European order, they all hope that conventional arms reduction talks succeed.

However, conventional arms reduction talks involve a large region, many countries and complex reduction topics, so it will be difficult to coordinate the interests of the two large blocs or even the participating countries and a great many serious differences will be difficult to resolve. At the same time, new issues may arise in the process of the talks. According to reports, General

Galvin, Supreme Commander of NATO, recently revealed that NATO military authorities are planning to shift their best weapons among the allies in order to ensure that when weapons are reduced in East and West, they will only be reducing NATO's most out-of-date weapons. This undoubtedly will provoke new contradictions between the two sides in the talks. It appears that the talks will also be tortuous and complex. However, disarmament is the major trend. International public opinion generally holds that, once European conventional arms reduction talks get under way, its momentum will be hard to stop. It is estimated that through the third round of talks, the positions of the two sides will draw closer and it appears there is hope for the achievement of an agreement before the end of next year as proposed by President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev.

Article Examines U.S.-Soviet Detente, Europe

HK3001143490 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI
in Chinese No 24, 16 Dec 89, p 6

[Article by Chen Xiaogong (7115 1420 0501): "Beyond Containment Asks for High Price, There is Bottom Line in Soviet Concession, Europe Is Still a Key Area, the 1990's Are Crucial Years"]

[Text] When talking about U.S.-Soviet relations, people have paid much attention to the so-called "beyond containment" [chao yue e zhi 6389 6390 6666 0455] put forward by President Bush in May and have made a great deal of comments on this issue. In my view, the United States has not yet built up an explicit theoretical framework for "beyond containment," but this new concept indeed shows that the United States has further adjusted its policy toward the Soviet Union. First, the U.S. decisionmakers have begun to hold that the domestic reforms in the Soviet Union are developing in line with Western interests and the West should grasp this "historic opportunity" to change its previous strategy of "containing" the Soviet Union in all political and economic aspects. Henceforth, under the premise of ensuring the U.S. security and strategic stability, the United States will "support" the Soviet reforms and promote further changes in the Soviet Union in the orientation favorable to the West. Second, the United States still takes the Soviet Union as its main rival, and still holds that the Soviet Union will continue to constitute strategic threats against the United States for a long time. Therefore, the United States will not give up its "containment" strategy which proved to be effective in the past. In this sense, "beyond containment" only represents a tactical change, or adds some new contents to the "containment" strategy under the new conditions. It was established on the basis of the following preconditions: The Soviet Union must increase its "openness"; internally, it must evolve toward Western-style democracy; and externally, "thoroughly change its international behavior." Finally, the fundamental strategic objective of the United States is still to weaken the Soviet Union. Therefore, it must be prudent in pursuing

the "beyond containment" strategy. At the same time, the United States and the West are also worried that the reforms in the Soviet Union may be "reversed," so they try hard to seek the greatest possible benefit from the present detente. Then, even if the Soviet reforms are indeed "reversed," the Soviets would still have to pay "much higher costs."

As for the prospects of the U.S.-Soviet detente in the near future, it is in line with the basic strategic interests of both sides and there is still room for development. Therefore, the momentum of the detente will be kept.

When Bush and Gorbachev hold their official meeting in the first half of next year, it is expected that a new high tide will again appear in the atmosphere of detente between the two countries. However, it must also be noticed that with the U.S.-Soviet detente making progress in the fields of arms control and solving regional conflicts in the past few years, their bilateral relationship has entered the field of trade and economic intercourse. This is a more substantive and sensitive issue for both sides. By adopting the "beyond containment" strategy, the United States has obviously charged the Soviet Union a very high price, and the Soviets are also aware of this. In a certain period, because the detente is still in line with the fundamental interests of the Soviet Union which has to concentrate on its domestic reform, Moscow is willing to make concessions again and again. However, Gorbachev repeatedly stressed that he opposes external interference in his country's internal affairs, that the Soviet Union will not adopt a multiparty system, and that the Communist Party's leadership and the socialist orientation will not be changed. He also stressed that neither "revolution" nor "capitalism" can be exported to Eastern Europe. This in fact drew a line of demarcation between the Soviet Union and the United States on this issue of detente. The overbearing and aggressive posture of the United States reflected in its adoption of the "beyond containment" policy also laid bare the limitation of the U.S.-Soviet detente. Now, the detente process has extended from the relaxation of the military confrontation between the East and the West to a sharp struggle between the two social systems and ideologies. The 1990's will be a crucial period for testing the U.S.-Soviet detente.

As for the European situation, in my view, the recent events showed that the reforms in the socialist countries are inevitably accompanied with intense and complicated struggle between the two social systems and ideologies at home and abroad. In the course of struggle, there will inevitably be twists and turns and even setbacks. The 1990's will also be a crucial period for reforms in the socialist countries. The reforms will go through many difficulties and obstacles.

Europe is the key region in the postwar East-West confrontation. After the 1970's, the U.S.-Soviet rivalry extended to other areas outside Europe. In recent years, with the U.S.-Soviet detente and the decline in the level of armaments in Europe, the centrifugal tendency in

both Eastern Europe and Western Europe has been more and more obvious, and the two parts of Europe have moved closer to each other. The increasing "minor detente" atmosphere in Europe is a demonstration of the world's multipolar tendency. However, events developed very quickly this year and some new complicated factors appeared. Europe has once again become the focus of East-West relations (or a political "hot spot"), and the remarks about the possible disintegration of the "Yalta pattern" sharply increased. However, because Europe may affect the entire international strategic situation, all sides concerned give more consideration to the long-term impact of the changing situation. At present, all parties concerned are worried about the "imbalance" and the "development out of control" in the strategic situation, and act rather prudently. On the other hand, they all hold high the banner of "European unification." Gorbachev put forward the concept of a "European common home," while Bush's catchword was a "free and united Europe, and the EC called for building a "great European market." The three sides all tried to bring Europe's future development into line with their own interests.

However, there remain too many uncertain factors for Europe's future, and the prospects will depend on the resultant of various forces. If a new situation appears in Europe, it will be a major change in the postwar international situation.

In this sense, the international situation is undergoing some profound and significant changes which may mark a turning point in the postwar history. The uncertain factors may increase and bring about the complicated characteristics of this period.

News Analysis Examines NATO 'Problems'

*OW0202055890 Beijing Domestic Service
in Mandarin 0530 GMT 1 Feb 90*

[News analysis by XINHUA reporter Yang Yanhua: "NATO's Problems Under the New Situation," from the "International News and Current Events" program]

[Text] According to the Western mass media, 1990 will not be an easy year for NATO. The rapid changes occurring in Europe, especially Eastern Europe, have brought along a number of knotty problems to the NATO alliance.

First, the troop withdrawal has embarrassed NATO. It has always regarded the Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe as a threat to the security of the West. The recent Soviet proposal to withdraw all foreign troops in both Eastern and Western Europe by 1995 has indeed embarrassed some NATO members. A NATO official said: If the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Eastern Europe, it would probably be bad news for us. Some NATO diplomats believe that the orderly process of disarmament might be derailed by a hasty Soviet troop withdrawal. There is reason for the uneasiness among NATO allies. They worry that the pillar of support for

the unity of NATO allies to deal with the threat from the East will no longer be effective, thus forfeiting the ground for NATO's existence as a military organization. The Soviet Union has unilaterally begun to withdraw troops from Eastern Europe. So far, about 38,000 have been withdrawn. However, Galvin, the supreme allied commander for Europe, recently expressed his strong opposition to any unilateral troop withdrawal. According to a Western proposal, the United States and the Soviet Union should each cut troops in Europe down to 275,000. However, the pace of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe may conflict with the Western proposal. NATO officials said: We are very concerned that the Soviet Union cannot resist the pressure to withdraw troops at a pace faster than scheduled, because we shall thus lose control over the entire process.

Second, NATO's internal contradictions have surfaced. For example, there are different views among NATO allies. Some have called for continuing to strengthen the existing military structure or even for increasing military expenditures, while others have demanded cutting back military expenditure and readjusting the military strategy in line with the current situation. These differences have gradually brought to light NATO's internal contradictions. Last week, Belgian National Defense Minister Coeme announced that his country intended to withdraw its troops stationed in the FRG within the NATO framework. The announcement shocked some NATO members. They said that, without prior consultations with the allies, the Belgian announcement would disrupt NATO deployment.

Third, the German question is the focus of NATO concern. Along with changes in the situation, the German question will increasingly become the focus of NATO concern and may become the key affecting the European situation. It is anticipated that, in order to clear the way for reunification of the two Germanies, the FRG may soon request its allies to cut back their troops in its territory. FRG Foreign Minister Genscher said on 28 January: It is impossible for a unified Germany to belong to NATO. Other FRG officials said: A unified Germany would cooperate with both the NATO and Warsaw Pact. Of course, the European countries, which have experienced two world wars, are alarmed by such statements, different from the views of leaders of the major Western countries. As for as the modernization of short-range missiles, NATO members have always disagreed among themselves on this question. The disagreement reflects the penetrating differences within NATO regarding the reality of a changing world and NATO's traditional strategy. The West German public has always been very sensitive to nuclear weapons deployed on West German territory. The deployment and upgrading of such nuclear weapons would directly affect the security of Western Germany. Once the nuclear weapons are deployed, West Germany will be the first victim. It is anticipated that the question of short-range missiles will once again become the focus of disagreement. Currently, the people in the West have become increasingly aware

of what the changes in Eastern Europe have brought about is not a bright future, but a series of knotty problems concerning the future.

Commentary on Reduction of U.S. Troops in ROK

*SK1102132090 Beijing International Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Unattributed commentary: "Plan To Unify or Abolish Military Bases"]

[Text] On 30 January, the South Korean authorities and the United States [words indistinct] that the United States will withdraw three air bases in Taegu, Suwon, and Kwangju and approximately 2,000 non-combat troops from South Korea. As various news agencies have commented, this plan by the United States to withdraw troops was not mapped out to alleviate tension on the Korean peninsula and to promote an atmosphere favorable to various channels of dialogue underway between the North and South of Korea but to put pressure on (?Seoul) as a last resort.

[Words indistinct], since late last year, some U.S. congressmen have demanded that the U.S. troops be withdrawn from South Korea because South Korea's (?military strength) enjoys absolute supremacy over that of the

North of Korea in [words indistinct], and has urged President Bush to immediately map out a plan to withdraw the troops. Because the budget deficit has drastically increased every year, the people in the United States have strongly demanded that military expenditure be reduced. It costs \$2 billion a year to maintain the U.S. troops in South Korea at their current scale. The South Korean side pays (?two fifths) of it. The (?Pentagon) demanded that the South Korean side increase its share, and the South Korean side rejected this demand. In January this year, the United States announced that it will (?reschedule its timetable) for the withdrawal of its troops from South Korea if South Korea pays more of the expenditures for the presence of the U.S. troops in South Korea. However, the South Korean side said that it is not able to accept this demand by the United States. Therefore, the United States is planning to withdraw approximately 2,000 troops from South Korea in order to reduce its military expenditures.

[passage indistinct] As a result, the South Korean people's anti-U.S. sentiment is growing, and the youth and students have continuously staged demonstrations, demanding that the U.S. troops be withdrawn. Last year, the South Korean authorities demanded that the U.S. forces headquarters be removed from Seoul, [words indistinct] operational control. [passage indistinct]

AUSTRALIA

Military To Discuss Increased Defense Ties

*BK0802134690 Hong Kong AFP in English
1303 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] Canberra, February 8 (AFP)—Senior Australian military officers will visit Indonesia next month to discuss closer defence ties and possibly joint security for the Timor Sea, military chief General Peter Gration said Thursday. General Gration, who is scheduled to visit Jakarta in the third week of March for talks with his Indonesia counterpart General Try Sutrisno, said a team of senior officers would go a week before him.

"They will be exchanging strategic views with the Indonesians, and they will be examining practical ways in which we can build on the improved relationship which we've established in the last 12 to 18 months," he told journalists. "We'll be looking at the possibility of military exercising—low level, low scale, starting modestly," Gen Gration said.

"We'll be looking at the possibility of cooperation in the Timor Sea, (with security for) the joint zone." Gen Gration said any joint exercises in the immediate future would involve only ships and aircraft, although land exercises could be held later on.

Australia and Indonesia had conflicting territorial claims to the Timor Sea but resolved them last year by agreeing to three separate zones, one of which would be jointly administered.

The Indonesians effectively suspended defence links with Australia in 1986 over a report in a Sydney newspaper alleging corruption involving members of President Suharto's family. But relations have warmed considerably since and both countries agreed to boost defence ties during a visit by Gen. Try to Australian defence bases in July.

In Jakarta, meanwhile, senior Foreign Ministry officials from Australia and Indonesia concluded two days of formal talks Thursday, the first meeting of its kind since 1978. Richard Woolcott, secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, director general of political affairs, told a press conference the talks had been friendly and cordial, covering bilateral trade, investment, cultural exchanges, the Timor Gap treaty and regional cooperation.

Such regular senior level official talks ground to a halt in 1978 amid difficult negotiations on settling the disputed Timor Gap boundary and increasing tension between the two countries.

JAPAN

Japan To Propose COCOM Embargo Relaxation

*OW0202234090 Tokyo KYODO in English 1537 GMT
2 Feb 90*

[Text] Tokyo, February 2 (KYODO)—The Japanese Government will propose at a mid-February meeting of the COCOM in Paris a gradual relaxation of the strategic goods export embargo against the communist bloc along much the same lines as the already announced U.S. proposal, government sources said Friday.

The sources said the Japanese proposal would call for a shorter screening period for machine tools, personal computers, communications equipment, and two more commodity groups that at present may be shipped to Eastern Europe on an exceptional permit basis. The Japanese proposal will also call for a realistic review of machine tools and some other products currently included in the COCOM's embargo list, the sources said.

The coming COCOM meeting will be held on February 14 and 15 in Paris, attended by representatives of 17 member countries, including Japan, the United States, Britain, and West Germany.

The sources said that at the coming meeting, COCOM, or Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export to East Bloc Countries, would likely decide to shorten the said screening period for some "strategic products" to be shipped to Eastern Europe on an exceptional permit. The committee will also draw up a work schedule for the coming period, the sources said.

The sources said COCOM would likely defer its decision as to whether the same relaxation measures should be applied to exports of such goods to the Soviet Union until its subsequent meeting in July in Paris.

Defense Vice Minister on U.S. Troop Cuts

*OW0702162090 Tokyo KYODO in English 1502 GMT
7 Feb 90*

[Text] Tokyo, February 7 (KYODO)—U.S. defense officials have no plans to pull frontline combat troops out of Japan but will take some steps to streamline its forces here, Vice Minister of Defense Seiki Nishihiro said Wednesday. Nishihiro had returned earlier from a series of consultations with defense officials in the United States and Europe.

Slight cutbacks in U.S. forces in Japan to improve efficiency and reduce excess personnel were being considered, Nishihiro said.

In meetings with U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Nishihiro discussed several elements in Asian security which impeded larger cuts. U.S. officials said the modernization of Soviet defenses in the Far East and possible instability in China and the Korean peninsula made the

Asian situation fundamentally different from that of East Europe. Large troop reductions in Europe have produced pressure for similar moves in Asia. There are some 50,000 U.S. troops in Japan. Reports of limited cutbacks in U.S. forces posted in Okinawa and Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture, surfaced before the announcement of selected troop withdrawals in Asia by Cheney last week.

Nishihiro said that Soviet Asian troops have replaced old, obsolete weapons with the latest armaments and are also stockpiling weaponry from forces pulled out of Europe. But the Defense Agency's second-in-command noted a marked reduction in the number of large-scale military exercises by the Soviets, adding the development of newer weaponry was unlikely.

Agency sources said late last month Japan's defense buildup plans are to be reviewed to reflect the findings of Nishihiro's visit, advancing Soviet reforms, and changes in East Europe.

DPRK Urged To Allow Nuclear Inspections
*OWI002053890 Tokyo KYODO in English 1408 GMT
9 Feb 90*

[Untitled article by Tim Johnson]

[Text] Tokyo, February 9 (KYODO)—Japan on Friday, prompted by reports North Korea may be building a nuclear weapons facility, urged Pyongyang to fulfill its international treaty obligations by allowing outside inspections of its nuclear facilities.

The call by a Foreign Ministry spokesman comes in the wake of concern by government officials over recurring reports of covert North Korean nuclear facilities in the northern part of the country.

Spokesman Taizo Watanabe, in a meeting with foreign correspondents, urged Pyongyang to conclude an agreement as soon as possible with the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) to allow for outside inspection of the reported facilities.

Watanabe said North Korea must agree to outside inspection as specified by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korea became a signatory to that treaty in 1985.

Similar sentiment was reportedly expressed by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker during recent talks with Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow.

Watanabe's remarks came in response to French satellite photographs published by Japanese newspapers Friday that allegedly show the construction of new nuclear facilities near a city some 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang.

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Ishihara told reporters that Japan is "very concerned" about the

alleged expansion, but has been unable to confirm the reports. The photographs reportedly were taken last [word indistinct].

Watanabe said Japan is trying to verify reports that the facilities have been constructed "with a view to developing a nuclear weapon."

"North Korea is one of those countries and areas about which we have [word indistinct] from a viewpoint of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as well as facilities," Watanabe said.

Japan has traditionally considered instability on the Korean peninsula to be a security threat.

The nonproliferation treaty obliges signatories to conclude a separate safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency within 18 months.

While North Korea acceded to the treaty, subsequent talks with them failed to produce agreement on safeguard inspections, despite pressure from its ally in Moscow and from the United States.

The Soviet Union was reported by South Korean sources last Monday to be helping North Korea build a nuclear power plant with four reactors in the northern part of the country.

North Korea acknowledges possessing only one nuclear reactor for research purposes in North Pyongyang Province. It became operational in February 1987.

One government source said Friday, however, that Pyongyang's unwillingness to agree to on-the-spot inspections "has raised suspicions among many countries about the intentions of the North Korean regime."

The London-based defense magazine, JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, reported last September that North Korea will likely achieve nuclear weapons capability within five years.

Washington officials have since warned that such capability would represent a serious threat in view of the country's "terrorist record."

U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost told KYODO NEWS SERVICE last November that [words indistinct] were to make significant progress toward nuclear capability, "it is a major concern for everybody in this region."

U.S. and Japanese officials reviewed classified satellite photographs during a two-day working-level security meeting last October and agreed to carefully monitor North Korea, according to Defense Agency sources.

Return of Okinawa Bases Welcomed

OW1102174390 Naha RYUKYU SHIMPO in Japanese
10 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Editorial: "The Planned Return of Bases Welcomed; Work Out 'Site Utilization' Plans Without Delay"]

[Text] With the 21st century just around the corner the world is shaking violently. International events of greatest concern until a few years ago were the EC's integration in 1992 and Hong Kong's reversion scheduled for 1997.

However, more violent shocks than the EC and Hong Kong have been felt: the waves of democratization in Eastern Europe sweeping like falling dominoes and billows of reform hitting the Soviet Union itself, leader of the East. One does not know how the world will reform in the days ahead.

Thus, the world is shaking violently. After four decades the structure of the U.S.-Soviet cold war, which took shape after the war, is being compelled to undergo drastic changes.

The swell is now surging even upon Okinawa.

Admiral Huntington Hardisty, commander of U.S. Forces Pacific, testifying before a U.S. House Armed Services Committee hearing on 7 February, disclosed that plans are under study for the consolidation and integration of bases. This, he said, includes U.S. military training areas in Okinawa and other base facilities to be put out of operation by this May and returned to Japan. In the beginning it was said that 19 facilities would be affected. However, according to subsequent surveys, it was found that, although a specific figure had not been made public, the facilities would be quite large in scale.

Apart from this, it has been announced that U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney is scheduled to visit Japan 20-24 February, during which time he also plans to stop over in Okinawa. It may be safe to assume that Admiral Hardisty's remarks and Secretary Cheney's visit to Japan have something to do with each other.

To put it in the Japanese way, Secretary Cheney may be coming to Japan, bringing a "present"—the return of the bases—with him.

Admiral Hardisty was quite specific in giving reasons for returning base facilities. He said, "Pursuant to its economic development Okinawa has been limited in the use of land and, thus, has intricate sensitivities toward the presence of U.S. forces and their use of bases." This is what the people of Okinawa Prefecture have been maintaining all along, and it is the reason they call for the removal of bases and oppose bases.

Therefore, it is believed that U.S. Forces Pacific came up with the latest plan to return facilities after examining the opinion of the Okinawan people, who oppose and call for the removal of bases.

Talk of returning or scaling down U.S. military bases has come to the fore many times thus far. Most recently, last 15 December, information attributed to a U.S. Forces Pacific source revealed plans to totally withdraw U.S. Marines from Okinawa and redeploy them to Hawaii around 1995.

At that time, the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency denied the report as unthinkable under the present circumstances. Since Admiral Hardisty's latest remarks are more specific, it is believed that the plan itself cannot be denied.

Against the backdrop of the United States returning its Okinawa bases are such developments as the relaxation of military tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, the change in quality of East-West relations, and drastic cuts in U.S. military spending. Particularly, U.S.-Soviet detente and the change in East-West relations are dramatic, and it may be safe to say that the military bases in Okinawa, built during the U.S.-Soviet cold war era, are already antiquated.

Which facilities will be returned is a matter to be noted from now on. The Onna communication station and Awase golf course appear to be mentioned as proposed facilities. Which others will follow?

U.S. forces may be returning bases they do not need to put their Okinawa bases to most effective use. It is conceivable that, after doing so, they will further strengthen base functions, mainly at Kadena and Futenma. The northern training area and other facilities perhaps may be returned gradually.

The return of bases is welcomed. However, the way in which they are returned is open to question. While it is said that bases will be put out of use and returned by this May as part of plans to consolidate and integrate bases, nothing has been made known to the Japanese and local Okinawan people as to which facilities these are. That is the question.

May is just around the corner. Should bases be put out of use and returned, plans must be worked out at once for the use of the sites after their return. However, this is impossible when nothing is made known about which facilities will be returned.

We reiterate that their return is greatly welcomed. However, a unilateral return is unwelcome. If they are saying that they are returning bases "because Okinawa has been limited in the use of land pursuant to its economic development," they should return bases in a way that will not hamper Okinawa's economic development.

At the same time, we want to stress that it is high time for the Okinawan side to make a realistic and concrete study of how to utilize base sites after their return.

To those who have been living on base for more than 40 years after the war, bases look unchangeable and immovable. We bet that even those who cry for the removal of

bases feel it is impossible that bases will be returned in the near future. Conversely speaking, bases have been as big a presence as that.

However, the world is shaking violently. It has come to a point where the Berlin Wall collapsed and the one-party dictatorship by the CPSU ended. It is natural for U.S. military bases in Okinawa, which shoulder an important section in the U.S.-Soviet cold war structure, to change. Although it may take time for the bases to be completely returned, the return of a considerable part of them may come unexpectedly soon.

What should we do in that event? It will be incoherent if, after calling for the return of bases, we say: Please wait a minute; please continue using them; we hope that the Self-Defense Forces will take them over.

The prefectural government, municipal authorities, and private organizations concerned should seriously think about how to utilize the base sites. Efforts should be made to avert a situation in which owners of military-used land find themselves in distress immediately after bases are returned.

The utilization of base sites is a question which determines what Okinawa will be like from now. It is a serious question which calls for beginning the formulation of concrete plans without a moment's delay.

NORTH KOREA

State Said To Be Expanding Nuclear Facility

OW0802163590 Tokyo KYODO in English 1503 GMT
8 Feb 90

[Text] Tokyo, February 8 (KYODO)—Satellite photo analysis shows a major expansion of what is believed to be a nuclear facility in North Korea, said researchers at Tokai University in Tokyo on Wednesday.

This was revealed in a comparative analysis of photos which a French satellite took separately in July 1986 and in September 1989, the researchers said.

The facility is located in Nyongbyong some 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang. A large structure, which was not spotted in the 1986 photo, is shown in the 1989 one, they said.

North Korea, backed by the Soviet Union, established a research reactor with an output capacity of 2,000-4,000 kilowatts around Nyongbyong in the middle of the 1970's, according to Western nuclear experts.

The experts say that North Korea began to build a larger reactor with an output of 300,000 kilowatts in 1980.

Britain's specialized defense magazine, JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, published last September, said that North Korea will possess a nuclear weapon capability within five years.

SOUTH KOREA

Future of U.S. Forces in Korea Discussed

902C0070A Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
8 Nov 89 p 17

[Report of Roundtable Discussion on U.S. Forces in Korea by Yi Chae-ho and Yi Tong-kwan; Participants: Pak Yong-ok, Defense Ministry Deputy Director of External Policy; Ha Yong-son, Associate Professor of Political Science at the Seoul National University; Yi Sam-song, Political Science Instructor at Sungmyong Women's University]

[Text] [Moderator] The serial "The U.S. Forces in Korea" is now coming to an end after over 10 months of serialization. Our special coverage team has endeavored to delve into the real state of the U.S. forces in Korea and the problems involved with them from a balanced point of view as much as possible and examine the demand for their withdrawal and the anti-American moves from an objective stance, but I feel the efforts of our team left much to be desired. In winding up this serial, we would like to focus our discussion on the "Future of the U.S. Forces in Korea." It is clear that the presence of U.S. forces in Korea cannot continue forever. Some day they will be withdrawn or reduced. What draws our attention in this connection is the question: Are the U.S. forces in Korea really a stumbling block to North-South talks and reunification?

[Pak Yong-ok] In my opinion, the presence of the U.S. forces is not a stumbling block to North-South talks and national reunification. I regard these as conditions for peaceful reunification: First, both North and South Korea are cognizant of the fact that they will gain nothing from a use of force (war) against each other; second, they build confidence in each other; and third, the powers surrounding Korea guarantee peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. In no way does the presence of U.S. troops in Korea hinder the fulfillment of these three requirements. First, the stationing of U.S. troops in Korea serves a deterrent to armed clashes between North and South Korea. Second, with regard to the question of building confidence, U.S. forces do not hamper confidence building. In Europe, while the NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces maintain their respective collective defense structures with U.S. and Soviet troops as their key elements, the East and West are pushing disarmament negotiations at a full scale based on mutual trust. Lastly, the U.S. forces in Korea are contributing to stabilizing the situation in the surrounding areas.

U.S. Forces Serve U.S. Interests

[Yi Sam-song] My idea is a little bit different. In my opinion, we should begin with recognizing that the U.S. forces in Korea are as a military power through and through. It is necessary to examine coolly whether the presence of an enormous force of arms can really be a

means for perpetuating peace or poses an obstruction to peace. People often say that we need a "change in our way of thinking." It means that we need to shift our stance from a military-oriented view to pacifism. People often try to justify the presence of U.S. troops in Korea by pointing out that "U.S. troops are also stationed in Europe." But they should know that although Soviet nuclear weapons exist in Europe, there is no such weapon in North Korea. In addition, we should recognize the fact that North Korea has refused to turn itself into a Soviet military base. Some people claim that thanks to the presence of U.S. troops in Korea, military balance and peace are maintained between North and South. But it must be pointed out that to the contrary, the presence of U.S. forces is a factor causing a vicious cycle of military confrontation and turning North and South Korea into military barracks and inhumane societies.

[Ha Yong-son] There are several reasons for the U.S. forces having become a new issue, reasons such as the new international detente, the relative decline in the influence of the United States, and the progress in relations between North and South Korea. I think Deputy Director Pak has so far stressed the favorable political aspect of the functions of the U.S. forces in Korea whereas Professor Yi has stressed the adverse side of these functions. It is my stand that we should give our first thought to how North Korea's unification policy should be viewed. The present North Korean policy on reunification is different from what it used to be in the fifties and sixties, but I think that as long as North Korea refuses to abandon its policy of "reunification through revolution," we should recognize the deterrent effect of the U.S. forces in Korea against military clashes. However, the trouble is the adverse side of the functions. What is called a deterrence to military clashes on the Korean Peninsula is part of U.S. world strategy, and this deterrence does not necessarily reflect the interest of the Korean Peninsula itself. In some cases it could operate adversely. It should also be recognized that the presence of the U.S. forces in Korea cannot accord with our interest 100 percent in achieving the independent reunification and democratization of our country. In a word, this is to say that we should also recognize that U.S. troops are stationed here partly for the purpose of promoting the interests of the United States. Accordingly, I think it is necessary to expand the areas in which the interests of our country and the United States are identical and reduce the areas where there is a conflict of interests.

[Moderator] I think the majority of people are worried that if the U.S. troops are suddenly withdrawn, the balance between North and South will be broken, leading to the outbreak of a war. To put it a different way, I think many people are afraid of war and are apprehensive of the idea of reunification for the sake of reunification, the idea that "everything else will take care of itself if only reunification is achieved."

[Yi] In my opinion, the so-called conservative circles have distorted the demand of the dissidents for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. In other words, the conservatives have pictured the stand of the dissidents as an extremist view in order to make it an easy target of attack. It is the position of the dissidents that in anticipation of changes in the surrounding circumstances resulting from the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the Korean people themselves should contrive peace and security devices on their own initiative. They don't mean to say that after having all of the U.S. troops withdrawn, the Koreans themselves talk things over among themselves. In other words, we should positively respond to the call of the North for North-South military talks, including discussions on the issue of withdrawal of the U.S. forces.

[Ha] But I think what is equally important is the question of whether the North Korean demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South signifies the abandonment of its revolutionary line or part of it.

[Yi] That question should be addressed not to North Korea, but to ourselves. Our party in power is trying to solve the question of North-South relations on the basis of an absolute negation of the communist society in the North. There is no difference between this attitude and the North's negation of the legitimacy of the South. Attention must be paid to the possibility that an announcement of a plan to withdraw U.S. forces will bring about an important change in the military strategy of the North.

[Ha] In my opinion, there must be something that performs a deterrent function before a shift takes place in the logic with regard to North-South relations, namely, a shift from a military to a political logic or the logic of peace. In other words, a means to back up a shift in the logic must precede the shift.

[Pak] It is quite natural that a shift should be made from a military to a political logic. I also agree with the opinion that the vicious cycle of military confrontation must be broken and that to this end, military talks should be actively promoted. However, military talks (disarmament talks) should proceed in the direction of maintaining the deterrent power. In the world history of disarmament negotiations, there has not been even a single instance of disarmament negotiation carried out in the direction of breaking existing deterrent powers. Yet, North Korea, while calling for military talks, demands the withdrawal of U.S. forces in an attempt to pull down one of the pillars in the joint ROK-U.S. defense structure, the backbone of our national defense.

[Yi] Probably, North Korea must have seen an imminent threat to its very survival in continuing ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and the growing of Japan as a military power.

[Pak] You just said North Korean's military may have stemmed from an imminent threat to its survival, but the by-law of the North Korean Workers Party and the

North Korean constitution clearly provide that the communization of the Korean Peninsula is an ultimate goal of the state. In addition, North Korean troops are deployed in the front line areas.

[Ha] It is depressing to see that North Korea's disarmament proposal seems to indicate that it is not sure of itself whether it recognizes the other party to the talks (the ROK). In other words, it is obscure whether North Korea recognizes the legitimacy of the other party to the talks. In addition, the disarmament proposal advanced by North Korea in 1987 called for a simultaneous reduction of the U.S. forces in Korea and for the North and South Korean forces. But the so-called "comprehensive disarmament proposal" made in 1988 gives priority to the question of the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons in South Korea, thus it is a step backward from the earlier proposal. If North Korea really wants disarmament negotiations, I think the order of priority should be reserved. Part of the blame falls on our side. Our side says it will actively deal with disarmament negotiations, but do you see any concrete plans?

Interest in Changing Military Structure

[Moderator] Let us now turn to the issue of withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea. The public seems to have the simple thought that inasmuch as there are great fears that withdrawing the U.S. forces from Korea will break the military balance between North and South, the withdrawal should be carried out only after a fool-proof device for security and peace has been contrived. In addition, fears are arising among some people that the discussion of the withdrawal issue currently underway among the dissident activist camp and on campuses may play into the strategic hands of North Korea.

[Yi] As in the 4 July joint statement issued in the early 1970's, North and South Korea has an experience in recognizing each other's systems on the basis of the principle of coexistence. Aside from the question of which side first broke this relationship of mutual recognition, it is true that this relationship was severed by the Yusin system. The very fact—the fact that there is a difference in character between North Korea's 1987 and 1988 military negotiation proposals in relation to the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea—conversely indicate the possibility that depending on the response of our side, North Korea will change its position. In the final analysis, depending on what kind of forward-leaning stance our side will take in military talks, the results will differ accordingly in dealing with the question of withdrawing U.S. troops and nuclear weapons. It is important to have an opportunity to confirm each other's true intention, and in this regard, our side should have self-reflection.

[Ha] In plain language, the difference in opinion between North and South Korea on the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea is the difference between "withdrawal first, peace afterward" and "peace first, withdrawal afterward." The position of North Korea is that

"when the troops are withdrawn, confidence building will be achieved." But there is no such historical precedent. North Korea should have the flexibility of reversing the proposal, and the trouble with our side is that it has yet to clearly express its stance toward military talks.

[Moderator] Withdrawing or reducing the U.S. forces in South Korea is not only a matter of great concern for the North and the South but also has a close bearing on the interests of the four neighboring powers, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China. Would you explain the opinion of each of these countries regarding the troop withdrawal issue and the question of achieving a stable peace on the Korean Peninsula?

[Pak] In my personal opinion, it seems that the four neighboring powers are concerned about the U.S. troop withdrawal issue because of the anticipated change in the structure of military forces in this region. I think that particularly China and the Soviet Union do not want a radical change in the configuration of the U.S. forces in Korea for fear that the withdrawal of the U.S. troops may lead to upgrading the military power of Japan, which now ranks third in terms of military expenditures, and to an enhancement of Japan's political and military role in this region. For us, the question will remain: if the U.S. troops are pulled out under the circumstance in which we lack our own defense capability, will we be able to maintain national independence unaffected by the military and political influence of Japan?

Independent Peace Efforts Urgently Needed

Recently I had an opportunity to talk with Soviet scholars during their stay in Korea. In the conversation, they pointed out that "before 1985, the Soviet Union might have fully supported the North Korean demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but since 1985, it has shifted to the stance that the interested countries should consult with one another to adjust their views on the timing and method of the withdrawal." Thus I could find in their stand something in common with our view.

I would say that the Soviet Union is in a dilemma because as far as its stand is concerned, it is interested in the question of whether withdrawing the U.S. forces from Korea will indeed increase Soviet influence, but the interests of the four powers cross one another over the question of reducing military forces in the Far East, including the withdrawing of the U.S. forces in Korea. At any rate, the Soviet Union, while tacitly supporting the principle of "peace first, withdrawal afterward," seems to take the flexible stand that North and South Korea should recognize each other. On the contrary, in the case of Japan, its stand seems to be somewhat delicate because when the U.S. forces are withdrawn from Korea, Japan expects to find itself in the dilemma of increasing its political and military influence and shouldering a greater burden.

[Pak] The U.S. Far Eastern defense strategy being a strategic concept centering around the navy and air

force, even if the U.S. ground force in Korea is withdrawn, it is not expected to result in a weakening of the U.S. naval and air power in the Far East. This is to say that under no circumstance will there be any change in the system of military cooperation between the United States and Japan.

[Yi] As far as the Soviet Union and Japan are concerned, it seems that because of the need for disarmament aimed at reducing its defense outlays, the Soviet Union would rather prefer a change in the form of stationing of U.S. forces in Korea than a boost in Japan's military power as a consequence of a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. On the contrary, Japan seems to have on the one hand the desire to have U.S. forces stationed continuously in South Korea and on the other hand the desire to maintain its status as a military power in the context of a "triangular defense structure" embracing the ROK, the U.S., and Japan.

In the final analysis, I would say it is urgently needed that the North and South Korean authorities exert independent efforts to achieve a stable peace if they are not to leave the issue of "war or peace" on the Korean Peninsula in the hands of others.

[Moderator] Experience shows that at one time the United States unilaterally reduced or withdrew its troops from Korea by a unilateral decision on the basis of its own interests. In view of the possibility of a recurrence of a similar state of affairs, would you discuss what the state of our preparedness for such a contingency is like and what the preconditions for troop withdrawal are?

[Yi] In my opinion, the U.S. stand with regard to the troop withdrawal issue is that it "wants to station its troops as long as possible at minimum expense." The U.S. demand that the ROK share a greater defense burden is based on expected force reductions. But the United States will interfere in ROK security in another way, for instance, through the sale of weapons. In the final analysis, the controversy recently spearheaded by the U.S. Congress over the issue of reducing or withdrawing U.S. forces in Korea should be viewed as a means of pressuring the ROK to increase its defense outlays and open its markets wider. On our part, we should be on guard against the unilateral U.S. argument about withdrawing or reducing its troops, an argument which is far detached from the issue of relaxation of tension on the Korean Peninsula.

[Ha] As a means of justifying itself and promoting its own interests at the same time while avoiding an economic burden and refraining from impeding the process of a "new detente" between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States will continue to station its forces in the ROK at an increasingly low stationing cost. This is to say that in proportion to the size of the defense burden borne by the ROK, the pace of troop reduction will slow down. However, even if the question of sharing of the defense cost is smoothly settled, it is expected that the so-called slab, such as noncombat

personnel, will be gradually cut out. Nevertheless, even when ground forces continue to be reduced, the air force is expected to stay for a long time because of the Far Eastern defense requirement.

[Pak] As of this moment, the United States seems to have no intention whatsoever to abandon its defense commitment to the ROK or abrogate the ROK-U.S. joint defense arrangement. However, it seems to be giving an active thought to a partial force reduction. It is clear that the ROK-U.S. joint defense arrangement will undergo a change in the direction of increasing the role and responsibility of the ROK. The United States will gradually recede from its leading role in the defense of South Korea to a supportive role.

[Moderator] I understand that the United States has a plan to reorganize the overall U.S. overseas forces in the mid-1990's. This is expected to bring about a change in the configuration and features of the U.S. forces in Korea in one form or another. Would you give your opinion as to when troop withdrawal will be possible and what preparatory posture we should take.

[Pak] Needless to say, as far as our stand is concerned, troop withdrawal should be carried out when we can cope with the military threat of North Korea on our own. Moreover, the U.S. commitment to intervene in the security of the ROK in case of war should be maintained as an institutional security device. As things stand now, we are expected to achieve a self-defense capability in the early 2000's. This presupposes an adequate economic growth and an adequate defense investment in the intervening period. However, it is an open question whether the situation in the areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula will remain "constant" until that time. True, the U.S. forces in Korea will have a low priority as a target of reduction in the reorganization of U.S. forces stationed overseas expected to be carried out in the mid-1990's. But I think a partial reduction will be carried out as a symbolic measure.

Shouldering of Adequate Defense Cost Necessary

[Ha] In my opinion, seen from the point of view of maintaining an overall balance of power in Northeast Asia, the U.S. forces should be withdrawn under the circumstances in which we can improve our self-defense capability rather than under the circumstances which may permit an increase in the political and military influence of Japan and the Soviet Union. Troop withdrawal should be carried out in accordance with the principle of "peace first, withdrawal afterward," and should come only after an institutional device for achieving a stable peace is in place.

[Pak] How to attain our own defense capability against North Korea while preventing excessive defense outlays is one of the problems confronting us. In the final analysis, as things stand now, the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Korea is inevitable in order to maintain a necessary deterrent power while avoiding domestic pressures for cuts in our military spending. Accordingly, we

need to bear an appropriate level of the defense burden in order to gain time necessary to attain our own self-defense capability and maintain a deterrent power against North Korea.

[Yi] In conclusion, what we like to ask of the United States in connection with the troop withdrawal issue is that the United States should not take advantage of the withdrawal issue to pressure us to shoulder a greater share of the defense burden and open our markets wider. The powers that are in our country for their part should not take advantage of the troop withdrawal issue to maintain their power as their predecessors did in the 1970's. North Korea for its part should take visible measures to achieve a stable peace by, for instance, transferring their troops to the rear from the front line area, from the point of view that either side should first break the chain of military confrontation. The public for its part should view the demand of students and dissidents as an expansion of mass peace movements for reunification instead of criticizing them from the standpoint of distorted anti-communism. I think dissidents and student activists should not resort to intermittent violence as in the past.

[Moderator] Thank you for the long time you have spent for this roundtable discussion.

Bush's State of Union Address Examined

Arms Reduction Proposal Viewed

SK0302121590 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean
3 Feb 90 p 6

[Editorial: "Bush's Proposal for Arms Reduction Is Seen To Be the Captive of Passivity"]

[Text] What drew our attention in U.S. President Bush's State of the Union address, made public on 31 January, is that he proposed a cut in U.S. and Soviet armed forces stationed in Central Europe to 195,000 on each side. At the moment, the United States has 305,000 troops in Europe, while 565,000 Soviet troops are stationed there. So, if Bush's proposal for a cut in the armed forces is realized, the United States and the Soviet Union will have 80,000 troops and 370,000 withdrawn respectively. This no doubt will reduce military tensions accordingly.

Is Bush's proposal for a cut in armed forces a "bold proposal," as described by high-ranking U.S. officials? Compared with Gorbachev's proposal for bringing down the U.S. and Soviet armed forces stationed in Europe to the level of 300,000 on each side in a speech delivered before the United Nations General Assembly session in December 1988 and Bush's proposal for cutting the two countries' armed forces in Europe by 275,000 respectively in a NATO summit meeting in May 1989, Bush's latest call for a cut in the armed forces stationed in Europe is unquestionably a "step forward."

However, given the rapid changes now taking place in East Europe and the warming trends between the East

and West, Bush's latest call cannot but be a deliberate, a very deliberate, act aimed at coping with the changing situation, rather than a "bold proposal."

An examination of the U.S. defense budget released shortly before Bush's State of the Union address shows that Bush is not coping with the new trends of history through his own initiative or productivity. In the defense budget, the United States has increased spending on strategic defense, including the Strategic Defense Initiative, and ended up integrating or closing some of the military bases at home and abroad.

What must not go unnoticed in Bush's State of the Union address are his ideas on U.S. domestic issues. Although such things as the drug problem, crime, and poverty in the United States have reached a serious stage, Bush's prescription for domestic issues was so pitifully meager. He said in his State of the Union address that he would increase the educational budget by 2 percent so that more effort can be concentrated on science and mathematics education for U.S. students. As much as 30 percent of U.S. high school students drop out before graduation and as many as 30 million U.S. citizens are illiterate. Can he address such a serious situation with only a 2 percent increase in the educational budget? Education is a social problem that is directly related to poverty. The poor in the United States, while constituting 20 percent of the U.S. population, account for only 4.6 percent of the total income of every American put together. So, without narrowing the serious gap of income, the United States will find it difficult to address such social problems as education, the drug problem, and crime at the grass-roots.

Finally, in the course of Bush's delivery of his State of the Union address before the joint session of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, we have once again confirmed the conservative and opportunist nature of U.S. politicians. When Bush said in his speech: "Just a year ago the Panamanian people lived amid terror under the thumb of a dictator. Today, however, Panama has recovered its democracy and is free," all the Republican and Democratic lawmakers gave him a standing ovation. Does U.S. imperialism have both ruling and opposition parties lined up behind itself?

Europe Troop Cut Proposal Viewed

SK0302030190 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
2 Feb 90 p 2

[Editorial: "Reduction of U.S.-Soviet Troops' in Revolutionized Europe"]

[Text] It seems that plans by the U.S. and the Soviet Union on how to break away from the cold war on the European continent is gradually taking shape. The foremost plan which is arousing interest the world over is arms reduction in Central Europe.

In his State of the Union Address on 31 January, U.S. President Bush proposed that the U.S. and the Soviet

Union each reduce their troop levels in Central Europe from 275,000 troops, which he proposed last May, to 195,000 troops—a drop of 80,000 troops.

This new proposal by the U.S. means that the U.S. side would reduce its troops by 110,000, while the Soviet Union side would reduce its troops by 405,000. [numbers as published]

Prior to this, the Soviet Union proposed that the Western side, NATO, and the Communist side, the Warsaw Pact, each reduce the level of their troops to 1,350,000. The Soviet Union also proposed that the U.S. and Soviet troops stationed in Europe be reduced to 350,000 troops at the same time.

Practical results could not be expected from the U.S. side on the troop cut proposal made by the Soviet Union because there are 305,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe. Therefore, it seems that the Bush administration presented a more positive troop cut proposal which can bring about a cut of 110,000 troops.

However, it also seems that the Soviet Union is also placing conditions on withdrawal of its troops from their Central European satellite countries which Stalin built up by using tanks and guns.

The Soviet Union already agreed with Hungary in January to withdraw its 65,000 troops from that country. Czechoslovakia is also openly demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Furthermore, since Poland is also demanding a stop to 'military intervention' by the Soviet Union toward its allies, the future of the Soviet military is not certain.

The Soviet Union is already insisting upon the disorganization of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and had revealed that it would give up intervention toward its allies at the Malta summit talks which were held last December.

It seems that ultimately this is an agreement by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to be free from the difficult military confrontation in Central Europe. At the Malta summit talks, both countries agreed to hold another summit meeting in June. They also agreed that before the summit talks, meetings between the foreign ministers of both countries would be carried out twice so that some kind of results on the issue of disarmament can be brought out.

There were reports that within the NATO allies, Belgium decided to withdraw its troops from West Germany, and Great Britain decided to reduce its overall number of military forces by one third. Great Britain also decided to examine the withdrawal of its troops from West Germany.

The issue of reducing troops in Central Europe will be carried out in conjunction with the issue of the reunification of Germany. East German Prime Minister Modrow's reluctant announcement that Gorbachev admitted the inevitability of the reunification of Germany under

the presupposition of "interests" among those countries concerned is viewed as a political strategy amid the trends of disarmament and moves to break from the cold war.

As the issue of disarmament becomes tangible on the European continent, we look at it from the viewpoint of how it will influence the Korean peninsula. Last November, the U.S. revealed practical polices to reduce the defense budget by 5 percent annually from 1992 to 1994. Considering all movements taking place, it is certain that there will also be changes in the scale of the U.S. troops stationed in Korea.

What is demanded is the wisdom of correctly perceiving the moves of the world, which strikingly change every day, without missing any of them.

Comments on 'Reality' of Pullout

SK0402033290 Seoul *THE KOREA TIMES* in English
4 Feb 90 p 2

[From the "News in Review" column by Political Editor Chong Un-pung: "U.S. Troop Pullout Looms as Reality"]

[Text] The withdrawal of U.S. troops has just got off the ground. Washington last week announced the closure of three air bases. It will result in a cut of around 2,000 non-combative troops in Korea.

It is only the beginning of the eventual pullout, an issue which has long been hanging over the head of the nation.

Besides the cut, officials at the Foreign Ministry admitted the likelihood of further cuts. According to them, negotiations between Seoul and Washington are going on the pullout separately from the just announced one.

Details of the negotiations may come to light during the annual defense talks between Dick Cheney, who announced the closure, and his counterpart Yi Sang-hun next week.

Timed with the planned cut, Secretary of State James Baker let on that the United States is seeking improvement in relations with North Korea.

At the Congressional hearing, Baker said the United States is looking forward to seeing a reciprocal amelioration between Seoul and Pyongyang and between Washington and Pyongyang.

It is an open secret that there have been seven rounds of talks between U.S. diplomats and North Korean diplomats in Beijing. The last two took place this year.

It is still unknown whether the results of the string of the contacts may have any connection with the U.S. decision on the closure of the air bases and the pullout of the troops.

When President Bush made a quick stopover in February last year, he said in a House session that "U.S. troops will remain in the Republic of Korea as long as they are needed and as long as we believe it is in the interest of peace to keep them there."

Given the assurance, one could assume that the United States concluded that there is some change in favor of cuts in the situational developments surrounding the Korean peninsula.

Aside from the frequent contacts with North Korean diplomats in Beijing, the United States and the Soviet Union are getting closer than at any other time in the past.

Bush and Gorbachev agreed to put an end mark to the era of Cold War on Malta in December last year. And the disintegration of the Communist regimes in Europe is rushing along like an avalanche.

All that this adds up to is that the United States may feel the need for cuts in U.S. troops overseas, action which is sure to be reciprocated by the Soviet Union, in order to reduce budget deficits.

But, there is something more to the affair than this. In the upcoming Yi-Cheney meeting, the United States will press hard for raising Korea's cost-sharing for keeping U.S. troops here.

The aforementioned further cuts may be contingent upon the outcome of the meeting of the two defense leaders. And indications are that the Seoul will not cling on to the coattails of the United States as it did in the past.

Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun instructed Defense Minister Yi to be fully prepared for the cuts so that no slips occur in the nation's defense.

However, Kang voiced concern about the effect the pullout may have on the psychology of the general public because they have long been used to the benefits of the presence of U.S. troops here.

No doubt, Korea has got fat under the U.S. defense protection. Now, it has grown to be one of the 10 leading trading nations.

If there is no improvement in relations between South and North Korea, South Korea will face enormous difficulties going it alone. Even Japan, which has no immediate hostile force confronting it, has about 50,000 U.S. troops on its soil.

Whatever the rhetoric, the withdrawal of U.S. troops has become a kind of unavoidable eventuality with only the date when it will be completed remaining unsettled.

A citizen in Seoul, who experienced the tragic intercine Korean War said, "We have to meet the new reality. And, it should be business as usual for all of us."

Cheney Visit, Cuts Draw 'Concern'

SK0402033690 Seoul *THE KOREA TIMES*
in English 4 Feb 90 p 2

[From the "News Analysis" column by staff reporter Pak In-chol: "Cheney's Visit Draws Concern Amid Reports of More" Troop Cuts"]

[Text] Keen attention is being drawn to U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's visit to Korea next week. Will he ask for more cuts in the U.S. troop level here? Then how deep?

There have been confused reports on the level of reduction of U.S. forces stationed in Korea the governments of Korea and the United States will take up during Cheney's trip here Feb. 14-17.

Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun told reporters last Tuesday that Seoul and Washington have not reached agreement on further troop reductions, except the pullout of slightly more than 2,000 airmen.

Nevertheless, he indicated that a limited number of administrative and other support personnel could be pulled out of Korea even if the U.S. ground forces are reduced.

In an interview with a vernacular paper last Thursday, President No Tae-u also said it is "inevitable," given the U.S. situation, that the United States should trim its military personnel in Korea to a level that it will not undermine the combat capability in Korea.

There have been close consultations between the two countries, about U.S. troop reductions, the President added.

The remarks by No and Yi are seen as a signal that American ground forces stationed in Korea will be reduced.

In a Seoul-dated story, *THE NEW YORK TIMES* reported Thursday that the reductions would involve roughly 4,000 to 5,000 of the 43,000-strong American forces, mostly support personnel.

The rollback should bring U.S. forces to the levels of the early 1980s, before the Reagan administration began a broad military buildup.

On the same day, *THE WASHINGTON POST*, quoting analysts, reported from Seoul that there would be sharper reductions of American forces in Korea in addition to the pullout of 5,000 noncombat personnel. The paper said the 5,000 men would come from the 2nd Infantry Division, and there will be a realignment of the combined Korea-U.S. defense posture.

Officials at the Defense Ministry denied the *POST* report yesterday, saying that there has been no agreement on further troop cuts thus far.

Analysts said there is a great possibility that the Korean government will promise to increase substantially its burden-sharing to stave off sharper reductions of the U.S. troops here when Cheney visits Korea.

Defense Minister Yi already indicated that. He has told reporters that Seoul is willing to increase its share of the upkeep of American troops, in return for maintaining the U.S. ground forces in Korea at the current level.

The Korean government has paid about \$300 million a year in direct costs for the U.S. forces and \$1.9 billion in land leases, officials have said.

It is yet to be seen, however, whether the U.S. side would be satisfied with Korean proposals for increasing the burdensharing. Seoul apparently will not comply with "excessive" U.S. demands.

A high-ranking Foreign Ministry official last week bluntly said Seoul would let the United States reduce its ground troops rather than yield to an "unreasonable" American demand.

Defense Ministry officials have said that the U.S. side is asking Seoul to pay the salaries of Korean workers hired by U.S. military installations in Korea.

As for the planned closing of three U.S. air bases in Korea, Defense Minister Yi has said the government was informed of the decision back in October 1988. Gen. Louis C. Menetrey, commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, told the then Defense Minister O Cha-pok about the plan, according to Yi.

The announcement of the base closings touched a raw nerve in Korea, where security is given top priority but public opinion has recently been split over the presence of 43,000 U.S. troops under the 1954 Mutual Defense Pact.

Radical students, dissidents and liberal groups demand a total withdrawal of the U.S. forces on the grounds that they hamper reunification of the Korean Peninsula, divided into two since the end of World War II in 1945.

Opinion polls show that most Koreans want U.S. forces to remain here.

But most Koreans seem to take the troop reduction in stride. Surprisingly, few conservative groups have issued statements opposing the troop cut.

As a matter of fact, the reduction announcement did not come as a total surprise to Koreans.

Few people took U.S. President George Bush at his word when he reaffirmed during a visit to Seoul last year U.S. troops "will remain in the Republic of Korea as long as they are needed, and as long as we believe it is in the interest of peace to keep them here."

It thus was little cause for wonder when Washington included Korea on the list of countries where its military presence will be reduced, although it had been predicted

that a withdrawal of ground forces would precede a reduction of the U.S. Air Force, which is a strong deterrent against North Korean attack.

Minister on Control of U.S. Military in Korea

SK0802030490 Seoul *THE KOREA HERALD*
in English 8 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Korea is seeking to produce submarines, fighters and missiles in the next 10 years to strengthen its security readiness, the Defense Ministry announced yesterday.

The government will "gradually" increase its share of the upkeep of U.S. forces posted in Korea, the announcement said.

Briefing President No Tae-u on the ministry's new year business, Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun said investment in military research and development of weapons will be increased sharply.

Such investment, currently at 1.5 percent of defense spending, will be raised to more than three percent in 1996 and seven percent in the early 2000s, Yi said.

By the early 2000s, he said, Korea will seek to produce all military aircraft, including fighters, and guided missiles, particularly those suitable for Korean terrain.

He expected the country will also be able to produce submarines and other battleships and all basic weapons in the next decade.

"We will try to secure high technologies in electronics and communication fields such as the C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Information) by the early 2000s," he said.

As for the much-talked-about burdensharing for maintaining U.S. forces in Korea, the minister said, "It is necessary to gradually increase the share as long as we can afford it."

He said the ministry will draft a bill which would make it easier for the government to increase the burdensharing.

U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney will be here Feb 14-17 to discuss more U.S. troop cuts and Korea's increased share of the upkeep of U.S. forces.

Some 5,000 noncombat U.S. military personnel are expected to be pulled out of Korea this year, according to authorities.

On other subjects, Yi said the ministry will be able to inaugurate the "Defense Force," a unified command of the Army, Air Force and Navy, by July this year.

He repeated that the planned military command is vital for modern warfare. A bill calling for setting up the combined command now awaits parliamentary action.

Analysts predicted that the bill will clear the National Assembly this month as a result of the merger of three political parties.

In an effort to cut defense expenditures, Yi said, the ministry will expand competitive bidding when it purchases defense industrial goods.

He said he will do his best to eliminate the "negative" image the public has of the military, which is caused by the military's political intervention.

To do so, Yi said he will stage a spiritual renewal campaign for the military.

On the matter of youths called up for nonmilitary duties, Yi said the ministry will have them serve in military camps along with regular soldiers, adding that such soldiers at police boxes and the headquarters of the Homeland Reserve Forces will be replaced by riot police and government officials.

Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun indicated that Korea could take over operational command the U.S. military now exercises over the Korean Armed Forces in peace time.

He told a news conference yesterday that Korea and the United States could "study ways of transferring operational authority to our side from the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) if the unified command of the Korean military is in operation by July."

The press conference came shortly after the minister gave a policy briefing to President No Tae-u.

Minister Yi said the U.S. side is asking Korea to represent it at the Military Armistice Meeting at Panmunjom, but "we have shelved our decision because doing so would entail demerits."

He said the Korea-U.S. military exercise, "Team Spirit," could be held every other year instead of every year and its scale could be reduced.

The decision depends on how North Korea acts, he said.

Further Reportage on North Nuclear Plant

Official Warns North About Plant

SK0902103690 Seoul YONHAP in English 1024 GMT
9 Feb 90

[Text] Seoul, February 9 (YONHAP)—A South Korean Government official warned North Korea that it will become an "international pariah" if it constructs a nuclear reprocessing plant in defiance of world opinion.

Chon Pung-il, a director with the Science and Technology Ministry and an expert on atomic engineering, was commenting on a Tokyo-based report that North Korea may have a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant near Yongbyon, some 80 km north of Pyongyang.

The information-technology center at Tokai University in Japan Thursday reportedly said it had observed the nuclear facilities, which appear to be a power station and a reprocessing plant, by computer analysis of infrared photographs taken by the French observation satellite spot last September.

Noting that North Korea has refused to sign the nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Chon said an IAEA meeting this month in Vienna would urge North Korea again to join the agreement.

North Korea joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 but delayed signing the fullscope safeguards agreement, arguing that it could not abide by the agreement because there is a nuclear threat against it. Under IAEA regulations, a treaty member should begin negotiations to sign the fullscope safeguard within six months and conclude the negotiations in 18 months. The IAEA cannot investigate North Korea's nuclear facilities to determine whether they are reprocessing plants for military purposes without its consent unless North Korea joins the agreement.

North Korea established an Atomic Energy Institute in Yongbyon in 1962 and imported a research reactor of two-megawatt class from the Soviet Union in 1965, on condition that it would return the radioactive waste. But North Korea constructed for itself in 1987 another reactor of 30-megawatt class that runs on natural uranium. Experts here said North Korea has 200-500 tons of radioactive waste, which is enough to reprocess into sufficient plutonium to make nuclear weapons.

Pictures of Plant Released

SK0902070090 Seoul YONHAP in English 0538 GMT
9 Feb 90

[Text] Tokyo, February 9 (YONHAP)—North Korea is constructing what appears to be an atomic power plant at Yongbyon near Pyongyang, Toshibumi Sakada, director of the information-technology center of Tokai University, said Thursday.

Sakada said his center had confirmed the construction by computer analysis of infrared photographs taken by the French observation satellite spot at an altitude of 832 kilometers last September.

The photographs clearly show concrete structures that seem to be facilities for nuclear fuel, piles and housing for workers scattered along a big curve of the Kuryong River, which flows through Yongbyon, he said.

Professor Sakada said the structures are apparently facilities for an atomic power station and noted that there were rumors that North Korea had succeeded in building a test pile in the 1970s and a full-scale power plant in the 1980s.

He said that his center decided to release the photographs in order to attract international attention and

persuade North Korea to allow an investigation because analysis shows the facilities could be used for military purposes.

It is the first time a private institution has confirmed that North Korea is constructing a nuclear power station.

Radio Moscow recently reported that North Korea was building four nuclear power plants with a generating capacity of 440,000 kilowatts, and a Japanese Foreign Ministry official in November revealed that a atomic fuel treatment plant was being constructed at a site North of Pyongyang.

JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, an authoritative british publication, reported last September that a U.S. reconnaissance satellite had spotted construction at Yongbyun of nuclear test facilities and a high power pile of 50-200 megawatts.

Officials, Experts Compose Arms Task Force

SK0902000190 Seoul *THE KOREA TIMES* in English
9 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] The government has organized a working-level task force to draft an official position for inter-Korean arms control including a change of U.S. military presence in the South, the Foreign Ministry said yesterday.

The task force, which is to be directly controlled by the Prime Minister's Office, will be headed by Yim Tong-won, dean of the state-run Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, and will be composed of eight officials from relevant ministries, spokesman Chong Ui-yong said.

The members will include Choe Mun-hyun, assistant national unification minister, Kim Sam-hun, director general for American affairs at the Foreign Ministry, and Pak Yong-ok, director general for external policy at the Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry sources said.

Staff of the task force will be beefed up with experts from within and outside the government, if necessary.

A senior official said, "Arms control by the South and North seems inevitable in this decade marked by U.S. moves to reduce its troops in the South and by the thawing of the East-West relations. We have to chart out our own schemes for the inter-Korean arms cut."

Pyongyang has repeatedly requested a complete pullout of U.S. troops from South Korea and for the curtailment of armed forces in the South and the North. Seoul has so far overlooked these calls as "peace offensive propaganda."

The official described Seoul's basic policy: arms control should be pushed ahead with in multi-phased steps—recognition of both governments and peaceful co-existence, followed by confidence building, arms control negotiation and finally the implementation of mutual accords on military cuts.

Cheney To Visit Seoul To Discuss U.S. Troops

SK1002060090 Seoul *YONHAP* in English
0509 GMT 10 Feb 90

[Text] Washington D.C., February 9 (YONHAP)—A high ranking U.S. Defense Department official said Friday that nothing has been decided concerning the reduction of the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. The official said a reduction will not be announced while Defense Secretary Richard Cheney is in Seoul next week.

In a background briefing on Cheney's two-week tour of Asia, he said the purpose is to hold final discussions with America's allies before Cheney submits a report to Congress on security in Asia. The defense secretary's visit is not intended to suggest any course of action to the countries, the official said.

Cheney leaves Washington on Saturday and arrives in Seoul on Tuesday after a stopover in Hawaii. During his stay in Korea, until Feb. 17, Cheney will discuss the possibility of a reduction in U.S. troop strength in Korea with Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun and visit U.S. military units. He is scheduled to visit the Philippines Feb. 17-18, Hong Kong Feb. 19 and Japan Feb. 20-23.

The Defense Department official said the administration's judgement is that North Korea is a constant threat in Northeast Asia. He said South Korea and Japan should take responsibility for regional security commensurate with their economic strength. Asked about the possibility that Cheney will encourage arms reduction talks between South and North Korea when he visits Seoul, the official said it is not a matter for the United States to encourage or not.

YONHAP Cites U.S. on Korea, Shevardnadze

SK1302025890 Seoul *YONHAP* in English
0202 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] Washington, February 12 (YONHAP)—The U.S. State Department, denying that there is a concrete wall on the Southern side of the truce line dividing the Korean peninsula, said Monday it welcomed Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's call for international efforts to dismantle the "Korean wall" if he meant a wall of distrust between South and North Korea.

Asked to comment on Shevardnadze's remarks, an official in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs said South Korean President No Tae-u has repeatedly proposed discussions with North Korea on free inter-Korean travel but that the North has suspended all dialogue with the South. The official, who wanted to remain anonymous, noted that North Korea has rejected any kind of regular exchange of personnel for the past 40 years and that a reunion of divided families, telephone calls and even correspondence have been blocked not by a physical obstacle but by North Korea's uncompromising stand. He said anyone who has traveled from Seoul to the truce village of Panmunjom knows there is no concrete wall on the Southern side of the military

demarcation line. The official noted that there are anti-tank barriers beside the roads along which the North invaded the South in 1950, and said dismantling them may result in weakened deterrence against North Korean attack.

REUTER and other Western wire services quoted the Soviet foreign minister, speaking in a news conference at the end of a visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on Saturday, as calling for international efforts to break down the "Korean wall" now that the Berlin Wall is being dismantled. But he was quoted by the Soviet News Agency TASS as using the words "concrete wall," causing some confusion among South Koreans.

Firms To Help USSR Convert Arms Factories

SK1302073890 Seoul YONHAP in English
0716 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] Seoul, February 13 (YONHAP)—The Soviet Union has invited South Korean firms to help it beat swords into ploughshares by converting arms factories to produce consumer goods, a source at the Korea Trade Promotion Corp. (KOTRA) said Tuesday [13 February].

The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Kazakhstan proposed to officials from KOTRA's office in Moscow during a visit to the republic that Korean businesses take part in a project to turn a factory making SS-20 missiles into a plant manufacturing daily necessities, the source said.

Daewoo Group, one of Korea's largest conglomerates, was asked to help remodel a munitions plant so it could produce electronic items and personal computers while Sunkyong was requested to join a project to transform an aerospace plant into a factory to make consumer goods, according to the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity. The source said the Korean firms are now reviewing the feasibility of the projects, but declined to elaborate.

PHILIPPINES

Editorial on Mission of U.S. Military Bases
HK0102052190 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE
in English 1 Feb 90 p 4

[Editorial: "Bases Must Serve Our Interests"]

[Text] Last Monday, U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney recommended the dismantling of some U.S. military installations worldwide, including the naval communications station in San Miguel, Zambales, as part of the effort to cut back on defense spending.

San Miguel is the communications center for the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific and a vital link for naval

communications between its forces in Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It played a vital role during the Vietnam War.

Yesterday, U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Platt said he had informed the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) about his Government's plans to close the San Miguel station, and reduce its staff in Clark Air Base "sometime in the near future."

Should anti-bases groups rejoice over this announcement? Is the closure of San Miguel a signal for the eventual removal of other bigger U.S. installations in the country?

The accompanying rhetoric hardly indicates a plan for a massive pullout now or in the near future.

Cheney's proposal was made ostensibly to reduce the Pentagon's budgetary deficit, and as a proper response to changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which have significantly scaled down the possibility of superpower conflicts. Yet, as Sen. Neptali Gonzales has pointed out, this does not tally with another Cheney statement that the U.S. intends to strengthen its ties with the Philippines "under the mutual defense treaty." Platt himself continues to assert that the U.S. will maintain a "strategic role" in this part of the world, no doubt through its bases in the Philippines. And former U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth says that the U.S. would leave a "vacuum" in the Pacific if it pulls out its major bases here.

The closure of the San Miguel facility is really insignificant. According to Philippine defense officials, it can hardly affect U.S. operations in the region. It will not even have an impact on the renegotiation of the bases treaty. As Bosworth has said, it need not be read as a signal about the U.S. entire plan for the rest of the bases in the Philippines.

What we should read into the Cheney announcement is in its timing. The proposal to close San Miguel came along with noises from Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Manila that the U.S. may not be able to meet its commitments under the Schultz-Manglapus accord. It therefore looks like part of a script to convince the Philippines not to press for the fulfillment of the U.S. commitments, and not to ask for more in the event of a renegotiation on the bases treaty.

The ploy, of course, is too obvious for a serious government negotiator to fall for. Government cannot allow Washington to get away with not honoring its commitments.

What Government must be doing right now is hasten the completion of its plans for the conversion of the bases in the event of a phaseout or withdrawal of the U.S. from here. The closure of the San Miguel station, insignificant as it is, is a good opportunity to test the workability of the plans that have been drawn for the area, and the use of the facilities that U.S. will leave behind.

The bottom line is it is the Philippine Government who must determine whether or not the U.S. bases will remain on Philippine soil. And this decision must be made in accordance, not with U.S. military interests, but the Philippines' national interests and geopolitical realities, as we read them.

U.S. Naval Cutbacks Urged

HK0102105690 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 1000 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] The Soviet Union has called for talks to reduce naval forces, particularly those in the Asian-Pacific region. The call was made by Oleg Sokolov, USSR ambassador to the Philippines, in a speech in Manila.

Sokolov warned that the growth of naval forces would lead to instability in the region.

Aquino Comments on U.S. Bases

HK0802095790 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog 0900 GMT 8 Feb 90

[“Press Statement” by President Corazon C. Aquino, read by Press Secretary Tomas Gomez III, at Malacanang Palace; recorded, in English]

[Text] I am still verifying what Secretary Ramos said on this subject. Meanwhile, I have asked for an updated study and report of the status of the free amnesty program for rebel returnees. There can be no amnesty, however, without the concurrence of Congress. For this reason, I have instructed the secretary of Justice, Franklin Drilon, to consult with leaders of Congress regarding this matter.

The present bases agreement expires by its terms on September 16, 1991. This is the end of its 25-year period. By its terms, apart from the Constitution, the executive agreement on the bases could be extended expressly or impliedly: expressly, by another express agreement, impliedly by silence. In which case, after September 16, 1991, the period will be indefinite, but it can be terminated by a one-year notice. If, therefore, we advise the United States that we do not want the agreement extended beyond September 16, 1991, then it will have to end on September 16, 1991.

The Constitution, on the other hand, said that after the expiration of the agreement in 1991, the U.S. facilities cannot stay in our territory except under a treaty duly ratified by our Senate. It is clear, therefore, that the present agreement cannot be extended beyond its expiry date of September 16, 1991. If we agree to allow the U.S. facilities to remain here beyond that date, there will have to be a treaty to that effect in place by that time. Hence, exploratory talks are expected next month about the prospects of negotiating such a treaty. During these talks, the shortfalls and certain arrangements can be taken up.

Another item: Senator Enrile's defense and evidence is a matter for the investigating fiscal [prosecutor] to take into account. As I said, due process is being followed and accorded.

Aquino Warns U.S. of Possible Bases Departure

HK1302020390 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 12 Feb 90

[Text] President Aquino warned that the Philippines might not renew its Military Bases Agreement with the United States if exploratory talks in March towards keeping the facilities will not be in Manila's interest. President Aquino did not say under what conditions her government would agree to keep the bases, but Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus said financial compensation would be a big factor.

U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney who will be visiting Manila on February 19 to 20 said in Hawaii last Sunday the United States wanted to retain its military bases in the Philippines, but only under terms acceptable to Washington.

Mrs Aquino said Manila had the option of negotiating a new agreement or talking about how the U.S. facilities will be moved out of the country.

TAIWAN

Commentary Discusses U.S. Military Cuts

OW1102061490 Taipei International Service in English 0200 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Station commentary: “U.S. Military Cuts: Prospects and Worries”]

[Text] Planned U.S. military cutbacks around the globe have won the support of most people, given that it appears that the Soviet Union is also reducing its military forces. As the two superpowers unwind from their previous high tension cold war days, the world may be on the threshold of a historical demilitarization. Hopes are high that that is the case.

The Soviet Union began its military scale-back after Mikhail Gorbachev wisely determined that the Soviet economy could no longer bear the burden of massive military spending. Near collapse, the Soviet economy has always been military oriented; now, Gorbachev wants to make it consumer based.

In the United States, a similar scenario is unfolding. Military cutbacks, and defense budget reductions, mean that even the greatest economy on earth cannot stand an arms race for long. During the Reagan years, the United States sacrificed its economic superiority by forcing the hand of the Soviet Union in the arms race. That gimmick was paid off well. Gorbachev has realized he cannot win the race and has instead focused his efforts on reforms at home.

That kind of hardball made possible the era of arms reductions and peace that is now upon us. But U.S. defense cutbacks also may spell trouble. For starters, many critics argue that it is too early for the United States to consider the cold war over and done with. Part of this argument has to do with the stability of Gorbachev's leadership position in the Kremlin. U.S. and Western military strategists must consider the worrisome specter that Gorbachev can be replaced any time by hardliners in the Kremlin who are opposed to both his economic reform at home and his military withdrawal abroad. If the hardliners seize power, the United States could be caught in a dangerous state of naivete and military unpreparedness.

In Asia, the specter of U.S. military cuts raises different, but no less serious questions. Asians worry that a U.S. drawback will cause Japan to fill the gap on Asian defense. Certainly Japan would feel compelled to step up its own defense responsibilities. That worries Asians because memories of the last world war are still very vivid. The Japanese militarists overran much of Asia,

leaving a scar that is still very much evident today. A U.S. pull-back of the Asian defenses may rekindle militarization in Japan, something the Asians simply cannot accept.

Naturally, everyone hopes that the easing of East-West tensions will lead to drastic reductions in arms spending and an era of genuine peace and friendship between the superpowers. While efforts should continue in that direction, the free world must not lower its vigilance of the consequences of sudden change in Soviet leadership and policy.

Indeed, no one knows more about the price of such vigilance than Chinese here in the Republic of China [ROC] on Taiwan. Faced with a massive threat from communist China a mere 100 miles away, Taiwan has had to spend some 30 percent of its GNP on defense over the years. Now the world's 20th richest nation, imagine how much better off the Republic of China on Taiwan would be, would it not for that defense burden. [sentence as received] The United States and the Soviet Union are obviously beginning to think the same thing about their futures.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

CSSR Representative on Arms Talks Results

AU2912094889 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Dec 89 p 6

[Report by Jozef Janta, Bratislava PRAVDA correspondent in Vienna: "The Fourth Round of Talks on Conventional Disarmament Has Ended; Important Start Into the Coming Year"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] We have asked Ambassador Ladislav Balcar, head of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Vienna talks, whether the comming year might be the year of a radical beginning of conventional disarmament on our continent.

—We are not satisfied with labor productivity. To date, the expended effort has not yielded such results—in the form of the amount of agreed upon texts for the future agreement; we must have a guarantee that, while maintaining this pace, we will conclude the agreement during the next year. Until now only a few texts concerning the exchange of information have been adopted. We are not overestimating this fact, because what is involved are not very controversial issues. L. Balcar thus answered my question about whether there has been success in working out the definition of some types of weapons.

—Not even in the course of the fourth round have we succeeded in finalizing definitions of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and combat helicopters, although when the round began even pessimists believed that at least one definition would be worked out. And I am not even talking about air forces, where standpoints are at variance all the time concerning the issue of defensive air forces. Also the issue of determining the levels of ground troops and air forces remains open. Opinions also differ with regard to the troops stationed abroad. However, we hope that the New Year recess will make it possible for all partners to assess the situation and draw from it conclusions that will help to attain the set objective on time. [passage omitted]

News Conference Held on 'Open Skies' Talks

LD010222290 Budapest MTI in English
2110 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Budapest, February 1 (MTI)—An agreement between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO on the freedom of control flights will hopefully be reached in 1990, it was announced at the press conference held at the end of the three-day preparatory meeting of the "Open Skies" series of talks.

At the conference, held in Budapest from January 30 to February 1, the expert delegations of the participating countries evaluated the technical and other experiences of the control flight made over Hungary by the Hercules transport plane of the Canadian Air Force on January 6. Participants also reviewed the themes of the negotiation

series to be held first in Ottawa from February 12 to 28, and then in Budapest at the end of April.

Tibor Toth, leader of the Hungarian expert delegation, reported that preparations for the Ottawa conference were mainly made in organizational and procedural issues. Foreign ministers of the participating countries are to make opening statements during the first three days of the Ottawa conference. Fred Bild, general secretary of the Ottawa conference, added that the foreign ministers are to appreciate the initiative, which is unique in the history of arms reduction and arms control talks, the fact that East European, West European and North American countries open their air space to each other, for control aims. Participants will also discuss the East European political situation, which has undergone rapid changes in the past months, in the course of bi- and multilateral discussions. The delegations are to coordinate, on an expert level, the views of the individual nations and the two alliance systems.

The 23 countries attending the talks profess differing views in many issues. The aim is for all states to have a realistic negotiation platform that takes the national security aims into consideration for the Ottawa conference, leaders of the delegations to the preparatory conference said. Toth said that the NATO members have already created their negotiation position, the Warsaw Treaty members have not as yet finalized the position they shall jointly represent.

Participants noted that arms reduction and arms control talks are usually protracted for several years. The "Open Skies" conference is particularly important as the participants intend to reach results within a very short time.

"Open Skies" is the initiative of U.S. President George Bush, and Hungarian foreign policy the first of the Warsaw Treaty states to lend it support. Foreign Minister Gyula Horn proposed that the series of negotiations be held in part on the area of a NATO country, and in part in a Warsaw Treaty member state. Hungary was the first to allow an aircraft of the NATO air fleet over its air-space, for control aims. But, as was noted by the expert delegation of the United States, the Canadian Hercules craft flew into Hungary from the direction of Czechoslovakia.

CSCE Delegate on Military Doctrines Seminar

LD0202230290 Prague CTK in English 2127 GMT
2 Feb 90

[Text] Vienna, February 2 (CTK)—The current seminar on military doctrines has confirmed the irreplaceability of the exchange of views which has acquired a qualitatively new dimension by the presence of high-ranking military representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) signatories, head of a Czechoslovak delegation Ladislav Balcar told CTK here today.

He referred to the seminar taking place here since January 16 within the framework of talks of the 35 CSCE participants on Confidence-and Security-Building measures in Europe with the aim to present and compare military doctrines of the Helsinki Final Act signatories. The Czechoslovak official said that all the participants evaluated the seminar positively. Discussions had a business-like, non-confrontation and open character, he stated and concluded that although assessment of the outcome of the talks will require some time, it is clear already now before the end of the seminar that it will be useful to continue this political forum also in the future.

Soviet Western Group Military Exercises Begin

LD0502091290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0850 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The troop exercise by the Western Group of the USSR Armed Forces announced for the Haldensleben, Lindau, Dobritz, Brandenburg, Wessenberg, Sewekow and Jeaenitz regions (GDR Areas Magdeburg, Potsdam and Neubrandenburg) began today with the troops being relocated to the exercise region. It is being headed by a deputy army commander of the Western Group.

The actions, which continue until 11 February, are attended by up to 15,900 Army members. The National People's Army of the GDR is represented with 400 participants.

CSSR Delegate on European Conventional Forces

LD0602201590 Prague CTK in English 1837 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Vienna, February 6 (CTK)—Czechoslovakia's delegate to the Vienna talks on conventional forces in Europe Ladislav Balcar told CTK it can be only hoped that the forthcoming talks between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze will help find solutions which could be confirmed at a meeting of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO foreign ministers in Ottawa, Canada, this month.

Settlement of the issue of troops is one of the topical political items on the agenda of the Vienna forum, the Czechoslovak ambassador said. First of all, it is necessary to determine the maximum level to which the numbers of troops of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO in a zone stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals should be reduced. The Warsaw Treaty members will have to consider most probably whether it is useful to insist on the level of 1,350,000 million [figure as received] men under the present conditions. Secondly, the number of troops deployed outside a country's own territory must be determined, Balcar stressed, adding that U.S. President George Bush's initiative to set the level at 195,000 men on each side can make the solution to this sensitive issue much more easier.

In its work concerning e.g. elaborating definitions of individual categories of weaponry, creation of prerequisites for exchanges of information, verification and stabilizing and limiting measures, the Czechoslovak delegation consistently asserts its own national, political, military and security interests.

Papers Comment on Bush Troop Cut Proposal

MLADA FRONTA: 'Right Step'

AU0602185590 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech
2 Feb 90 p 5

[Ivana Stepankova commentary: "A Well-Timed Proposal"]

[Text] American congressmen applauded President Bush five times as he read his Message on the State of the Union. As the REUTER agency stated, among the last to join the applause when President Bush announced his proposal for troop cuts in Europe were the joint chiefs of staff. For the first time since his inauguration last year, George Bush evidently took over the initiative in the sphere of the all-European process. It would be inappropriate to lend support to the reasoning of some agencies that Bush took advantage of M. Gorbachev's momentary difficulties while the USSR is paralyzed by interethnic strife, while there is tension in the ruling Communist Party, and while M. Gorbachev is forced to deny reports that he intends to resign from the post of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. As a matter of fact, immediately before his speech in Congress the American President telephoned M. Gorbachev. The two men spoke primarily about developments in Europe and about disarmament talks—in other words, just as the United States' NATO allies did, Moscow knew beforehand that G. Bush would propose a cut in the number of American and Soviet troops in Central and East Europe to 195,000 men.

In the wake of the first wave of enthusiasm over the American proposal, it is necessary to call attention to the fact that while the United States has 305,000 men in this area, according to some sources, the USSR has 570,000 soldiers stationed here. The data differs according to whether only the center of Europe or Europe as a whole are taken into consideration. In the case of an agreement being concluded, the USSR would definitely have to withdraw several times the number of troops which the United States would have to withdraw, a fact to which Soviet spokesman Gerasimov also referred to in his initial reaction. The issue of the timetable of the withdrawal also remains open.

What is positive is the approving, though cautious, response of Moscow to Bush's proposal. Nonetheless, Moscow still wants to discuss it within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Approving reactions have come also from NATO Secretary General Woerner, FRG Chancellor Kohl, and the British Government. In our region, too, the American standpoint needs to be welcomed

because its realization would make it possible to place the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central Europe into a broader European context involving both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It is possible that Moscow, whom the governments of Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already requested to withdraw its troops from their territories, would find such a collective solution more congenial. It is also interesting, however, that the proposals submitted thus far, and the reactions to them, do not indicate an answer to the question of the role of the German states in the radical reduction of armed forces. The fact that, in addition to 246,000 U.S. soldiers, there are also 120,000 British and French soldiers in the FRG (compared with 380,000 Soviet troops in the GDR) is not accounted for either.

The great significance of Bush's disarmament proposal should not make one forget the other points of the State of the Union Message that have drawn applause from congressmen (though sometimes only from the Republican side). The President said that U.S. troops would return from Panama by the end of February. In spite of changes in the Communist countries, he once again pressed ahead with the SDI program. He also announced a plan under which all American children should have a secondary school diploma by the year 2000, and he announced the start of the "Beautiful America" project involving the expansion of national parks.

With his State of the Union Message, G. Bush surely won more supporters for his inconspicuous presidency. The proposal for troop cuts by the two big powers in Europe will certainly figure on the agenda of J. Baker's visit to Moscow next week, as well as the agenda of the Vienna talks. It was the right step at the right moment.

Bratislava PRAVDA: 'Complicated' Problem

AU0602190390 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
3 Feb 90 p 5

[Bedrich Zagar commentary: "In Coordination and in Parallel"]

[Text] In his State of the Union address President George Bush did not lay the main emphasis on domestic political issues, as American presidents have always done until now, but he gave priority to foreign policy issues. Obviously, he had nothing specific to say about domestic problems, so he opportunistically used the process of change under way in Central Europe to make generally popular proposals to reduce the number of armed forces in Central Europe. He had expected to receive help from the mood and political processes in East European countries, countries which are pressing for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. In conceiving his proposal, Bush certainly had in mind the political and military advantages of such a step.

In a nutshell, Bush's proposal is that the United States and the Soviet Union should reduce the number of their forces in Central and East Europe to 195,000 men. According to Western figures, the United States has

305,000 troops in Europe. Contained in Bush's proposal are only the 270,000 troops in Central Europe—to be more precise in the FRG—while an additional 35,000 troops are stationed in the "external" European zone in Britain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. This contingent would not be affected by the proposal. The Soviet Union has its military units stationed only in the suggested reduction zone—that is, in Central and East Europe, and would have to reduce several times as many troops from its total of 570,000 (American figures). However, in the case of an agreement being reached, the important point is that the USSR would be left with 195,000 troops outside its own territory in Europe while the United States would have 230,000 troops.

Despite this, the Soviet Union has welcomed President Bush's proposals, but so far has not responded. It will probably receive them officially on paper at the Vienna negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe. The Soviet Union is willing to consider the American proposal, but, as it does not have its military units stationed anywhere other than Central and East Europe, it will require more time to study these proposals.

Comments on the President's State of the Union address as a whole have also appeared in Soviet reactions. They criticize, in particular, the ideologization contained in Bush's address. Gennady Gerasimov, the Soviet press representative, among others said that observations made in a spirit of confrontationist ideology "about the victory of the American ideal and the collapse of Communism" do not correspond to the present time. Such observations come from the cold war period which, according to President Bush, belongs to the past. Gerasimov also criticized Bush's celebratory statements about the American military intervention in Panama and the Soviets also noticed a passage on the strategic threat from the Soviet side. In this passage, G. Bush insisted that the United States would continue to modernize its strategic strike weapons and develop its "star wars" program. Such words are at variance with the President's proposal to reduce troops at a time when the "pacts policy" [NATO and the Warsaw Pact] has given way to new attitudes of cooperation between states.

It seems that Moscow does not reject the White House's initiative; however, Moscow has obviously given priority to collectively resolving the problem of reducing the number of forces in Europe with the participation of other states so that the demilitarization of Central Europe takes place in parallel in both blocs. In his address on 31 January, President Bush did not put forward a specific timetable for implementing his proposal; maybe this could be discussed at the Vienna talks where all the NATO and Warsaw Pact member states are represented. Lastly, this forum is the most competent to deal with these issues. For example, Czechoslovakia is insisting that Soviet troops be withdrawn from its territory before the end of this year; Hungary, in an extreme case, is allowing for a withdrawal next year. A timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from European countries could be coordinated in Vienna. If

we add to this the process of rapprochement between the two German states, we see that the problem is indeed complicated and desperately requires a deliberate course of action.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Hungary Viewed
*AU0602133290 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 29 Jan 90 p 2*

[Franz Helling editorial: "Change Of Guarantors"]

[Text] The withdrawal of foreign troops is one of the topics that not only touches off businesslike discussions in East and West on the pros and cons, but also create emotions. Many foreign troops are deployed in Central Europe; on either side of the former Iron Curtain, hundreds of thousands of armed men are deployed in foreign countries. Some people call them liberators, others members of the occupation forces. Most people have considered these troops as guarantors of peaceful life for decades—on this side, the Soviet soldiers, and on the other side, American, British, French, Canadian, and other soldiers.

With the fall of the Iron Curtain, many old patterns of thinking, enemy images, and dogmas have been called into question. Disarmament can now be changed from a gesture into substantive security policy. According to the new way of thinking, the thesis that wars cannot be won by anyone is now developing into the hope that wars have become unnecessary. Democracy, the peoples' self-determination, and the unhindered flow of opinions and people are being established as security guarantees of a modern Europe.

Hungary has concluded from this that the deployment of Soviet troops on its territory is no longer justified—neither on political nor on military aspects. Premier Miklos Nemeth stated to the Parliament in Budapest that he agreed on this with his Moscow counterpart. Negotiations will begin in the next few days on the total troop withdrawal within a very short time.

However, in addition to the national emotions, Hungary once again demonstrates a "European dimension," as it did in September when it dismantled the border. Will others follow its example? The international echo is divided. NATO has welcomed the step. Many people would welcome the idea even more if this military alliance following suit. However, so far only Belgium has indicated that it intends to withdraw its 25,000 troops from the FRG.

Commentary Views Soviet Troop Withdrawal
*AU0602180390 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
3-4 Feb 90 p 9*

[Vlado Teslic commentary from the "Week in the World" column: "It Is Easy To Withdraw a Tank...."]

[Text] A Soviet "military diplomat" recently very openly stated, while talking about the current problem of withdrawing his country's Armed Forces from Eastern Europe: It is easy to withdraw a tank, it is difficult to withdraw a general. He meant in this respect the large number of commanding officers with the Soviet Armed Forces in Eastern Europe who are not great advocates of withdrawal and whose future in their own country is not exactly rosy since there is a large number of them.

The U.S. version of this surreal vision (or conduct) of military diplomacy could be: It is easy to withdraw tanks (especially if we force them on Italy, Belgium, or Portugal) but what do we then do with Germany? In other words, can NATO do without Germany and can Germany do without NATO? The answer to the first part of the question is a categorical "no" because NATO was formed so that the United States could have a firm foothold in the FRG. The answer to the second part of the question is "perhaps," because a future united Germany could soon be a member of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which is a thought that makes U.S. generals' hair stand on end.

Several days ago, one of the partners in the ruling Christian-Liberal Bonn coalition, Genscher, said, for example, that a united Germany could not belong to NATO and that anyone who wanted to extend NATO as far as the rivers Oder and Neisse (on the border between East Germany and Poland) was closing the door to the unification of Germany. What could Oscar Lafontaine, winner at Sunday's elections in Saarland and the probable future leader of the Social Democratic party and even a potential chancellor of the future two German states, say or do?

How Many Soldiers in Europe?

According to the habit started by Gorbachev, the Soviets have proposed more than the West had expected: The withdrawal of all armed forces belonging to the USSR from Eastern Europe by 1995 under the condition, of course, that this is done by the Western powers in relation to the FRG. This proposal was quickly followed by a "releasing of tension" on the other side, but in the well-known U.S. fashion, with delay and caution. Two days ago in the traditional "address to the nation," President Bush called for the ceilings on the armed forces of the two super powers in Europe to be evened out to 195,000 soldiers, thus reducing the level of 275,000 that he himself had recently proposed. Military experts will immediately notice that what is far more significant in the U.S. stand is that U.S. weapons will be modernized at the same time and that the program of space defense or "Star Wars" will continue, of course, with the pretext that the other side is in fact doing this too.

President Bush is doing this skillfully so that he in some way satisfies all partners and interested parties, as well as interest groups in the country. He will, therefore, reduce the number of U.S. soldiers and arms in order to satisfy that part of the U.S. and even German public that has

been insisting on this for a long time, while at the same time not angering those partners in Europe (France) who insist on the full involvement of U.S. armed power until a new equilibrium of forces is set up in Europe, as well as those conservative forces at home who still do not believe Gorbachev.

What Happens After the Warsaw Pact?

It is clear that Washington is sticking to its two main strategic orientations: to remain in Germany with NATO and on the new geopolitical map of Europe and to stick to strategic nuclear armament, both defensive and offensive. Optimists will also comment that in both cases the Americans are sticking to a continuation of talks with the USSR while pessimists could conclude that this means the continuation of the arms race and an old confrontation.

What is quite certain in this arrangement: The changes in Eastern Europe are opening up new territory in the very sensitive area of security and Germany continues to be a great enigma and touchstone in the construction of a new common European home.

When the foreign ministers of France, the FRG, and Italy recently visited Vienna with the desire of "pushing" the disarmament talks along, they left the impression that they were either surprised by the possible new development of the German question or they did not know about the real preoccupations of the USSR in the new situation, whereby the Warsaw Pact has virtually lost its military edge. According to the old tradition of French diplomacy, Roland Dumas thought quite vaguely about the wide perspectives of the new possible options but at the same time was quite definite about sticking to what was certain—that French and other European troops would remain in the FRG even after the Soviet-U.S. withdrawal. De Michelis was sweet-talking and optimistic as usual, agreeing to all possible new possible solutions but not rejecting NATO. Genscher seemed to be most aware of the reality and complexity of the new European solutions.

What is really the primary aim of Soviet policy in the area of security in Europe apart from the quite vague sketching of a "common European home"? Especially now after the great changes in Eastern Europe and the rejection of the ideological veil and even concept of the Warsaw Pact as the keeper of the "socialist community"? It is one thing to say that the Warsaw Pact should become a political-military alliance of equal partners and national armed forces (which obviously are not and cannot be equal) and whose military doctrine would be defensive, and quite another, however, if this is placed into the context of the existing relations and trends whereby Soviet troops are unilaterally withdrawing from some countries, whereby we are faced with the unification of Germany, and whereby Western partners are demonstrating their unwillingness to build the unification of Europe on disarmament as well.

There is no doubt that there has been a certain "balkanization" of Eastern Europe with the tacit agreement of Moscow but is this also a process of the "finlandization" of this region? Is Moscow, therefore, ready for processes of neutralization and for something more: the free choice of every country in Eastern Europe to decide on one bloc or the other, which was after all hinted at as far back as 15 years ago in Helsinki.

Negotiations in Budapest and Prague on the withdrawal of Soviet troops will probably be linked with negotiations in Vienna despite the very small probability that Hungary and Czechoslovakia will, for now, ask to leave the Warsaw Pact. By withdrawing from these countries, the Soviet Union does not lose anything on the military scene but it could lose a lot on the political scene.

It is another thing with Germany. After the meeting with Premier Modrow, it is obvious that Gorbachev has nothing against unification. No one, however, has noticed that the Soviet leader has renounced the role of the USSR and interests in Germany, an armed Germany, of course. Most Soviet troops are, after all, in East Germany (300,000) and their withdrawal is difficult to imagine out of the context of a simultaneous U.S. withdrawal from the FRG. Is this a subject for negotiation in Vienna or with the FRG perhaps? And is this a point that is already raising dust not about the neutralization of a future united Germany but about its possible dual membership of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact? Especially if this also suits the interests of Poland and even some Western partners.

GDR Lauds NATO Proposals at Vienna Talks

LD0802173890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1606 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Vienna (ADN)—The head of the GDR delegation at the Vienna negotiations, Ambassador Klaus-Dieter Ernst, has described the new NATO proposals as "steps in the right direction." Today he stated to ADN's Vienna correspondent that it was known that the GDR, the USSR, and the other Warsaw Pact states were striving to withdraw all foreign troops by the end of the decade. However, the proposal to limit the U.S. and USSR units stationed in Central Europe to 195,000 men each left questions open. Among these were the 160,000 men from France, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the FRG, as well as the problem of troop strengths outside Central Europe. [passage omitted]

GDR's Buehring Views Vienna Doctrines Seminar

AU0802103590 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 6 Feb 90 p 1

[ADN report: "Good Marks for the CSCE Seminar on Military Doctrines"]

[Text] Vienna—At a news conference in Vienna on Monday [5 February], representatives of Warsaw Pact

and NATO member states for the most part made positive assessments at the end of the Seminar on Military Doctrines. They all praised the demonstrated readiness for openness. They said that the efforts made to dispel feelings of being threatened by the other side had helped strengthen confidence and stability in Europe.

In his concluding statement, Ambassador Guenter Buehring, head of the GDR delegation, described the seminar as the beginning of a process of understanding between high-ranking military officials of the CSCE states, which should be continued. He said that it was an "impetus intended to bring the new military thinking into line with a reduction in conventional forces, which will be negotiated." He said that the Modrow plan brought new aspects into the discussion and that it had become clear "that the ideas concerning the possible unification of the two German states are embedded in the pan-European process, and, in the final analysis, this problem can only be solved within this framework."

Romanian Delegate Addresses Geneva Arms Talks

AU1002183790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1613 GMT 10 Feb 90

[“On the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons”—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, 2 February (ROMPRES)—Romania militates for the soonest possible conclusion of an international convention on stopping the manufacture of chemical weapons and completely destroying the existing stockpiles under a strict and efficient international control. It no longer makes the liquidation of chemical weapons contingent upon the simultaneous achievement of nuclear disarmament (as it was done before, owing to an absurd indication given by the ex-dictator).

Such points were given by the Romanian foreign minister when setting forth the stance of the Romanian delegation at the current session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

Hungary Proposes Troop Reductions in Vienna

LD1302213190 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] At the Vienna armed forces reduction talks, Hungary has proposed that the NATO and Warsaw Pact member states should not be allowed to station more than 225,000 troops beyond their borders. Even out of this number, only 195,000 at most should be permitted in Central Europe. In the event of the proposal being adopted, the Soviet Union would have to withdraw 330,000 and the United States 80,000 troops.

At the Vienna armed forces reduction talks, this was the first time that an initiative has been submitted not by one of the alliance systems but by a single state, in this case the Hungarian state. The Hungarian concepts take the NATO

standpoint into consideration. On one point, however, they diverge from it; namely, that a commitment to limiting the stationing of troops abroad should be undertaken not only by the two big powers, but by the other countries as well.

ALBANIA

Security Service, Military Strength Described

AU1901103590 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
15 Jan 90 p 9

[Article by Miodrag Dinic: “Army Under Surveillance”]

[Text] Ramiz Alia, Albanian head of state, has continued to pull the strings of Hoxha's policies, albeit with a certain relaxation. He bears an uncanny resemblance to his predecessor. He goes among the people, rallies his fellow-citizens by invoking historical leaders, folklore, and the national heritage. Following Hoxha's style, he directs the population's attention to enemies abroad, the biggest among them being Yugoslavia.

The new Albanian leader has also failed to renounce Hoxha's defense doctrine, which is mainly meant to protect the regime and not the country. This is why the Army is still being strictly controlled, because for years now there have been signs that a large number of its members are not completely loyal to the Tirana regime. Secret agents and informants have been interspersed throughout the entire Army structure, because the present Albanian rulers feel somewhat uneasy about the Army, subconsciously fearing that it may turn against them one day, as it did in Romania recently.

Thought Police

The main protection of the present Tirana regime is ensured by the State Security Directorate [uprava], “Sigurimi,” which is primarily the Communist Party police. It performs the duties of an offensive political intelligence service, a counterintelligence service in the field [na teritoriji], political police, and a security service protecting party and state officials.

The building of the “Sigurimi” service is located on the main Tirana square, a four-storey building built by Italians. Whenever security officers, agents, informants, and clerks enter the building, they cannot help seeing an equestrian statue of Skenderbeg which reminds them of the battles of the past.

Future “Sigurimi” members are chosen from the circles loyal to the regime and have to be recommended by a person of high standing. After passing strict psychophysical tests, the best people continue schooling and training, and the others are employed as informants. Joining “Sigurimi” opens the way into the Albanian “jet-set” for whom it is made possible to see the world outside their isolated country.

"Sigurimi" has 26 posts in Albania in an equal number of districts, as well as its headquarters in Tirana. In its work the service relies on about 10,000 agents throughout the country, while the number of informants is impossible to establish precisely.

According to an Albanian emigre, the general opinion in that isolated country is that the "Sigurimi" activity has been brought to perfection. Apart from controlling the real world, they are also in charge of controlling dreams. It may sound incredible, but the truth is that all dreams other than those about the ideal Albanian communism are forbidden.

"Sigurimi" members are well armed. Their arsenal includes UZI and Kalashnikov automatic rifles, various cold steel weapons, and chemical weapons intended for close combat [za dejstvo na bliskom rastojanju]. They also possess the most modern communications devices, as well as taping equipment.

"Sigurimi" has its members throughout the world. They have been deployed in embassies, trade agencies, and information-cultural centers. There are also truck drivers driving via Yugoslavia as far as Scandinavia, as well as members of the UN mission in New York. They are the ones who spread Albanian propaganda, which is very well organized and aggressive. The work of "Sigurimi" members abroad is financed out of a super-secret contingency fund which is provided by underground drug trafficking and smuggling gold and arms.

The Army Belongs to the People

The Albanian Armed Forces have 42,000 regular members, including 22,400 recruits. The length of military service is 2 years for the Army, and 3 years for the Navy, air defense, and the special units. Reserves include 16,000 people up to the age of 56.

The Intelligence Directorate of the Army General Staff collects information about foreign armies, primarily the armed forces of the neighboring countries: Greece and Yugoslavia. The Counterintelligence Directorate of the People's Defense Ministry protects the Albanian Armed Forces, as well as military institutions and enterprises. According to the information received from the West and some well-informed circles, there are about 2,500 "Sigurimi" members in the Albanian Army.

Albania's military budget amounted to about \$188 million in 1985 and \$230 million in 1986. Since then, one could notice a constant increase in funds allocated for the Army. According to estimates made by world military experts, Albania's Army expenditure in 1990 will be somewhat over \$300 million.

According to available data, with its armament and equipment the Albanian Armed Forces occupy last place in Europe. However, the increase in the military budget indicates an orientation toward modernizing the Armed Forces. Special attention is being given to acquiring infantry armament.

Although Albania broke its relations with China after Mao Zedong's death, since 1984 containers with Chinese marks have been unloaded in the port of Durres. Western military experts claim that they contain spare parts for tanks and planes and military equipment. During the last few years the Albanian Armed Forces have been modernized with missile and communications systems produced in Italy and the FRG.

The Ground Forces consist of 31,500 members, including 20,000 recruits. These forces are divided into a tank brigade, four infantry brigades, three artillery regiments, and six coast artillery battalions. There is a shortage of spare parts for Army equipment and armament which has resulted in the reduced operational capability of these forces.

The Navy numbers 3,300 members, including 1,000 recruits. Their bases are in Durres and Vlore, as well as on the islands of Sazan and Pasha Liman.

The Air Force includes 5,800 officers and 1,400 recruits. The most modern plane in the Air Force is the Chinese Shenyang J-7. Among the Air Force helicopters, not one is equipped for antiaarmor combat.

Apart from the regular Army, the Armed Forces also include 12,000 members of paramilitary [polu-vojni] units, 5,000 members of internal security, and 7,000 members of border units.

[The following passage appears boxed within the body of the item]

The Army:

- Tanks: 190 tanks of the T-34 and T-54 type;
- Armored combat vehicles: 13 BRDM-1;
- Armored personnel carriers: 80 of the BTR-40/-50—152 and K-63 type;
- Howitzer-gun: 122-mm M1938 and Type 60; 152-mm M1937 and Type 66;
- Howitzers: 152-mm D-1;
- Mortars: 120-mm and 160-mm;
- Multiple rocket launchers: 107-mm Type 63;
- Antitank armament: recoilless 82-mm T-21, and 45-mm M1942, 57-mm M1943, 85-mm D-44, and Type 56 guns;
- Antiaircraft defense: 50 37-mm M1939 and double 23-mm ZU-23 cannons;

The Navy:

- Submarines: two Soviet-made "W" [transliterated as "V" in cyrillic] class submarines (one used for training);
- Patrol boats: two Soviet-made "Kronshtadt" class;
- Torpedo boats: 12 Chinese-made B-4 class and 32 Chinese-made "Huchuan" hydrofoils;
- Minesweepers: two inshore of the "T 301" class and six general-purpose of the "PO 2" class;
- Reserve: one "W" submarine, two "Kronshtadt" ships, two minesweepers T-34, and four "T 301" ships;

The Air Force:

Fighter planes: 20 MiG-15, 20 MiG-17, 40 MiG-19, and 20 Shenyang J-7;
—Cargo planes: 3 Il-14M and 10 An-2;
—Training planes: a squadron of MiG-15 UTI;
—Helicopters: 30 Mi-4;
—Surface-to-air missiles: five launchers equipped with SA-2 missiles.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Slimak Cites Stance for NATO-Pact Seminar

AU2301165390 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Jan 90 pp 1,7

[Interview with Major General Anton Slimak, first deputy minister of defense, by PRAVDA editor Jozef Janto, in Vienna; date not given: "The Army's Sole Purpose Is Defense; Interviewing the Head of CSSR's Military Delegation to the Vienna Talks"]

[Text] As we know, the fifth round of two disarmament forums opened in Vienna's Hofburg palace a few days ago—namely, the talks of 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states on the conventional disarmament on our continent, and the negotiations of 35 countries participating in the CSCE, better known as talks on confidence-building and security measures. A seminar on military doctrines is being held from 16 January to 5 February within the framework of this latter forum; it is attended by delegations of high-ranking army personnel, headed by the chiefs of general staffs. The head of the CSSR delegation to this seminar is Major General Anton Slimak, CSSR's first deputy minister of national defense and chief of the general staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army [CSLA]. He granted Czechoslovak Radio Bratislava and the PRAVDA daily an interview in Vienna.

He began by stressing that this is the first time in history that such a meeting is being held. The Czechoslovak side is thoroughly prepared for it; it believes that this representative, high-level military gathering will lay the foundations for further contacts between military experts and that it will significantly contribute toward removing the danger of a military confrontation. One of the Czechoslovak delegation's tasks will be to explain the essential features of our defensive military doctrine.

This doctrine was to have been approved last year, the chief of the CSLA general staff went on to say. In connection with the preparations for this seminar, the doctrine was considered by the Federal Government Presidium and is now being worked out further, in keeping with the continuing domestic political changes. However, it can be said that, in the military-political sphere, we have taken into account both the current developments in Europe and the new orientation of our foreign policy. As for the second, military-technical part of our military doctrine, we are consistently developing its

defensive character, by, among other things, reducing the offensive arms systems in the CSLA. For instance, by the end of this year, we will have taken out of service 850 tanks, i.e. 20 percent of the total number, as well as 51 fighter planes and 165 armored personnel vehicles. We are reducing the offensive structures even further: Thus, if a tank division used to have three tank regiments and one motorized infantry regiment, it now has two tank regiments and one motorized infantry regiment. We also want to take out of service the means for crossing waterways, and to gradually stop tank production.

In his statement at the seminar, Major General A. Slimak announced, inter alia, that by 1 February we will have cut down the forces and means for accomplishing combat tasks within set deadlines in the frontline divisions, the Air Force, and the units of our state's antiair defense to one-third of their present strength; this year we will call up for military exercises 90,000 reserve soldiers less than in the preceding years; and, as is also known, we are preparing an amendment to the law on military service which would substantially shorten the length of basic national service.

As for the further developments to be expected along these lines, he replied that this is merely the beginning, that everything will depend on the results of disarmament negotiations in Vienna and, naturally, also on the changes in our Constitution.

—When speaking of our state's defensive doctrine, we obviously do not mean that we are incapable of providing for the state's defense. We are training our army in harmony with the development of the situation in Europe, since for the time being we cannot afford a unilateral disarmament. I have said as much in my statement at the seminar, and my words were received positively by all the participants, he stressed.

Asked whether any bilateral talks are being held at the seminar, the chief of the CSLA general staff stated that the Czechoslovak delegation is making use of its time especially for meeting the delegations of our neighboring countries which are interested in the current processes in our Army. Thus, Major General A. Slimak has already met General O. Tauschitz, inspector general of the Austrian Army; Admiral Dieter Welershoff, inspector general of the Bundeswehr; and Army General Heinz Haesler, chief of staff of the Swiss Armed Forces. His negotiations with Colin L. Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, were different; at lunchtime the day before yesterday [17 January], they were attended by the heads of delegations from several Warsaw Pact states. During the next few days the chief of the CSLA general staff will also meet the chiefs of the general staffs of France, Canada, Belgium, Finland, and Greece.

Asked about the results of the first 2 days of the seminar, he said that the participants—including those from neutral countries—have agreed in their view that armies are at present inevitable for defense, as an attribute of every

sovereign state. All 35 chiefs of general staffs have stressed that their armies could be potentially used only for the purposes of defense.

We also discussed other problems with Major General A. Slimak, such as the Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the CSSR. Since these matters are still at the stage of negotiations, in this context it is necessary to wait for their results. However, he concluded by stating that at the beginning of the seminar he had met Mikhail Moiseyev, USSR's first deputy minister of national defense and chief of the general staff of the Soviet Army, and the chiefs of the general staffs of other Warsaw Pact states. During their meeting it was stated that they would speak frankly at the seminar, among other things about the substance of our mutual agreements within the framework of the Warsaw Pact organization.

Nations Urged To Heed Example, End Arms Exports

LD2601212890 Prague International Service
in English 1900 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Commentary by Radio Prague's Milan Suchanek]

[Text] The quality of Czechoslovak arms is highly respected in the world, yet the Czechoslovak Government decided to stop its arms exports. This will certainly bring about losses in hard-currency income for our country, but on the other hand will raise our moral credit, which the new Czechoslovak Government sees as its top priority.

Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier told THE NEW YORK TIMES in this connection that Czechoslovakia rejects the views of some pragmatists who claim that other nations would deliver arms to our clients if we halt shipments. According to Western sources, in the years 1983-1988 Czechoslovakia was the seventh-largest arms exporter in the world.

The fact that Czechoslovakia stops its exports guarantees the speedy conversion of the Czechoslovak military industry to civilian purposes. By this decision, Czechoslovakia gives an example for the solution of the issue of international arms trading. The arms trade is in contradiction with the climate of easing [as heard] world tensions, and also promotes the creation of hotbeds of tension and local conflicts. This is why the Czechoslovak decision to halt arms exports should be interpreted as a moral move which proposes [as heard] other states to follow suit.

Newspapers Survey Soviet Troop Presence Issues

AU3001084090

[Editorial Report] Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 23 January on pages 1 and 2 and on 24 January on page 1 publishes in two installments a 1,300-word

interview with two commanders of Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia. Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE and Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 24 January both publish correspondents' reports on a demonstration by Vysoké Myto residents held on 23 January, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the city.

The ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY interview with the Soviet commanders was conducted by Frantisek Lauer in Milovice, the headquarters of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia, on 22 January. Lauer's interview partners are Major General Gennadiy Proprshchev, first deputy chief of staff of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in the CSSR, and Colonel Yuriy Arskiy, the group's "political worker."

In the interview, Proposhev first "fully supports" the recent Soviet Government statement on the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and says that the situation should have been dealt with by political means. He assesses as "positive" the recently opened talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, emphasizing that the Soviet side "is not opposed" to a withdrawal. Asked whether he believes that the withdrawal can be completed this year, as demanded by the Czechoslovak side, Proposhev says: "We realize that the aim of the talks is the withdrawal of our troops. We understand this. We will hand over to you, the Czechoslovak people, everything that we have acquired and built here. We will hand it over intact. We will leave as friends. Although the deadlines of the withdrawal have yet to be negotiated, it needs to be considered that, if the whole [central] group is to be withdrawn, it must happen in a humane way, taking account of the fact that entire families with children are here. My opinion is that everything should run its course in 1 and 1/2 or 2 years. This is necessary to head off unnecessary damage." Speaking about apartments occupied by Soviet soldiers, Proposhev reiterates that all of them will be handed over to the Czechoslovak side, including those "built from our own resources, which is the case of roughly one-half of our housing stock." In his concluding statement, Proposhev stresses that the Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia never interfered in Czechoslovak affairs; in this context he also denies rumors about Soviet troops being in "heightened combat alert" in the period immediately after 17 November. He says: "We have never placed the troops on combat alert. I am saying this with full responsibility as a member of the supreme command."

Colonel Arskiy's statements concern the relationship between the Soviet troops and Czechoslovak citizens. He assures the Czechoslovak public that the Soviet troops will do everything "to leave a good impression." In this context he observes that "some of the information about us is not exactly friendly. The Soviet Army and our entire country are being attacked, often unobjectively. It seems that it suits someone fine when seeds of contention are sown.... I believe that in this situation one

should not forget that it was the Soviet soldier who liberated Czechoslovakia in 1945 and that 145,000 of them died here."

Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech on 24 January on page 5 carries a 1,000-word article by Jan Kastanek entitled "Protest Action by Vysoke Myto Citizens," dealing with a demonstration staged by residents of that East Bohemian city the preceding day against the presence of the Soviet garrison there. On the basis of a news conference with representatives of the local authorities which preceded the demonstration, Kastanek summarizes the local population's grievances about the Soviet troops. According to the LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE reporter, the locals complain about "the increasing number of traffic accidents, house burglaries, and other offenses caused by Soviet troops in the city." They also blame them for the housing shortage in the city because "besides three Army barracks, one hospital, and other property, Soviet troops occupy 262 city apartments, plus an additional 500 housing units that were built for their officers." Furthermore, the reporter writes, the Soviet troops are being accused of maintaining an unguarded fuel depot in a protected water zone, of having destroyed 400 hectares of forests, and of being responsible for the "catastrophic condition" of the Lucna river. In connection with the expected departure of the troops, the city is also said to be faced with "raids" on its shops, during which "Soviet soldiers and members of their families buy up, above all, articles which are in short supply."

Similar charges are raised also in a 400-word "la"-signed report on the VYSOKE MYTO demonstration, published in Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 24 January on page 2. According to the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY report, the "Soviet Army has willfully preempted more than 50 hectares of high-quality agricultural land," has erected a number of buildings without applying for a building permit, and is responsible for "large-scale poaching in rivers and forests." The reporter mentions that, although the exact number of Soviet soldiers stationed in Vysoke Myto is a "military secret," locals say that the "number of soldiers is at least as high as the number of VYSOKE MYTO residents"—that is, 12,000.

Rally for Soviet Withdrawal Scheduled 6 Feb

LD3101203190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1800 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] The Prague city committee of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party calls on the citizens of the capital Prague to take part in the rally in support of the efforts of the President of the Republic Vaclav Havel, and the Czechoslovak Government aimed at achieving a speedy withdrawal of the Soviet troops from our territory. The demonstration will take place on 6 February at 1630 in the Old Town Square in Prague.

Talks With Soviet Military End in 'Deadlock'

LD3101213590 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1730 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] [Announcer] There are great problems with the movement of Soviet military technology along public communication routes in the Olomouc district. Pavel Smid has sent a dispatch from today's talks about these questions:

[Smid] The only actual result of today's complicated deliberations is the decision that Soviet heavy tanks will now not leave the military area of (Libava) for repair shops in the barracks in the center of Olomouc. Although this was one of the more or less important points of the meeting, which was attended by a delegation from the Soviet garrison and by representatives of the district National Committee, the Union of Students of Czechoslovakia from Palacky University, civic initiatives of the town, as well as those of Velka Bystrice—the village which is suffering most from the movement of military technology, particularly tanks. There was also some talk about the availability of certain kinds of goods in retail shops, about the impatiently awaited vacating of apartments. In Olomouc alone this should be 1,500 apartments and another 300 in other parts of the district.

Finally, the talks on further movements of technology ended in deadlock owing to mutual mistrust. Thus it appears that marked progress on the question of the stay of Soviet troops, not only here in Olomouc district but on the entire territory of our republic, will only be achieved after the talks between President Vaclav Havel and Mikhail Gorbachev.

E. Bohemia Prepares for USSR Troop Withdrawal

LD3101211190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1730 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] [Announcer] The first step in preparation for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia was made in East Bohemia today. Editor Vaclav Martinik reports:

[Martinik] The district national committee in Trutnov, political parties, and civic initiatives have decided to wait no longer and to prepare the locations used since 1968 by Soviet troops to be handed over to those to whom they belong, primarily forestry workers and housing economy enterprises. Although the principled viewpoint will be known only after the president's visit to the USSR, the commissions began working in the Trutnov area today. They have several days to discover the state of the locations in Trutnov, Volanov, Mustek, and Hostinne, and to decide on further progress. According to the agreement, the Soviet units should put them in order. That is why, as early as Tuesday [6 February] a coordination commission will meet in

Trutnov to agree on further progress. Our representatives are pleased so far and believe that the Soviet command will fulfill its promises and meet the deadlines.

Soviet Official Calls Troop Presence 'Valid'

LD0102123190 Prague CTK in English 1108 GMT 1 Feb 90

[“Czechoslovakia Demands Soviet Troops Withdrawn by End of Year”—CTK headline]

[Text] Prague, February 1 (CTK)—The question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia is the affair of two states that take necessary steps, Major-General Gennadiy Proposhchev, deputy chief of staff of the central group of Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia, has told CTK.

He replied to the question of the CTK news agency whether a possible political defeat of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union would threaten the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

Asked about the validity of the treaty on the temporary stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, which the Czechoslovak Government considers invalid, Soviet Government commissioner for questions of the temporary stay, Colonel Aleksey Belousov said that the 1968 treaty is valid.

“If somebody questions its validity he puts it on the only argument that the entry of troops took place before the treaty was signed”, he said and added: “The stay of the Soviet troops by no means violates the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. All expenses are paid by the Soviet Government. The Soviet troops are obliged to respect Czechoslovak laws. The treaty is based on the principle of friendship, cooperation and ensuring mutual security”.

Bush Troop Cut Proposals Possible 'Good Omen'

LD0202074690 Prague International Service in English 1900 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] On Wednesday [31 January] evening, President Bush delivered his traditional state of the Union message, or was it really that much traditional? We have a comment by Radio Prague's Vaclav Kvasnicka:

The State of the Union message delivered by President Bush unveiled much of the secrecy shrouding this mysterious telephone conversation with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev earlier that same day. It came to light that Bush had informed the Soviet leader about his plan for substantive cuts in both U.S. and Soviet forces deployed in Central Europe. Already last year, the White House had announced it was reducing its troops in the region to about 250,000. Now, the President proposes a reduction to about 195,000 on each side. At the same time, the United States would be willing to dismantle nine of its military bases in Europe, and cut others to

size, which looks like a very constructive reaction to the turbulent changes in Eastern Europe, and to talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Also, Washington is meeting halfway the Western demands for NATO to react more flexibly to the processes in Europe, now dominated by the changes in its Eastern half.

These aspects of the latest American disarmament initiative could be a good omen for the program of rebuilding Europe on a new, far more solid foundation. They will doubtlessly project favorably into the Vienna talks on conventional weapons in the whole of Europe. At the same time, the Bush initiative strengthens mutual trust in Europe, and gives a powerful boost to efforts to reshape NATO and the Warsaw Pact into instruments of political cooperation. Such development is highly desirable, especially as regards the prospect of eliminating Europe's division into blocs.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Issues Surveyed

LD0402135790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0830 GMT 4 Feb 90

[“Sunday Foreign Policy Comment” by Vera Stovickova-Heroldova, former Czechoslovak Radio editor]

[Excerpts] This week we begin the conclusive talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from our territory. Developments have headed logically towards this conclusion since the moment the Soviet Union officially admitted that the entry of the five Warsaw Pact countries' armies into Czechoslovakia did not represent help, even less fraternal assistance.

It is generally known that, during the first round of talks in Prague, our delegation put forward a plan of withdrawal worked out in detail, including possible deadlines. Military and other experts—for example railwaymen—prepared tables that clearly indicated that the deadlines we were suggesting were realistic. All 73,000 Soviet soldiers, their families, and most of their military technical equipment are to be transported by trains to spare our roads.

We demand that 60 percent of the soldiers leave before the elections, more by 15 May, and the rest before the end of the year. According to our tables, it would be technically possible to advance these deadlines and speed up the withdrawal. Nevertheless, while the government wishes to behave properly toward the Soviet side, it intends to forcefully defend our citizens' interests and avoid complications.

The Soviet side has made it clear on different occasions that it considers the deadlines tight. According to Radio Moscow reports, the military weekly KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote something which essentially meant that we are in too much of a hurry since the threat—to be understood as the danger against which the armies arrived to defend us—has not yet disappeared.

Nevertheless, in fact both we and they know very well that the Soviet Army did not arrive suddenly in the middle of the night to defend us against an external threat, and that the agreement on its temporary stay—which was imposed on us and is therefore invalid—left the Soviet Army to keep order, to avoid the unpopular expression: the occupation army.

The argument about the threat, which is still real, is remarkable for yet another reason: The situation in Europe is better than at any time since World War II. [passage omitted]

As was stated earlier, the Soviet troops on our territory are not a part of the framework of European security and balance and therefore should not be counted as a part of the contingent of Soviet troops placed in Europe. Nevertheless, it seems that our bilateral talks on their withdrawal have an interesting influence on the conventional armed forces reductions talks in Vienna. [passage omitted]

Our representatives have attempted to explain to the Soviet representatives that, given all these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that our citizens are impatient, especially those who are affected by the Army's presence in their towns and villages. Meetings and talks between citizens' representatives and Soviet commanders are being held. Their results vary. It seems that some Soviet commanders wish to meet citizens' demands, some restrict moves of military technical equipment, and some concentrate the program of their exercises on withdrawal training. Others show by their negative attitudes that they do not understand the depth of the changes which have taken place.

Nevertheless, I think that we should keep our justified demonstrations within the limits of a dignified civic protest. If somebody wants to knock down a statue of Lenin in the course of the demonstrations, then I ask: In whose interest is it? Is it really in our interest? Or is it in the interest of somebody who wants, through provocation, to provide the other side with arguments? We do not knock down statues! Let us remember the promise we made to ourselves: We are not like them. [passage omitted]

Demonstrators Call for May Troop Withdrawal

Open Letter Intended for Soviet Ambassador
LD0602214290 Prague CTK in English 2102 GMT
6 Feb 90

[Text] Prague, February 6 (CTK)—Over 30,000 people staged a demonstration in support of the demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia at Prague's Old Town Square here today.

The demonstration was called by the Municipal Committee of the Czechoslovak Social Democracy. Speakers expressed surprise that it took one single day for the

Soviet troops to occupy Czechoslovakia and that they would need whole months to withdraw from this country.

Chairman of the Czechoslovak Social Democracy Slavomir Klaban read an open letter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which is to be handed to the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia. The letter approved by the demonstrators unanimously called for a complete and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops by May 31, 1990, and for all districts and buildings to be handed over in good order and the damage caused by the presence of the troops to be calculated and compensated.

Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, together with troops of Hungary, Poland, the GDR and Bulgaria to stop the reform movement in the country.

Foreign Ministry Rejects TASS View

LD0702145190 Prague CTK in English 1254 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, February 7 (CTK)—“The Soviet public seems to be rather surprised and to certain extent even irritated by demonstrations taking place in Czechoslovakia these days. TASS reports from Prague characterized yesterday's demonstration as anti-Soviet. I am of the opinion that this is not a correct evaluation,” Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky told Czechoslovak journalists here Wednesday.

He said that the Czechoslovak delegation, which opened the second round of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia here today, understands to the full the indignation of Czechoslovak citizens concerning their deployment on Czechoslovak territory.

“I think that it is especially the Soviet side which bears a deal of responsibility for the demonstrations. Certain reluctance in solving the extremely important question concerning mutual relations between the two countries, has by right aroused nervousness of the Czechoslovak public. There is no need to be surprised at it, as much time has been wasted. The Soviet troops could have already been on their way home. The questions concerning the complicated technical and social affairs could have been solved and the society could have lived more quietly,” Lubos Dobrovsky said.

“I absolutely reject the TASS formulations. They are distorting, trying to sow the seeds of misunderstanding between our two nations. They do not serve the resumption of friendly contacts which is the aim of our activities here. If we reach the withdrawal of Soviet troops, we will resume the possibility of normalizing Czechoslovak-Soviet relations which could be friendly in our opinion,” the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

He underlined that the delegation will consistently and responsibly fulfil the tasks given to it by the Czechoslovak Government. It will resolutely push through the demands formulated in the first round of the talks, i.e. to

finish the withdrawal of Soviet troops by the end of 1990 with respect to the fact that the majority of them will leave by the free elections. "May 15, 1990 remains the fundamental date," Lubos Dobrovsky stressed.

Second Round of Talks on Troop Pullout Starts

1968 Deployment Treaty Considered Invalid

LD0702132890 Prague CTK in English 1146 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, February 7 (CTK)—The second round of negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the territory of Czechoslovakia started here today.

The Czechoslovak delegation is led by Deputy Foreign Minister Evzen Vacek, the Soviet delegation by Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov. They will deal with a whole complex of questions connected with the stay and withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Czechoslovak territory, as well as with consequences of their 22-year long stay, including compensation for the damage, financial settlement and the question of property rights.

Spokesman for the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Lubos Dobrovsky has told CTK that a significant agreement was reached already during the negotiations in Prague in January. The Soviet delegation said that its aim is also the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, which results from the evaluation of the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia by the present Soviet leadership.

Czechoslovakia has suggested a term for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops—the end of this year—and its timetable. It has also submitted to the Soviet side a proposal for a new statute of these troops till their definitive withdrawal as Czechoslovakia considers the 1968 treaty on their temporary deployment invalid, Lubos Dobrovsky stressed.

The aim of the second round is to agree upon a term of the start of the withdrawal, its circumstances and to solve technical problems, Dobrovsky said and pointed out that the Soviet Union will face social and humanitarian difficulties in connection with the withdrawal. "We are of the opinion that the deadline till the end of this year provides the Soviet side with the possibility to solve these questions", Lubos Dobrovsky said.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Statement

LD0702133990 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak
1100 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Statement by Foreign Ministry press spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky—in Czech, recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Our people also link with the year 1990 other hopes and convictions—that all Soviet troops will leave our country. Further Soviet-Czechoslovak talks on this issue started in Moscow this morning.

Shortly before the talks started, Lubos Dobrovsky, Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry press spokesman, made the following statement:

[Begin recording, Dobrovsky] To start with I would like to stress that in the first round of talks an important agreement between our delegation has already been reached. The Soviet delegation said that their goal, just like ours, is to reach a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from our territory. This is obvious from the attitude of the Soviet Government to the entry of troops in August more than 22 years ago [as heard]. They have made it quite clear that this entry of troops was not only a political mistake but also a significant violation of international law. It is therefore obvious that the Soviet Government, just like our government, is interested in the withdrawal of these troops.

Unfortunately, a number of complex technical problems are connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. The Soviet side lists a number of social and humanitarian problems. I must stress that even when our delegation was preparing for talks on the withdrawal of the troops, we took into account these humanitarian and social questions connected, for example, with Soviet officers; children completing their schooling, and also questions connected with a number of complex problems such as the accommodation of Soviet troops after their return. That is why we have set the withdrawal date for so late, for the end of 1990. Technically, as our experts—both transport and military—have calculated, the withdrawal could be carried out sooner.

I would now like to mention one very important fact: It seems the Soviet public is somewhat surprised and to a certain extent even alarmed by demonstrations which have and are taking place in Czechoslovakia. The latest was yesterday. A TASS report from Prague even characterizes yesterday's demonstration as anti-Soviet. I think that this is an incorrect assessment.

Our delegation fully understands the reasons which prompt Czechoslovak citizens to express their dissatisfaction with Soviet troops' remaining on our territory. I would like to stress that all of us in the delegation are aware of our responsibility. We will very consistently carry out the task entrusted to us by our government and resolutely insist on those requirements we have already voiced in the first round of talks. This means that we would like to achieve a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops by 1990. The first and decisive section of the Soviet military power should be pulled out from Czechoslovakia by the beginning of the elections. But 15 May is, of course, a basic timeframe.

Once again, as far as the aforementioned demonstration is concerned, I think that it is first and foremost the Soviet side which is to a certain degree responsible for its occurrence. The hesitation in tackling this extremely important question in our mutual relations, this hesitation of the Soviet side, rouses nervousness among the

Czechoslovak public. And no wonder. After all, a lot of time has already been wasted in this respect. The Soviet troops could have already been on their way home. The questions on complicated technical and social matters could have been resolved and society could have lived a more peaceful life.

I would like to use this opportunity to say that I resolutely reject the allegations of the TASS report. They are distorting and create causes for misunderstanding between our two countries. This kind of reporting does not serve the renewal of friendly relations between our countries—which is, in fact, the purpose and objective of our work here. By achieving the withdrawal of Soviet troops, we will renew opportunities for normalizing Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, which we would like to see as friendly relations.

General Slimak Meets With U.S. Gen. Powell

AU0702170090 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
6 Feb 90 p 7

[Unattributed report from the "24 Hours Abroad" column]

[Text] CSSR and U.S. chiefs of general staff, General Anton Slimak and General Colin Powell, met for the first time on the occasion of a seminar on military doctrines held within the framework of the CSCE, which ended its work on Monday [5 February] in Vienna. Details about the meeting of the two generals were not released.

Further on Visit of Secretary of State Baker

Discusses Arms Issues With Dienstbier
LD0702133890 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1200 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Today in Cernin Palace in Prague, Jiri Dienstbier and James Baker, ministers of foreign affairs of Czechoslovakia and United States, respectively, exchanged views on the future of military blocs in the world and of further development of the pan-European process, particularly in the military and political sphere.

Also on the agenda were questions related to the negotiations of the Czechoslovak-Soviet commission on Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia.

In the course of evaluation of Czechoslovak-U.S. relations, Ministers Jiri Dienstbier and James Baker noted that favorable conditions for developing relations on a qualitatively new basis have been created.

Dienstbier, Baker Hold Talks

LD0702182490 Prague CTK in English 1406 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Prague, February 7 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker exchanged views here today on the future of

military blocs in the world and on further development of the all-European process, in the military and political spheres in particular.

Under discussion were also topics concerning the negotiations of the Czechoslovak-Soviet commission on withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. Evaluating Czechoslovak-U.S. relations they stated that good prerequisites have been created for their promotion on a qualitatively new basis.

During their talks here today, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker briefed Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier of U.S. readiness to offer experience in shaping and developing a private sector in Czechoslovakia. He spoke about the U.S. Administration's measures leading to the resumption of the validity of the most-favoured-nation clause for Czechoslovakia, providing administration's guarantees for commercial credits and loans, and about changes in the control of exports of sophisticated technology. First negotiations on these issues will take place during the visit of a Czechoslovak Government delegation to the United States in March.

Jiri Dienstbier stressed Czechoslovakia's interest in the assistance of U.S. teachers and university students in teaching English at schools and universities in Czechoslovakia and in various forms of exchanges, particularly exchanges of youth delegations.

Referring to further development of the all-European process, they agreed that the mission of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty must be adapted to changes being carried out in international relations. Jiri Dienstbier emphasized that the present concept of the existing military-political blocs as well as political thinking do not keep up with dynamic processes in military-political dynamic processes in the East European countries and in international relations.

Both ministers appreciated the proposal of U.S. President George Bush to reduce the maximum numbers of Soviet and U.S. troops deployed in other European countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO to 195,000 men on each side and said that it creates good prerequisites for the current Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

Dienstbier, U.S. Envoy View Baker's Talks

LD0702232190 Prague Television Service
in Czech 1830 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Excerpt] [Announcer] The talks between Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker were described by Dienstbier and U.S. Ambassador Shirley Temple-Black in the following words:

[Begin Dienstbier recording] This was in effect the first meeting—the first visit at such a high political level—for many years, and we were naturally able to make a kind of a survey in these circumstances of what we should talk

about, what we should develop. We are able to state that a new period is beginning in Czechoslovak-U.S. relations, which will now be free of the artificial problems of the past. [end recording]

[Begin Temple-Black recording in English, fading to Czech translation] The meetings conducted with your government were very constructive. We discussed a number of issues, and the speech by the U.S. secretary of state at Charles University especially made an impression on me. I was pleased above all that our consulate in Bratislava will be reopened and that, in addition, a cultural center will be opened there as well. We shall have another cultural center in Prague. As for the most-favored-nation status, the granting of it is now dependent only on the conclusion of a trade agreement between our two countries and then on the President's exercising his powers. [end recording]

[Announcer] In answer to a question put to him by Czechoslovak television, Jiri Dienstbier replied:

[Begin Dienstbier recording] We support the convening of the second Helsinki conference this year, and I think that the conference on open skies in Ottawa next week will discuss European institutions and institutions of the European process more than open skies. This is because the political development in the eastern half of Europe during the past months has far outstripped not only the existing institutions or those that have been created during the past 40 years, it has also frequently outstripped political thinking. In brief, what various political scientists and politicians have been thinking about has proven to be obsolete today and totally new concepts and the need to speed up all processes will have to be considered. I believe that the talks that are conducted today are conducted on the basis of mandates that were given during the previous period and there is, therefore, a need to reformulate and speed all this up. [end recording] [passage omitted]

RUDE PRAVO on Visit

AU0702152590 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
6 Feb 90 p 1

[Jiri Roskot commentary: "Aprops J. Baker's Visit"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker arrives today in Prague. This is an extremely important event for Czechoslovak-U.S. relations. His visit is taking place at a time when the Central European region, and Europe as a whole, is under the microscope of international policy, including from the military point of view. Secretary Baker's arrival is still under the influence of President Bush's remarkable proposal to reduce the ceiling on the number of Soviet and U.S. Armed Forces in Central Europe to 195,000 on each side.

This is a proposal which immediately concerns us. It is necessary to welcome every endeavor that pursues a reduction in military concentration—and, consequently, confrontation—as long as, on the basis of generally

accepted principles for the security of all participating countries, it assists in the transition to the sensible defense capability of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as of their individual member states.

The Soviet Union received Bush's proposal with interest, and it is logical to expect that Baker's talks in Moscow (where he is heading after his visit to Prague) will clarify the initiative's viability. Meanwhile, the issue is as follows: Washington assumes that Bush's proposal could be considered in parallel with the Vienna negotiations. His previous initiative from last May is being assessed there. At that time, Bush proposed reducing the number of U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe to 275,000. A further shift, then, has occurred in the American point of view.

In the meantime, particular military issues are already in a state of flux. This involves the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, a date before the end of 1990 is possible. Mikhail Moiseyev, USSR chief of general staff, said in Moscow on Saturday [3 February] that his country is willing to agree to the immediate and complete withdrawal of its units from the GDR if U.S., British, and French units are withdrawn from the FRG. This case involves direct and historically evolved ties.

Secretary Baker's visit to Prague and Moscow will be interesting, therefore, from the point of view of U.S. attitudes toward the revolutionary changes taking place in the process of European political and military detente.

'Differences' With USSR Over Withdrawal Timing

LD0702222590 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
2030 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] In Moscow today certain differences of view on the date persist in the attitudes of the Czechoslovak and Soviet delegations which opened the second round of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory. The Czechoslovak delegation demands the withdrawal by the end of this year, and has submitted calculations according to which this date is realistic. The Soviet side, on the other hand, envisages that the withdrawal could be concluded only in 1991.

Two working groups were set up at the talks today. The first one is dealing with the possible formulation of the future agreement, while the second is composed of experts on military matters and transport. The results of the talks of these two groups will be discussed tomorrow at a joint session of both delegations.

As yet it cannot be said whether the talks will end tomorrow or whether they will continue.

Decin Residents Demand Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD0702202790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1730 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] The Czechoslovak Government's efforts to speed up the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovak

territory have received the support of the citizens of Decin. Antonian Dohnal reports:

[Begin Dohnal recording] A meeting of local inhabitants in support of the demands put forward by the Czechoslovak Government and made by the people of Czechoslovakia for the Soviet troops to withdraw from Czechoslovak territory as soon as possible was held in Decin's Lenin Square late this afternoon without slogans, emotions, or banners.

Their 22-year stay has been especially burdensome for the town and its inhabitants. Not only are the troops devastating the castle where they are garrisoned, but the traffic generated in the town by military vehicles and by the soldiers themselves has been quite intolerable for some time now. This is why citizens at today's meeting have been demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops by 20 August in order to be able to celebrate the 21st in a truly free town, free of foreign presence. [end recording]

U.S. Initiative on Troop Cuts Welcomed

*AU0802121790 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY
in Czech 2 Feb 90 p 5*

[Kveta Buschova commentary: "Week of Disarmament Proposals"]

[Text] The United States has been rich in keynote policy statements this week. At its outset George Bush presented to Congress the draft budget for fiscal year 1991 (which actually starts this October) and on Wednesday [31 January] he delivered on Capitol Hill the traditional Message on the State of the Union. It is gratifying that disarmament steps and initiatives were one of the common denominators in both of these statements.

U.S. defense expenditures, for example, are to amount to \$295 billion next fiscal year, which represents a 2 percent real cut in the defense budget when inflation is taken into account. And since democratic congressmen in particular (and they represent the majority) consider even this sum to be too high, the part of the budget "dedicated" to the Pentagon is likely to "shrink" a bit further when the budget is discussed in the legislative body.

It is also worth noting that, in connection with this, 55 military bases in the United States and 14 U.S. military bases abroad are to be abolished or scaled down over the course of 5 years and that 38,000 members of the U.S. armed forces and an additional 29,000 civilian employees of the defense department are to be laid off. Even though the 14 foreign bases represent only the proverbial "drop in the ocean" among the almost 600 U.S. military installations in 34 countries of the world, this is tangible proof of positive shifts in the thinking of the Washington leadership—all the more so as most of these bases are situated on the European Continent. Moreover, some of them are bases from which American intermediate- and short-range nuclear weapons are being gradually withdrawn.

However, the most important disarmament initiative is George Bush's proposal, made in his message on Wednesday [31 January], to cut the number of U.S. and USSR troops in Central Europe to 195,000 men on each side. Even though even this proposal evidently has certain weak points—among other things, the lack of a timetable and the failure to mention U.S. troops in southern Europe and in Great Britain (35,000 men)—it has met with interest and a positive response both within NATO and in the USSR. In connection with G. Bush's proposal of last May for an "all-European ceiling" of 275,000 troops for each superpower, this latest proposal also fails to make it clear that the numbers of U.S. troops stationed there [in southern Europe and Great Britain] would not be augmented.

In the Soviet Union and the other countries of East Europe, including Czechoslovakia, most people cannot fail to acknowledge the fact that the American President's proposal is based on a profoundly realistic analysis of the situation in Europe. It is also evident that Bush's proposal respects the situation in which the USSR and Mikhail Gorbachev, in particular, have found themselves. Because of interethnic conflicts, the complicated situation in the CPSU, and Czechoslovakia's and Hungary's efforts to bring about the earliest possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories, Mikhail Gorbachev is now under strong pressure from radical forces from both poles of the opposition.

This week's initiative from the American President is thus welcomed in both the West and the East. It is likely to become the central theme of comprehensive bilateral and multilateral discussions, not only at the Vienna disarmament talks, where the new U.S. proposal will soon be officially presented, but also during U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's visit next week to Prague, Moscow, and other European states.

U.S. Report on Havel-Baker Talks Outlined

*AU0802141790 Prague LIDOVÁ DEMOKRACIE in
Czech
7 Feb 90 pp 1, 4*

[CTK report: "U.S. Secretary of State in Prague"]

[Excerpt] Prague—[passage omitted] President V. Havel and Secretary of State J. Baker discussed the mutual economic cooperation of both countries, attitudes toward the proposals for the reunification of Germany, reducing the Soviet and U.S. military forces in Europe, and other problems of European cooperation. This was announced by a high-ranking U.S. State Department official at a meeting with journalists in Prague.

Secretary of State Baker emphasized the fact that the United States has been supporting the idea of the reunification of Germany for 40 years. He also rejected the recent proposal by East German Premier H. Modrow calling for neutrality of the future Germany. The high-ranking U.S. official, however, refused to comment on

the proposal that NATO armies not enter GDR territory after the reunification, if it materializes.

As far as CSSR-U.S. cooperation is concerned, the American official emphasized that President Havel did not ask for economic aid.

V. Havel and J. Baker spoke broadly about conventional force reduction in Europe. President Havel, according to the American official, pointed out the strong wish of the Czechoslovak people for the early departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. He said he will discuss this matter with the highest-ranking Soviet official, M. Gorbachev. V. Havel told the American guest that Czechoslovakia was negotiating not only the departure of all the Soviet troops from CSSR territory, but is also making preparations for reducing the size of its own army. He confirmed that Czechoslovakia will gradually reduce arms exports and intends to stop exporting arms altogether in the future.

According to the previously mentioned American official, V. Havel and J. Baker agreed on the fact that American army units will remain in Europe. In connection with the assumed large Soviet force reductions in Central Europe, the CSSR president said that it would be also beneficial to reduce the U.S. troops in Europe. V. Havel said that the dissolution of the military alliances is a long-term gradual aim which can be achieved only after a new European security system is built. J. Baker emphasized that NATO will retain its importance not only as a military alliance but also as a political one. [passage omitted]

'Plenary Session' on USSR Troop Talks

LD0902155890 Prague CTK in English 1506 GMT
9 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, February 9 (CTK)—The first part of the second round of Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia finished here today. The talks will continue at the level of experts' groups.

The last session of the two delegations brought the positions of the delegations on some points closer to one another. The delegations discussed a Czechoslovak draft agreement, involving dates of departure of the Soviet troops and ways of settling property questions.

The Soviet side said it is prepared to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia completely. The delegations discussed the possibility of withdrawing a substantial part of the troops by the end of May 1990 and both sides agreed that this step is realistic.

The delegations decided to continue work at the level of experts. A plenary session can be convened upon a proposal of one of the sides at any time.

Spokesman Criticizes Soviet Article on Troops

LD0902093990 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
0700 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] Lubos Dobrovsky, press spokesman of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, responded today to Thursday's [8 February] commentary by Aleksandr Kondrashov carried by TASS. He said in the statement that the author of the commentary evidently had not noticed that it is not a matter of Czechoslovak troops' being illegally on the Soviet Union's territory, but one in which the Soviet troops have for 22 years been violating a number of international treaties, the UN Charter, and the Treaty on Friendship between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. It is therefore up to the Soviet Union to demonstrate initiative, at least from the moment when the highest political places in Moscow stated that the Soviet troops' entry into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was a political error and a violation of international law.

Ostrava Body Backs Civic Forum on USSR Forces

LD0902042590 Prague CTK in English 1743 GMT
8 Feb 90

[Text] Ostrava, North Moravia, February 8 (CTK)—The regional council of the Civic Forum in Ostrava issued a statement today, supporting the demand that no foreign soldiers should be on Czechoslovak territory by December 31, 1990 and that at least 40 per cent of Soviet troops should leave the region by the elections to the Federal Assembly due in June.

In its statement, issued on the occasion of the current round of Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia in Moscow, the Ostrava Civic Forum stressed two points—firstly, that the 1968 agreement on the temporary stationing of the Soviet troops strictly defined the temporary character of their presence and the Soviet side must have foreseen that the pullout would once take place. Arguing with the housing problem in the USSR proves, however, that the Soviet side foresaw nothing of the sort. Secondly, a combat-capable army must be able to transfer itself by railway to a given place as five armies took only two days to occupy Czechoslovakia.

The statement also demanded that the area evacuated by the troops should never again be used for any military purposes.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Talks Continue

Second Round of Talks Ends in Moscow

LD0902144190 Prague Domestic Service
in Slovak 1400 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] The first part of the second round of Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from our territory has ended in Moscow today. The talks will

be continued at the expert level. The meeting of the two delegations brought the two sides closer together on certain points. The Soviet side announced its readiness to pull out its troops from our territory. In the course of the talks, the participants discussed the possibility of withdrawing a substantial number of combat units by the end of May according to an agreed specification. The two sides agreed that the completion of this step is realistic.

Ready To Begin 'This Month'

*LD0902192290 Bratislava Domestic Service
in Slovak 1730 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] [Announcer] Our first item—one of exceptional importance—is from Moscow where the first part of the second round of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory ended today. Petr Voldan reports:

[Voldan in Czech] The joint report on the talks with which our Foreign Ministry spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky has acquainted us says that the delegations decided to continue, without interrupting the talks, at the expert level, while leaving the option to convene a plenary session at any time on the proposal of one of the concerned parties.

Deputy Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Evgen Vacek said in an interview that the delegation evaluated the talks positively. Although the talks were complicated, the responsible preparation and the constructive attitude of both sides could be felt. When asked about the prospects of the talks, Evgen Vacek said:

[Begin Vacek recording in Czech] We agreed that, with regard to the good and constructive course of the talks, we shall not end the second round of the Moscow talks but that we shall press on. We agreed that the talks of the two groups of experts, legal experts and military experts, the representatives of the two ministries of national defense, and naturally other relevant representatives from the two countries would continue intensively. I think it can be said without going too far that it is not only in the interest of both sides but that both sides will succeed in soon achieving complete agreement about a final deadline for the full and speedy withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet side confirmed and clearly underscored that it will completely withdraw its military troops from Czechoslovakia—that is, that no Soviet military unit of those which are currently there will remain in Czechoslovakia. This is the first thing. The second important thing is that the withdrawal of combat troops of the Soviet Army from Czechoslovakia will start in the nearest future with the aim being that by the end of May the substantial, and I emphasize the substantial, part of these combat units will be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia. We see this as a very important result of this still unfinished round of talks. Speaking frankly, there is one thing which remains to be done: to agree on the final date

of a complete and speedy departure of the Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. [end recording]

[Voldan] We can also hear the view of the head of the Soviet delegation, Ivan Aboimov, about the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia. The Soviet deputy foreign minister said, among other things, when evaluating the talks:

[Begin Aboimov recording in Russian fading to Czech translation] The Czechoslovak delegation rightly argued that the Czechoslovak public is interested in learning as soon as possible when and how the Soviet troops will be withdrawn. The essential factor, which in my view also shows the wish of the Soviet side not only to assess this issue but also to tackle it constructively, is our statement that without waiting for the signing of the documents—as the deadline for the signing of the documents has not yet been set—the Soviet side has shown readiness to begin the withdrawal of the troops this month. I would like to say this to the Czechoslovak public personally, as I know that it gives much importance to our talks and pays great attention to this issue. [end recording]

[Voldan] As is obvious from the words of the heads of the two delegations, Evgen Vacek and Ivan Aboimov, the difficult talks about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory have borne first fruit, though we must wait further for the final solution of the problem.

Dienstbier Stresses 'Humanitarian' Aspect

*LD0902193590 Prague CTK in English 1708 GMT
9 Feb 90*

[Text] Prague, February 9 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier dealt here Friday at a news conference with the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

He said that the talks of the government delegations of experts ended in Moscow today without any result and a part of the Czechoslovak delegation returned home at noon. "The most important prerequisites for an agreement are in substance the internal, social issues of the Soviet side," Jiri Dienstbier said. The humanitarian aspects could also be mentioned in this connection, as the Soviet Union has no accommodation for both its soldiers coming from Czechoslovakia, and the officers and their families as well. That was why the Soviet delegation insisted that the withdrawal should not be finished by the end of 1990, according to Czechoslovakia's proposal. It is obvious that the withdrawal is not prevented by either strategic or political questions, as the Soviet Union has expressed its will to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia. They are the humanitarian and social questions which remain open, the Czechoslovak foreign minister underlined.

Vacek: 'Should Leave' by End of Year

*LD0902222590 Prague CTK in English 1740 GMT
9 Feb 90*

[Text] Prague, February 9 (CTK)—Soviet units should leave Czechoslovakia and are capable of doing so by the end of this year, Czechoslovak Defence Minister General-Colonel Miroslav Vacek told a press conference here today.

He added that questions regarding the families of the Soviet soldiers and expected complications during transport are currently discussed by the foreign ministry.

Minister Vacek also said the government had accepted his suggestion that military parades should not be held in Prague and Bratislava this year.

Answering a question concerning military airports, the minister said that the complaints of citizens living nearby were justified, and the air force was trying to limit air traffic.

Dienstbier Addresses 'Open Skies' Conference

*LD1302103890 Prague CTK in English 0910 GMT
13 Feb 90*

[Text] Ottawa, February 13 (CTK)—"Czechoslovakia welcomes the open skies proposal and gives it its full support," Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier said at the current conference devoted to the open skies proposal here yesterday.

Czechoslovakia does so because after important changes in its society it is decided to contribute to universal confidence building and to progress in the disarmament process in which a precise and thorough control is the basic prerequisite, it does so because the proposal corresponds to the requirements of maximum transparency of military activities and military organizations, and also because according to Czechoslovakia, open skies will strengthen significantly collective security, which is what Czechoslovakia seeks, Jiri Dienstbier stated.

"We would like the open skies project to become gradually open to all states of Europe and to result in such a system of measures of confidence which would have really all-European and gradually global character," Jiri Dienstbier underlined.

"The conference on the 'open skies' proposal is very important because it is in fact for the first time after decades that a principle of free flights and air inspections is to be introduced which is an important measure to strengthen confidence," Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier told CTK here.

If airplanes of Warsaw Treaty member countries are allowed to fly over territories of NATO member countries and vice versa and to control the state of armament and military equipment of the other side, it is in my opinion a very important step towards disarmament, he added.

On the other side, it is, in my view, a symbolic act and it reflects the mental state of the world because at present states discuss something which has been true for many years. For thirty years, satellites have been able to provide most detailed information. It is an absurd aspect, nevertheless a positive one, that states are able to discuss this matter at all and are resolved to reach an agreement, Jiri Dienstbier underlined.

The Czechoslovak foreign minister further stated that Czechoslovakia wishes for a dynamic development in Europe in the conditions of stability. "The Czechoslovak Government of National Understanding does not, however, believe that this stability can be preserved or even strengthened by maintaining the status quo. We proceed from the fact that the conception of blocs should be replaced by a model of plurality," Jiri Dienstbier said adding that the dissolution of blocs is not possible immediately but that there should exist political will to overcome this conception.

"The existence of blocs today helps the disarmament process. Therefore in this stage we agree with those representatives who want to preserve blocs as an instrument making the process of disarmament easier. This should be their last chief task in the continuing development towards democracy," the minister stated.

He said that the Helsinki process is a tested instrument for the transition from the conception of blocs to that of democracy and plurality and Czechoslovakia will strive for this process to gain a new quality corresponding to the political, economic, humanitarian and security situation in Europe at the turn of the third millennium. In this connection the minister underlined the necessity of successful results of the Vienna talks of 23 states on conventional armament in Europe to be achieved as soon as possible so that the negotiators could be given a new and far more resolute mandate.

Jiri Dienstbier also stated that Czechoslovakia welcomed with great satisfaction U.S. President George Bush's proposal for the reduction of Soviet and U.S. forces in Central Europe. "The limit of 195,000 men makes it possible to solve the wish of those states, including Czechoslovakia, which do not consider it necessary to have foreign forces on their territories," the minister said.

CSSR: Compromise Reached on Troop Withdrawals

*AU1302125490 Paris AFP in English 1238 GMT
13 Feb 90*

[Text] Prague, February 13 (AFP)—Czechoslovakia has agreed to extend its deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops beyond the end of this year, after Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev intervened personally in the negotiations, a foreign ministry spokesman announced Tuesday.

The departure of Soviet "combat units" will take place before the end of the year but support and logistic units will not withdraw until next year, spokesman Lubomir Dobrovsky said.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Party organ, SVOBODNE SLOVO, said Saturday that 1,700 trains of 35 coaches would be needed for the transport of the 75,000 Soviet soldiers and their material.

The Soviet troops, which were deployed in August 1968, have 1,200 tanks, 146 helicopters, 77 aircraft and 2,500 vehicles and troop transporters. All this equipment, excluding the aircraft, will be loaded onto trains near Soviet military bases, the paper said quoting Czechoslovak Defence Minister Milan Vacek.

The paper noted that all the convoys would have to go through Cierna nad Tisou station in eastern Slovakia for a change of bogies because of the difference in gauge between Czechoslovak and Soviet railways.

Technical resources could cope with no more than four convoys a day, or 140 wagons. But the daily said "a year would be enough" to complete the operation.

The second round of negotiations on the withdrawal on February 8 and 9 was adjourned and talks were to resume this week in Moscow at expert level.

The main Soviet bases are in northern Bohemia near Ceska Lipa and Teplice, north of Prague between Mlada Boleslav and Milovice airport, northern Moravia at Olomouc, central Slovakia at Zvolen and at Kosice in eastern Slovakia.

Spokesman Discusses Transport Problems

LD1302204490 Prague Domestic Service
in Czech 1730 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] Immediately after the news conference by the president of the Republic, the press spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lubos Dobrovsky, met with journalists.

He confirmed that the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia and that therefore, there will be none here in the future. Nevertheless, there are some problems connected with this withdrawal and its date, in particular transport problems. The Vienna talks will not have an effect on this withdrawal. Lubos Dobrovsky expressed appreciation for the significance of yesterday's message by Mikhail Gorbachev to Vaclav Havel which helps to explain the reasons why the Soviet side is doing so much to extend the date of the final withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovak territory. He continued:

[Begin Dobrovsky recording] In any event, in the talks we wish to achieve, as far as possible, the departure of all fighting units so that our date, the end of the year 1990, is not exceeded by too large a margin. We also hope to do this so that the rest of what remains—that is, the

noncombatant installations, are removed naturally also as soon as possible. However, we hope this is done in such a way as to ensure that the ecological damage that is taking place shall, we say now, no longer take place. I believe that this is very hopeful and very realistic. [end recording]

Lubos Dobrovsky said that an agreement was reached which stipulates, above all, that those military units to be withdrawn this month will stop their exercise activity. The agreement also stipulates that the Soviet side join in working out a special agreement in which all damage proved to have been caused by the troops, their exercise activity, their nonrespect of certain hygiene and ecology regulations, will be paid for by the Soviet Union. Problems connected with a great number of purchases made by Soviet soldiers in our country before their departure are also being discussed.

Discussion in Ottawa

LD1402094190 Prague CTK in English 0750 GMT
14 Feb 90

[Text] Ottawa, February 14 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier and his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze met here last night in the framework of the "Open Skies" conference for talks on a Soviet troops withdrawal from Czechoslovak territory.

Eduard Shevardnadze explained the difficulties that the Soviet Union has with providing social security to members of the Soviet Army after the withdrawal, and promised that the Soviet side will send a written statement on the proposals of the Czechoslovak authorities.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Secret Missile Unit Begins Disbanding

LD3101184190 East Berlin Voice of GDR
Domestic Service in German 1800 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] The disbanding of a missile unit of the National People's Army began today in the Schwerin area [bezirk]. It is equipped with modern Soviet weapons systems with a range of under 500 km, about which, until now, the public had no knowledge. The missiles, launchers, and ground equipment are to be scrapped in November. One weapons system will be placed in the Dresden Military Museum.

Government Positively Assesses Bush Proposal

LD0102182290 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1658 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—[Passage omitted] The Council of Ministers has positively assessed the viewpoint

expressed by U.S. President Bush on the speedier conclusion of the Vienna talks and on reducing the number of U.S. and USSR troops in Europe to 195,000 men each, government spokesman Wolfgang Meyer said at a news conference in Berlin today. It would be desirable for other NATO states to take this as an example.

Soviet Troop Exercises To Proceed 5-11 Feb

LD0102182190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1709 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—A troop exercise by the Western Group of Soviet Forces will take place as planned 5-11 February in the Haldensleben, Lindau, Dobritz, Brandenburg, Wesenberg, Sewekow, and Jaevenitz area. Up to 15,500 members of the Western Group of Soviet Forces will be involved in the troop exercises. The GDR's National People's Army will take part in the exercise with 400 members.

This troop exercise was announced to all participant states by the GDR Government in accordance with the final document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

Commentary on Bush Arms-Cut Proposal

LD0202120790 East Berlin Domestic Service in German 1630 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Guenther Leuschner commentary from Vienna]

[Text] Bush's surprising proposal must, according to the general view held here in Vienna, be seen against the background of budget problems and the conflicts they entail in Congress. It is also welcomed, however, as an accommodating move toward the Soviet Union, which may in any case be forced to pull out its forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In the past, U.S. support has been for a mutual reduction of both its own and Soviet forces on their allied territories in Europe to a ceiling of 275,000 troops. Now Washington would be prepared to withdraw an extra 80,000 troops from Central Europe. As a consequence, some clarification will have to be brought to the question of what is going to happen to those forces deployed in southern Europe.

Given an agreement for a ceiling of just under 200,000 troops, the Soviet Union would have to or have the chance to withdraw a far higher number of troops without jeopardizing the military balance. That is perhaps what the U.S. accommodation is all about. However, it would only leave a balance between the U.S. and Soviet forces deployed in the region and not take into account the 160,000 British, French, Canadian, Belgian and Dutch troops stationed in the FRG. Adding those, as one will certainly have to, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would be placed with a disadvantage that will rise as the ceiling for U.S. and Soviet forces is lowered.

The reckoning behind it is simple. The new proposal by President Bush would leave the West with 350,000 foreign troops on FRG soil, while the Eastern side would be left with a mere 195,000. The difference turns out even larger with the 3:1 ratio of the Bundeswehr and National People's Army forces taken into account. All things considered, the demarcation line between the two alliances would see a 'substantial' NATO superiority. That, too, will be part of the calculation to be conducted at the negotiating table here in Vienna.

Whether Bush's proposal does, in fact, accommodate the Soviet Union might depend on Western readiness to also include the 160,000 non-U.S. foreign troops in the FRG in the disarmament process. That has long been at issue and has blocked a successful conclusion to the corresponding parts of the Vienna accords. Now this issue might play an even greater role.

U.S. Resistance to Disarmament Criticized

AU0202110390 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 30 Jan 90 p 2

[Franz Knipping commentary: "Washington Takes Time Out"]

[Text] Regarding disarmament, contradictory signals come from Washington. According to CIA Director William Webster the threat to Western Europe and the United States has perceptibly lessened and will probably decrease even further. He substantiated this by the political changes in the Warsaw Pact states and the unilateral Soviet troop reduction in Central and Eastern Europe.

However, those who assumed that the decreasing sense of threat would encourage the Bush administration to intensify its disarmament efforts have been corrected. The lights have been switched from green to red, at least in an important sector. For an indefinite period, Washington does not want to negotiate with Moscow on a further restriction of nuclear tests or their comprehensive ban. This decision marks the break of a promise given to the Soviet Union and a turn in the previous U.S. policy.

The foreign ministers of the two world powers agreed in Jackson Hole in September 1989 to immediately start a new round of negotiations after the ratification of two agreements on subterranean nuclear tests concluded in the seventies. However, now it is stated that a longer break is needed, so that the efficiency of the verification measures, which, after many years of experiments by specialists of both sides, has long been regarded as proven, can be studied.

In the opinion of experts and members of Congress, the real reasons were completely different. The work to modernize the U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is being continued, and, for example, in the SDI space armament program the study and development of nuclear X-ray lasers and electromagnetic impulse

weapons are on the agenda. All those forces that cling to the concept of nuclear deterrence despite perceptible easing of tension between East and West are not interested in further limiting the power of warheads being tested.

The opponents of success-oriented disarmament negotiations also introduced discordant notes in other questions. The WALL STREET JOURNAL has campaigned for the abandonment of the Vienna disarmament negotiations on conventional disarmament, and presidential adviser Rowny evaluated the USSR's unilateral troop reduction as alarming. Reason: In this way the pressure on Washington for unilateral disarmament or a troop withdrawal is increasing.

In view of the contradictory signals, President Bush made it clear that he is not considering a revision of the new realistic policy toward the Soviet Union that has been laboriously initiated.

Armored Personnel Carriers To Be Scrapped

LD0202095790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0915 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Over the next few weeks, armored personnel carriers [APC's] of the GDR border troops will be scrapped. A statement issued by the border troops says that this will be carried out either on-site or via intermediary depots. On 5 February, the first 100 APC's will be moved to the Neubrandenburg repair works. This measure is part of the reforms being carried out among the GDR border troops.

U.S. Disarmament Proposal Called 'Overdue'

AU0502152590 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 1 Feb 90 p 2

[Franz Knipping editorial: "An Overdue Reaction"]

[Text] The offer made by U.S. President Bush on more far-reaching troop reductions in Europe where NATO and the Warsaw Pact continue to face each other highly armed, does not come as a surprise. It is much rather an overdue reaction to the political changes that have been taking place in all Warsaw Pact states without any exception. These changes are accompanied by considerable force reductions. Negotiations are being held on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the CSSR, Hungary, and Poland. In addition, the Soviet Union suggested that all of its troops and those of the United States should be totally withdrawn from Europe by the end of the nineties.

As a result of all this, the feeling of being threatened by the respective other side has disappeared in East and West. The wish has grown on either side to get rid of excessive arms burdens; this should be particularly easy in the case of conventional troops and weapons. Because the NATO camp failed to take disarmament steps, it was coming under pressure to move. A political impetus was

necessary to make the Vienna talks on force reductions between the Atlantic and the Urals result in a first agreement before the end of 1990. Bush's proposal could be such an impetus.

At the same time, the U.S. President's message has also domestic policy causes. In Congress, those voices are becoming increasingly audible that say that the United States should reduce its forces and should considerably reduce its presence of 320,000 men in Europe. In view of its state debt of \$2 trillion, its budget deficit of \$123 billion in the current fiscal year, and in view of gloomy economic forecasts, representatives advocate more thrift, particularly in the military area. Ranking first is the desire for a strategy and expenditures that are adjusted to the changed political landscape in Central and Eastern Europe.

Bush has taken account of such moods by a dual admission—the admission that the military threat by the Soviet Union in Europe has been decreasing, and the admission that fewer U.S. troops are required there than has been claimed until recently. However, those who had hoped for the U.S. readiness to carry out disarmament in other areas as well are disappointed. The modernization of the U.S. strategic offensive weapons and the SDI space weapons program are being continued undiminished. Bush's message left absolutely no doubt about that.

Pentagon Budget Cut Proposal Assessed

AU0602121090 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 31 Jan 90 p 5

[Klaus Wilczynski commentary: "Contradictory Bush on Arms Reduction"]

[Text] President Bush will present the Congress his proposals on the coming military budget, the nightmare of the U.S. taxpayer. After lengthy discussion of increases and cuts, he wants to reduce arms spending by a total of 2 percent in real terms.

In relation to the Pentagon's current annual spending of \$305 billion, 2 percent—or \$6.1 billion—is not exactly a lot. Nevertheless, they make a difference in the expected \$140 billion deficit in the 1989/90 state budget. By the end of 1989, the accumulated debts of the government amounted to \$2.8 trillion. This is a threat to stability. The arms budget is the main reason for this mountain of debts.

However, what is more important are the global factors. In connection with the rapid changes in the socialist countries, even the military experts can no longer seriously come up with the danger from the East. Thus one should consider Bush's proposal as an offer. The financial means are to be recovered through troop reductions. It was stated that one was also considering reducing the number of U.S. soldiers in the FRG. Some 15,000 men are to be withdrawn anyway in connection with the INF

Treaty. Within NATO there have been fierce and contradictory discussions on reducing foreign armed forces in the FRG. This reduction would promote the Vienna talks on conventional disarmament.

This holds equally true for the closing of the two major U.S. bases in Greece, which has been proposed, even if today they are only of little military value and their disbandment, which has been demanded by the Greeks for a long time, would bring this country closer to NATO again.

The catch of the Bush proposal is that there are no planned cuts for the two most dangerous and expensive armament projects, namely SDI and the Stealth bomber. These are a real threat and stimulate the arms race. How is Bush going to make this compatible with the improvement in East-West relations, which even he mentioned? Heated arguments are expected in Congress.

GDR Officials Address Military Doctrines Seminar

NVA Structures Noted at Vienna Talks

AU070211790 East Berlin NATIONAL-ZEITUNG
in German 26 Jan 90 p 4

[ADN report: "NVA Structures Published in Vienna"]

[Text] Vienna (ADN)—Yesterday at the CSCE seminar on military doctrines in Vienna, Major General Hans-Werner Deim, who is responsible for combat readiness and operational training on the Main Staff of the National People's Army [NVA], presented previously unpublished details of the structure and the defense tasks of the NVA.

According to him, the two armies of the ground forces have the defensive order "to hold their own against the potential of an enemy who is two to three times stronger in numbers in areas near the border that are 120 to 150 km wide and to repel attacks by fire of any kind and by troops." This follows the "logic of response;" in this connection, "prevention and preemption are demonstrably" ruled out.

Concerning tanks, the defense capability in the event of a conflict is based on 69 tank battalions, of which 26 with a total of 806 tanks are integrated in the alert units. Gen. Deim itemized all 2,542 tanks that remained after the unilateral reduction of 600 NVA tanks. If the Vienna negotiations are successful, only 1,060 tanks will be left. At present, the Western Group of Soviet Forces has 5,800 tanks stationed in the GDR. Since this number is also being reduced, a total of 6,000 to 6,500 tanks are to remain on GDR territory by the end of 1990.

According to information about the other armed forces, personnel strength, and safeguards, Deim discussed equipment. In the GDR, handguns, ammunition, explosives, communications and pioneer technology, certain ships, and military supplies are produced. In 1989, 1

percent of industrial goods production came from this sector. The NVA gets most of its arms from imports, mainly from the USSR, the CSSR, and Poland. Two-thirds of its resources are used for imports. GDR industry does not grant any preferential treatment to the NVA; "the prices are a result of objective cost calculations."

According to the general, since 1 December 1989 "exact definitions" of the ready-alert regime "that additionally defuse the general situation" have been carried out in the NVA, in which one was "guided by the low probability of outside threats and the increasing reliability of early warning." The permanently available minimum amount of personnel has been reduced from 80 to 50 percent.

Military Exercises Reduced

AU0802120490 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 1 Feb 90 p 1

[ADN report: "NVA Intends To Reduce Number of Exercises"]

[Text] Vienna—The dimension and number of tactical exercises of the GDR National People's Army [NVA] will be further substantially reduced this year. That was announced by Major General Professor Rolf Lehmann, deputy chief of the "Friedrich Engels" Military Academy, at the CSCE Seminar on Military Doctrines in Vienna on Wednesday [31 January].

The general added that the NVA was planning to hold one tactical exercise each of an Army division, an Air Force division, and a Navy flotilla in 1990. He said that the NVA's training was "oriented toward active defense against a numerically superior enemy and the repulsion of concentrated strikes of its air forces." This was based on the "principle of responsive actions," he said, adding that the NVA would not begin military actions.

Envoy Discusses Talks

LD0602184590 East Berlin Domestic Service
in German 1830 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Interview with Guenther Boehring, head of the GDR delegation at the Vienna CSCE military doctrine seminar, by correspondent Guenter Lueschner; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Mr Ambassador, a three-week seminar with high-level military officers from the 35 CSCE states has ended in Vienna today. Could you give our listeners an idea on what that is all about?

[Boehring] From the very beginning of the Western alliance, NATO, and the Eastern alliance, the Warsaw Pact, both systems have been asserting that all their weapons and all of their military thinking were exclusively aligned to defense. This seminar's purpose was to actually test the military personnel of each participating

state, all 35 states—let me include the neutral, non-aligned states—as it were, in order to prove credibly that this was the case.

[Correspondent] Apparently, all those participating are satisfied with the seminar's results. Does that imply that not only general political statements were made, but that there were also definite talks about what may have been inside the safes—that is, still secret classified matters.

[Boehring] Yes. First, one did not make any political statements at all. From the very beginning, there were only definite factual talks. As regards what you term secret classified matters lying in the safes, the Western participants were in fact perplexed over the Warsaw Pact state delegations' openness in their presentation of the structure of their forces and their defense budgets.

[Correspondent] Regarding its Army, the GDR is currently in a not-very-easy situation. Did that have an impact on our officers' appearances here in the Vienna Hofburg?

[Boehring] One did not perceive anything of it. On the contrary, those generals discussing the individual items of the agenda indeed received, let me use this term, best marks for the details they submitted and for the way they answered questions.

[Correspondent] That is, questions regarding training, operational missions, the National People's Army's weapons, and questions ranging up to armament budgets. Mr Ambassador, the last question now: Whatever applies to disarmament, now applies to the subject of unity, paths toward unity. Please give me your personal impression regarding the seminar on military doctrines—how do you see it in relation to what is probably the most-discussed topic in the GDR at the moment—unity?

[Boehring] Yes, I will gladly answer your question, Mr Leuschner. In the light of the variety of bilateral talks that we had here in Vienna during the seminar with supreme-level and high-level NATO officers, particularly the United States, let me first state that I have gained the positive impression that the people in charge in that organization are aware of handling military power and sensitive to our delicate situation—which is a positive factor, I believe. For the rest, when you use the word unity in that context, then I would like to tell you very personally—and I tell it to the listeners in my country very personally—I do not wish to be a citizen of a united NATO Germany, and I do not want my grandchildren to serve with the Bundeswehr.

Details of Secret Weapons Export Depot Given

LD0702175590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1702 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Neubrandenburg (ADN)—About two months after the discovery of the secret weapons export depot of the IMES company in Kavelstorf, near Rostock, the

precise number of the weapons and munitions stored there have been made public. At the beginning of December, a total of 24,760 submachine guns, 1,398 machine guns, 198 carbines, and 1,691 revolvers, pistols, and shotguns were impounded. This was announced today in Waren (Neubrandenburg Bezirk), where the weapons are being stored for the time being. [passage omitted]

The People's Navy and the State Prosecutor's Office now have sealed up the weapons and munitions once again. The government will decide on where the weapons and munitions are to be stored in the future. [passage omitted]

Commentary on Modrow's Neutrality Concept

LD0702161590 East Berlin Voice of GDR
Domestic Service in German 1617 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Studio commentary by Colonel Wolfgang Lehmann, retired—recorded]

[Excerpts] According to Modrow's own words, his ideas about the military neutrality of a united Germany were meant to be an offer for dialogue. [passage omitted] As yet there have not been any feasible and coordinated concepts on how this German-German process of rapprochement and unification, which is gaining its own dynamics now, should be integrated into the European context and concurrently be made controllable in political terms, without old fears of being threatened reviving or even new such fears emerging.

Thus, complicated military policy problems have to be solved in that context. Those rather earthy positions, which were taken up in the West on this subject and are still in vogue, are aimed at simply clapping the NATO helmet over the GDR—and that's that. Such age-old thinking must be assumed when it comes to Pentagon chief Cheney. Also FRG Defense Minister Stoltenberg gave some signals that were at least unclear when in Munich he stated that one must insist upon each state's right to defend its territory on its own national border, which means forward defense.

Would that be under a NATO structure, on the Oder or the Neisse River? Aside from the sensibility of the borders toward Poland and the CSSR, the existing security structures in Europe would be downright toppled over then.

Of course, there were other opinions, for example the Genscher formula "Germany within NATO, but NATO not as far as the Oder River." Or there was the Momper pattern of a demilitarized GDR with Soviet troops deployed there temporarily.

But all those ideas seem to be first thoughts that are by no means definite solutions. Definite answers cannot be given. One will have to go on thinking, will have to negotiate with each other—and the Germans in the GDR will have to be asked. [passage omitted]

If the growing-together process by the Germans will take place in harmony without becoming a nightmare to others, then it must be carefully embedded in the process of building security structures in Europe that go beyond the blocs. That requires that changes be made to the opposite blocs. Instead of military-political instruments, they must become political alliances that safeguard security and stability in a period of radical changes.

Their military organization should be disbanded and an all-European security created. That would mean goodbye to images of foes, to deterrence doctrines, and to nuclear first-strike concepts. Logically, that would result in an interplay of unification and disarmament. Within the CSCE framework, prospects are already perceivable leading from the reduction of conventional force up to offensive incapability. In that connection, the idea of military neutrality would be justified—but not as a final stage, but as an initial step toward a desirable demilitarization of Germany and all of Europe. [passage omitted]

Dresden 'Pax' Group Urges No Military Alliance

LD0702112790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1046 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Dresden (ADN)—A united Germany must, under no circumstances, belong to any military pact—either the Warsaw Pact or NATO. The present developments in Europe have shown that the two military blocs have lost their original purpose. The Dresden Human Rights group "Pax" notes this in a letter to FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl, which was also sent to ADN.

"The democratic movements in Dresden, Leipzig, and Berlin certainly did not intend for the military bloc to simply be exchanged. We believe, rather, that the efforts of the German people should be directed toward the creation of a neutral, democratic, and peaceful new German state," "Pax" notes.

The human rights group asked Helmut Kohl to use his authority as federal chancellor to ensure that a future Germany will be a member of neither of the two military blocs and that the military service be completely abolished.

Council Reaches Accord on Military Doctrine

LD0802141890 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1224 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] A fourth session was held by the national Defense Ministry's consultative council, which is where representatives of 29 parties, organizations, and movements came together to meet GDR Defense Minister Admiral Hoffmann, high-level military officers, and military scientists. The discussion concentrated on one of the military reform's supporting pillars—the GDR's military doctrine. Here is our report by Wolfgang Lehmann:

[Begin Lehmann recording] This was the fourth attempt made by the council to come to an agreement on that weighty subject, which can justly be termed the key

military issue. Let me tell you first of all that this time the goal was reached, following four-hour discussions that were constructive and sometimes rather controversial.

A key issue was under discussion inasmuch as concepts regarding the military doctrine matter—which all states and coalitions have given their blessings to in a highly official manner—give good evidence about the purpose, the tasks, and the character of the military tool of power. Under discussion were the attitude toward war, definite statements regarding the preservation of peace, the use or nonuse of employing military power, offensive and defensive concepts, and up to pinpointing the character and the missions of an army.

Certainly, that is a highly political, explosive matter that must also be sanctioned by the Constitution. That is why those participating agreed with the defense minister's proposal that the results elaborated by the consultative council be submitted to the new representative bodies of the people following the March elections.

The contradictory debate over the issue of whether the National People's Army [NVA] should remain a compulsory military service army or become a vocational army indeed demonstrated that the above decision was right. There were several such crossroads, which were in the end settled with formulations leaving undecided several options for the Cabinet.

There was much resoluteness in rejecting speculations with regard to the process of unification by both German states. Today any conclusions arising from such a process with reference to shaping the military scope simply cannot be drawn in advance. Consequently, the realistic decision was made to proceed from the status quo. The rest of the discussion was conducted on the basis of an improved draft, with a variety of participants making their contributions by proposals on amendments and other ideas.

Professor Dr Schefer, military scientist, who chaired the revision committee, mentioned the following course of thinking in that connection: The statements aimed at preventing war are even stronger. They have been put in line with our concepts regarding disarmament and military trust-building in a better way. Patterns of threat have been eliminated. The debate has fully confirmed these intentions.

With these military policy guidelines—that term was placed in lieu of the strictly scientific term "military doctrine"—I believe some precious work of thoughts has been rendered. That work may certainly be very useful to the newly elected People's Chamber and its subsequent government.

Thereupon, the defense minister read a statement on the NVA's attitude during the October events. He said that the army had neither as a whole nor in part been prepared for an armed operation against demonstrations. Only some units involving about 100 men had

been equipped with police tools so as to reinforce the protection of targets, he added. Using firearms was not only prohibited, but almost generally made impossible because weapons had to be deposited. Any reports reading differently were rumors, he stated.

Before long, the consultative council will deal with the GDR's security conception. [end recording]

Commentator Doubts U.S. Disarmament Credibility

LD1002101790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0939 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Commentary by Jochen Stennert—recorded]

[Text] Only one week ago, U.S. President George Bush suggested a considerable reduction of U.S. and Soviet troops. His suggestion was promptly supported, even by Mikhail Gorbachev. No doubt, that suggestion might push ahead the Vienna negotiations, for there are talks about the reduction of arms and forces in Europe going on, as everybody knows. Also the statement of Secretary of State James Baker, who is currently discussing details of the Bush proposal with the USSR leadership, has given rise to optimism. He advocated that the CSCE summit take place this very year, where a treaty on conventional arms in Europe might be signed. According to Baker, NATO should indeed remain the military guarantor for stability in Europe, yet it should develop more markedly toward a political alliance.

All the more astonishing, Bush is now defending SDI and wants to extend that project, and he does not see any reason, in the context of the changes going on in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, to reduce U.S. military offensive capability.

There is also another report: Les Aspin, chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, criticized the U.S. administration on the grounds that the draft of the 1991 defense budget reflects old thinking. Old thinking because the Pentagon draft budget meets neither the new international political reality, nor U.S. reality. Aspin believes that the USSR's domestic economic pressures certainly guarantee its interest in drastically reducing the strategic sector.

Esteemed listeners, doubts must be permitted—why preserve offensive capability? In Eastern Europe, when everything has begun to move, including the military sector. Hungary wants the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops. There will be talks about such a withdrawal in the CSSR. The USSR itself has declared its preparedness to immediately and completely withdraw its troops from the GDR, provided that U.S., UK and French troops are withdrawn from the FRG. Only recently the GDR belatedly disclosed its defense expenses' structure and planning; in the past transparency was not taken too seriously in that field.

Particularly in light of such events, I harbor doubts when George Bush speaks of preserving offensive capability. I believe, the people in the East, who are advancing reforms and who are concerned over the future of their countries, have a right to hear clear statements by President Bush. To preserve offensive capability—how shall we understand that in view of the ongoing process of finally sealing the shipwreck of the old through free elections, while comprehensive cooperation with the West in all areas is sought?

I think that people in the East who have demonstrated such a great degree of courage in demolishing that ossified Stalinism, and who have also stressed honesty, particularly in the military field, do not deserve to be told that, notwithstanding all reforms and changes, U.S. offensive capability should remain. In my opinion, the question arises: Who is that offensive capability aimed at?

HUNGARY

Votes on Withdrawal of Soviet Forces

LD3101155590

[Editorial Report] Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian at 1520 GMT on 31 January begins carrying a live relay of the afternoon proceedings at the Hungarian National Assembly. Acting session chairman L. Horvath opens the proceedings as follows:

“A decision will be made. I ask the esteemed National Assembly: Does it accept the National Assembly's draft resolution on the representation of the Republic of Hungary's military policy interests, on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from our country? Let us vote.”

A reporter is then heard saying: “According to this, the Hungarian National Assembly authorizes the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Hungary, that at the talks under way between the Hungarian and the Soviet Governments, the Hungarian side should urge the soonest possible elaboration of a schedule for the full withdrawal of Soviet troops, taking into account the amount of time which is technically necessary and the international aspects of the question, so that on this basis total withdrawal should take place this year, or at the latest in 1991. We have 209 votes in favor.”

L. Horvath is heard saying: “The National Assembly has adopted the draft resolution with 209 votes in favor and 9 abstentions.

Talks on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Begin

LD0102180690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Hungarian-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary have begun in Budapest. At the discussion, which is expected to last 2 days, the detailed schedule for the departure of military

units will be discussed. The Hungarian National Assembly yesterday authorized the government to urge the full withdrawal of Soviet troops as soon as possible.

Horn Welcomes Bush Disarmament Proposal

*LD0202085590 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0600 GMT 2 Feb 90*

[Text] The Hungarian foreign minister has stated that there is no obstacle, from a military viewpoint, to the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Gyula Horn described as one-sided those opinions in the Soviet press which have been alleging this.

The head of Hungary's diplomacy, in NEPSZABADSAG, described President Bush's disarmament proposal as positive, because it envisages radical troop reductions in the Western half of the continent as well. After over 40 years, it is high time to begin the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in Europe, said Gyula Horn.

Hungary, USSR Agree on Troop Withdrawal

Agreement Reached on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD0202182790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 2 Feb 90*

[Text] [Announcer] Talks between Hungarian and Soviet experts on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops have concluded in Budapest. Elemer Csak reports:

[Csak] After initial encouraging signs, the discussions appeared to come to a standstill in the final round. Detailed coordination work followed, and, in the end, the experts left the negotiating table late in the afternoon with a completed work document and a press statement in their hands.

The latter states, among other things, that under the leadership of Ferenc Somogyi, Hungarian state secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ivan Aboimov, Soviet deputy foreign minister, talks were held for 2 days on the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. The two delegations agreed that the troop withdrawal—and I reiterate, the complete troop withdrawal—will be carried out within the shortest time possible, on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement.

The sides also agreed that the coordinating talks on the pace of the troop withdrawal would be further continued. Otherwise, as the Soviet deputy foreign minister said in response to my question, one of the biggest problems is that it is necessary to provide for dwellings, and, in part, jobs, for the soldiers who leave, and it is necessary to find a solution for the schooling of the children of those who have families. Obviously, the question of the extent to which the roads and railways can be burdened with the vehicles, tanks, and other technology to be withdrawn, when this can be done, and how the reloading should be scheduled at the border-stations which otherwise are extremely crowded, is no

simple task either. All these things must be taken into account when the experts work out the timetable for troop withdrawal.

With regard to the final withdrawal of the units of the Soviet Army, it appears that there is no obstacle in principle to this. That is, the Soviet side shares the Hungarian standpoint that militarily nothing justifies the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary.

At the conclusion of the talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Aboimov was received by Foreign Minister Gyula Horn. Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati held a separate discussion with Colonel-General Omelichev, Soviet chief of general staff [title as heard].

Communique on Talks

*LD0202211690 Budapest MTI in English
1755 GMT 2 Feb 90*

[Text] Budapest, February 2 (MTI)—The Hungarian Foreign Ministry has forwarded the following communique to MTI:

On the basis of agreements between the governments of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Hungary, talks were held in Budapest on February 1 and 2, 1990. The Hungarian delegation was led by Ferenc Somogyi, secretary of state at the Foreign Ministry, the Soviet by Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov. The delegations held talks about the full withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary.

In the course of the talks the sides set forth their position, and agreed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops will be carried out on the basis of an inter-governmental agreement to be concluded within the shortest possible time. The sides agreed to continue talks related to the agreement, and at working out the timetable for the pull-out. The talks were held in an objective, constructive atmosphere.

Gyula Horn, foreign minister of the Republic of Hungary, met Ivan Aboimov. Ferenc Karpati, minister of defence of the Republic of Hungary, met Colonel General Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy of the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army.

Negotiators on Troop Withdrawal

*LD0402211090 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1800 GMT 4 Feb 90*

[Interview with Hungarian State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi; Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, Hungarian chief of general staff; and Ivan Aboimov, USSR deputy foreign minister by unidentified reporter on "The Week" program; date and place not given—recorded; Aboimov speaks in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[Text] [Reporter] Mr State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi, you have conferred on complete troop withdrawal and

reached an agreement that the schedule of the withdrawal is to be finalized at the government level, and, what is more, within the shortest possible time. What is the shortest possible time?

[Somogyi] In practice, starting from now, we shall clarify, within the framework of continuous expert discussions, all the circumstances and viewpoints that have to be taken into consideration in order to work out a schedule for the complete troop withdrawal, on the basis of which this withdrawal can be carried out in settled conditions and, hopefully, within the timeframe proposed by us. To be specific, hopefully this will take place before the end of this year or next year, at the latest.

[Reporter] This series of discussions has paved the way for another one. Why is there so much preparation?

[Somogyi] If we want—and we do want—the troop withdrawal to occur amid settled conditions, then we have to take into consideration numerous factors such as, for example, the fact that rail transportation, which is the number one method of transportation that comes into question, should be organized in such a way that it should not impede normal civilian deliveries, either in passenger transport or freight transport.

[Reporter] I would like to ask one more question about the scheduling: Was it the combined effect of such a kind of domestic necessity or international factors which made it possible or necessary for the Hungarian Government to put complete withdrawal on the agenda precisely at this time?

[Somogyi] It was at this point that it became clear that those earlier concepts, those earlier analyses, which caused the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary had become outmoded.

[Reporter] Half seriously, half in jest, people generally say that disarmament always costs a lot, at least in the first phase. What will be done with the equipment, installations, building, or—this is the sort of thing I was thinking about—the gasoline which the Soviet troops might leave here? Will we have to pay for these?

[Somogyi] During the discussions, we offered the possibility for examination of these questions in order to see how we could settle this issue. Our Soviet negotiating partners asked for patience in this connection. They still have to think it through. They plan to take the bulk of their materials home. They will certainly offer us certain equipment. Naturally, we shall have to compensate them for this equipment, these materials.

[Reporter] If I remember correctly, Mr State Secretary, one of your most recent statements noted that the troop withdrawal does not affect our membership in the Warsaw Pact. But I, a layman, think that it does nevertheless affect the distribution of military roles within the Warsaw Pact, because the USSR is to withdraw 50,000 troops and a large amount of technology from our country.

[Somogyi] Our leaving the Warsaw Pact is, naturally, not a precondition for the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops, just as the cessation of our membership is not necessarily a consequence of the complete withdrawal.

[Reporter] And from a military viewpoint?

[Borsits] From the military viewpoint, it is likewise not justified that the Soviet troops remain here. The basic function of the Hungarian People's Army is to reliably protect the country's borders, both on land and in the air, and to defend our country.

[Reporter] Do we have adequate equipment? Do we have, or shall we have, expensive planes which will be able to perform this task?

[Borsits] We hope that at a later date we shall be able to create the conditions in order to be able to replace our existing equipment, to the extent possible, with more modern technology. In my judgment, we cannot plan this now but perhaps will be able to within a few years.

[Reporter] It would appear that by now it is no problem to make a political decision about troop withdrawal. But how ready is the Soviet Union to take this step?

[Aboimov] The essence of the Soviet Union's principled stand with regard to the troops stationed on foreign territory is that by the year 2000—as our leaders have on more than one occasion stressed—we must completely withdraw our troops from foreign territories. As for the question of how ready the Soviet Union is at this moment for the withdrawal of those military units temporarily stationed in Hungary, we have reached agreement in Budapest. This will have to be set down in an intergovernmental agreement and an appropriate schedule worked out.

Naturally, the logistics of moving such a large military unit is accompanied by particular difficulties. We have exchanged views on precisely this question of how we should set about the practical realization of this work. In our opinion, thorough work will have to be performed in the Soviet Union as well; the appropriate infrastructure will have to be created to accommodate the military units which are to be withdrawn from Hungary. We cannot ignore the human factor either. I would like to recall the fact that among the soldiers currently fulfilling their duty in Hungary are many military officers' families which, for instance, do not have permanent homes in the Soviet Union. Apart from this, there are also many children in these families. We have to build day nurseries and nursery schools; further, we also have to ponder what to do with the schoolchildren.

At the discussions, we agreed, as I have already mentioned, on the text of the necessary intergovernmental agreement. We have created a working group to elaborate on financial and material details. I believe that a decision will be reached by paying attention to all the possibilities at the disposal of the two sides as to the final deadline of the troop withdrawal.

[Reporter] And what will be the fate of the troops themselves? From time to time we hear and read accusations with regard to the Soviet Union that reductions of this nature in fact mean only a regrouping of troops.

[Aboimov] Look, at present it is difficult for me to say anything specific. I would just like to note that The Soviet Union is a ready carrying out unilateral Armed Forces reductions. The extent of the reductions announced by us numbers 500,000. With regard to numbers, this is equal to the West German Bundeswehr. Therefore, I believe that in light of the Vienna agreement, which we hope will be realized and the appropriate document signed, the reductions would take place by mutual agreement. I do not exclude the possibility that these reductions might also affect those military units which will be withdrawn from Hungary's territory. But we shall only be able to judge this more objectively after agreement is reached in Vienna.

Horn on Troop Withdrawal

LD0402160190 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0730 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Interview with Foreign Minister Gyula Horn by Jozsef P. Szabo on the "World Clock" program; date and place not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Szabo] The first edition of "World Clock" goes out at the end of the week when Hungarian-Soviet negotiations have begun on the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

[Horn] And what is more—if I wanted to formulate it very precisely—a truly substantive phase of the negotiations has begun. I too have held negotiations with Deputy Minister Aboimov.

Well, a precise timetable to determine the order, the calendar of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, has been adopted. Such a timetable had not existed until now; there had only been [agreements] extending only to certain partial areas. Now a workplan of timetable is being prepared for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops stationed here. The other thing is that we wish to lay this down in an intergovernmental agreement within, at the maximum, a few weeks.

The withdrawal, it must be said, is a very complex question from the point of view that appropriate technical conditions must exist. What do I have in mind? I must have assurance that the withdrawal would not overburden or cause serious delays in our already crowded roads. It is well known that the Zahony-Csop railway stations or focal points are crowded as it is. Thus, the car must be dispatched in such a way that there [on the Soviet side] it should be possible to receive in an appropriate rhythm the trains coming from Zahony. What is more, a large proportion of the Soviet military units to be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia concentrates on this station. In other words, the elaboration of such technical details will be worked out by experts beginning

on Monday, i.e., 5 February. What is fundamental for me is the complete readiness of the Soviet political and military leadership to withdraw their troops without residue.

[Szabo] We have received news this past week about the possibility of opening the [Hungarian] Chief Consulate in Cluj. I have read in your recent statement that even in your view the Hungarian-Romanian negotiations proceed haltingly. Is it not possible that we have had excessive illusions regarding today's regime in Romania?

[Horn] There are two things. One is that it [the Romanian leadership] must struggle with many other very difficult tasks. The other is that it is surrounded by the old apparatus, with which we have had very unfavorable experiences in the past. Thus, a kind of resistance must be overcome. [passage omitted: Horn lists the proposals Hungary put on the table for closer relations, including radio and television cooperation]

Somogyi Foresees Withdrawal 'This Year'

LD0202221590 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Excerpts] The Hungarian-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops ended today. [passage omitted] Peter Zentay has given an interview to Ferenc Somogyi. We now quote just one sentence from the deputy minister [as heard], which predicts the time of the troop withdrawal.

[Begin Somogyi recording] My conviction is still that our formulation, according to which the troop withdrawal can take place this year, or at the latest next year, is realistic, and on the basis of my knowledge now, too, I say that this can be realized.

Somogyi on Soviet Troop Talks

LD0302144390 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0545 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Telephone interview with Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi by Peter Zentay on 2 February—recorded]

[Text] [Somogyi] The fact that these negotiations took place at this time and that as a result of the negotiations we agreed on the further continuation of the talks is in itself very significant.

Realistically speaking, from these first experts' talks, we could not have expected anything other than that the two sides would express their position in detail on problems connected with the complete withdrawal of troops. Apart from this, such talks should determine the circumstances and points of view which must be taken into account when we work out the complete timetable for the troop withdrawal and a timetable on the basis of which the complete withdrawal can take place within the shortest possible time, in an ordered fashion.

[Zentay] Tell me, what points of view have to be taken into consideration, what kinds of details are we talking about here?

[Somogyi] For example, we have to take into account that the withdrawal of troops should take place in such a way that there will be no damage to Hungarian roads—thus, we will basically use the railways as the mode of transportation—and in such a way that the troop withdrawals do not hinder the course of civilian transportation, either passenger or freight transport. Also, we should take into account the fact that it is a question of the departure from Hungary of 50,000 soldiers and their families and their resettlement in the Soviet Union. We should take into account the financial questions which arise, questions of accounting, during the course of the stay here, such as compensation for the installations left here.

[Zentay] I do not understand exactly, who owes whom?

[Somogyi] At the moment, nobody owes anything to anybody, for it is a question of once the Soviet troops have left the country, then perhaps the various organs of the Hungarian Republic will make use of installations which they have built, and which could be useful for us, in return for some kind of compensation.

[Zentay] So, payment will have to be made for those installations which they have built in Hungary?

[Somogyi] For that part of those which we can [word indistinct] make use of.

[Zentay] What was your impression about the attitude of the Soviet negotiating delegation? The Soviets must after all feel pressured, since in Hungary the leaders declared well in advance that they want them to pull out this year or at the latest by the beginning of next year. In Czechoslovakia they would like to see the Soviet troops depart almost immediately. At the same time, U.S. President George Bush has come forward with a proposal which really could have had the effect of a surprise, too, if you like, for the Soviets. Thus, the Soviet delegation sat down at the negotiating table in rather a difficult psychological situation, did they not?

[Somogyi] I think that the official Hungarian statements—and I would emphasize the adjective official here—did not have the nature of an ultimatum. My conviction is still that our formulation, according to which the troop withdrawal can take place this year, or at the latest next year, is realistic, and, on the basis of my knowledge now, too, I say that this can be realized.

As for U.S. President Bush's proposal, to a certain extent, this really had the effect of a surprise. At the same time, it must also be said that it was more or less in the air. I would refer only to the fact that two weeks ago in Vienna, the Hungarian representation contributed at the negotiating forum of the 23, the Hungarian stance on precisely this question stated that the ceiling, after the signing of the agreements, for the stationing of foreign

troops must be determined at a significantly lower level than the 275,000 figure at the negotiating table at that time.

[Zentay] This Hungarian proposal did not get publicity in the Hungarian press. One wonders whether the Hungarians and Americans had coordinated, but I suppose there was no question of this.

[Somogyi] No there was no question of this. I would explain it rather by the fact that, taking into account that a significant part of my aforementioned contribution dealt with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, and the Vienna aspects of this question, the local press—I think understandably—primarily devoted attention to this, and the press missed the part of the speech which formulated a new Hungarian stance on other questions on the agenda of the Vienna talks.

Lorincz Explains Army Reductions Criteria

LD0202052890 Budapest MTI in English 2244 GMT
1 Feb 90

[Text] Budapest, February 1 (MTI)—The priority of the defensive character, improvement of quality—these are the two guiding principles of the planned staff reduction and Armed Forces reform of the Hungarian Peoples Army, said Lieutenant General Kalman Lorincz, commander of the Hungarian Peoples Army, at a press conference on Thursday in Papa, on the occasion of an inspection held at the local air division.

Present at the inspection was Lieutenant General Janos Stock, head of the air defence and flight group of the Hungarian Peoples Army. Special attention was given to the crash of the MiG-23 training plane on January 26, which claimed two lives.

Lieutenant General Lorincz told MTI that the expert investigation is still in progress, thus a precise reconstruction of what happened is not available as yet. MiG-23 type aircraft are not allowed to take off until the investigation is completed.

With respect to the staff reduction, it was said this will be realized gradually by the end of 1992, by far-reaching taking human points of view into consideration. Various alternatives will be offered to those affected by the reduction, and they will be able to choose between other military or civilian jobs, or will be able to retire with age exemption.

The measure, under which two-thirds fewer students will be accepted to the military officers schools, also serves staff reduction.

Cuts in Border Guard Troops Planned

LD0602173390 Budapest MTI in English 1518 GMT
6 Feb 90

[Text] Budapest, February 6 (MTI)—The border guard in Hungary is to be cut from 22,000 to 9,000 over the

course of the next five years, Brigadier General Janos Szekely, national commander of the border guard of the Ministry of the Interior, announced at a press briefing on Tuesday.

Guarding state borders and monitoring border traffic will be exclusively in the charge of professional guards from 1995.

At present, there are 3,000 professional border guards, 1,600 civilians and 17,000 soldiers in the service, while the corresponding figures for 1995 will be 5,000, 1,600 and 2,000-2,500. Soldiers will have to do only assistant jobs.

The commander said that during the last year, 97 million passports were handled and 25 million vehicles checked. This job is extremely difficult using the old methods, and it is to be hoped that a time will soon come when it will no longer be necessary to stamp each and every passport, and when there will be only selective checks on passenger traffic. However, this kind of service could be carried out only by professionals.

The period of transition will commence on March 1, with professional guards taking over control of the northern border section to begin with.

In order to accelerate passenger traffic, the 72 border-crossing stations will be gradually equipped with computers, and arrangements will be launched to handle European passports, which are coded and planned to be issued to Hungarian citizens as well within a few years' time.

Soviet Army Says No Maneuvers During Elections

*LD0602190790 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1830 GMT 6 Feb 90*

[Text] The Soviet Southern Army Group command stationed in Hungary has sent us a statement, according to which they will not hold any kind of military maneuver in the country during the election campaign or the elections. The troops will remain in their barracks or on the exercise grounds. They will carry out the tasks included in the annual training plan. At the same time, the Southern Army Group command also announces that on 17 February, in a number of Soviet barracks, including Esztergom, Veszprem, Szeged, and Sarbogard, programs will be held entitled "Open Gate." Those interested are cordially invited to attend, including representatives of the various parties and organizations.

MDF Urges Suspending USSR Military Maneuvers

*LD0602184890 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 6 Feb 90*

[Text] The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] has protested over the fact that the Soviet Southern Army Group will be holding military maneuvers in Transdanubia in February, March, and April. In view of the

elections to be held on 25 March, the MDF evaluates the timing of the military maneuver as an unfriendly gesture. The MDF Presidium has called on the provisional president of the Republic and the acting speaker of Parliament to have the Soviet units' maneuvers suspended.

Government Decree Restricts Arms Sales

*LD0702173990 Budapest MTI in English 1449 GMT
7 Feb 90*

[Text] Budapest, February 7 (MTI-ECONNEWS)—The Hungarian Government has recently issued a new decree which lays down rules for the export of arms manufactured in Hungary.

The decree puts a ban on the sale of arms to countries which violate human rights or which are, or are likely to be, involved in armed conflict with a third country.

In addition, arms export licences will only be granted if the customer undertakes not to pass the weapons on to a third party without specifying the country.

With arms manufacture and exports figures still a secret, it is difficult to obtain a clear picture of Hungary's arms industry, particularly as military equipment is produced by companies which also manufacture other products, such as Videoton Electronics, the Diosgyor Machine Factory, the Precision Mechanical Company, the Mechanical Laboratory, the Labor Instrument Industrial Works, and the Weapons and Gas Appliance Company.

In 1987 sales of products for military use accounted for 22 per cent of total net turnover of these firms, while 80 per cent of such products, worth 20 billion forints' (\$425 million), were exported.

1989 saw a considerable drop in military production, with a 30 per cent fall in orders, and the trend is likely to continue this year, thus rendering the new restrictions largely irrelevant.

Communications equipment and instruments account for 75 per cent of Hungary's military production, while artillery and infantry firearms and ammunition make up 12 per cent, vehicle and aircraft maintenance contracts 8 per cent, and chemicals and light industrial products for military use 5 per cent.

Soviet Army Maneuvers Set for Feb-May

*LD0802101790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0500 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] [Announcer] Denes Csengey, member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum Presidium, speaking yesterday at the national summit meeting, repeatedly asked if there will be any Soviet military maneuvers at the time of the elections in Transdanubia. According to a report in NEPSZABADSAG, Premier Miklos Nemeth explicitly denied this and said that in the earlier training plan there were indeed plans for Soviet military maneuvers in

Hungary, but these had been renounced by the competent Soviet officials on the basis of a mutual agreement.

However, NEPSZAVA carries completely different information. Our newsreader, [name indistinct], will now acquaint you with this:

[Newsreader] Staff members of NEPSZAVA have investigated reports on planned Soviet military maneuvers based on the communique of the National [word indistinct] Service, and alluding to Soviet Captain (Klebov), who stated in MAGYAR HIRLAP: The Southern Army Group will not hold military maneuvers in either February or March.

The NEPSZAVA staff members telephoned Hungarian Democratic Forum staff members in Veszprem, who quoted an official statement from page eight of the 26 January issue of the local paper, in which the Territorial Command of the Soviet Army informs the population that it will be holding artillery and military maneuvers in the vicinity of Veszprem from 1 February to 30 May.

The journalists then telephoned an officer of the Southern Army Group, Colonel (Kristof Korespov), who told NEPSZAVA the following: It is possible that there will after all be military maneuvers in the vicinity of Veszprem, but this is the Territorial Command's discovery. Following further questioning, he stated that at the given time, over a three-month period, Soviet troops from throughout the country will move to the Veszprem region and, working in relays, will carry out military maneuvers until 30 May. By way of reassurance, the colonel added: This will not be a large, amalgamated military maneuver; it is merely lots of little ones.

Karpati Wants Soviet Troops Confined to Barracks

LD0802093190 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0900 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] The defense minister has called on the commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group to not carry out any maneuvers or artillery practice from February to April that would require the troops to leave their local garrisons.

This information was given to Hungarian radio by Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Csikos, deputy head of the Defense Ministry's Main Press Department. He said that Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati this morning summoned to the Ministry the commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group and asked for a briefing on the kind of maneuvers that are being planned for the coming months on Hungarian territory.

The commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group said that for this period they are not planning any more significant maneuvers at all, that they will only be carrying out leading artillery [vezetesi loeveszeti] tasks to be performed in the course of training and at the subunit level.

New Decree Regulates Arms Trading

LD0902121790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] The government has issued a decree regulating arms trading. From now on, deals can only be struck if they do not violate Hungarian foreign policy and defense interests. Sales cannot be made to countries where fundamental human rights are violated or where a war is under way. The sale of arms is prohibited to so-called crisis zones, too. The Committee of Experts appointed by the interior minister, and the defense, trade, and foreign ministers can issue licenses for arms traders to sign contracts. In disputed cases, they will also ask for the opinions of the parliamentary Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees.

Horn on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Talks

AU0902152090 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 2 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with Foreign Minister Gyula Horn by Laszlo L. Lengyel; place and date not given: "Negotiations on Soviet Troops Withdrawal Have Begun"]

[Text] Negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary began on 1 February. A few hours prior to the beginning of these negotiations, President Bush had submitted new proposals concerning the reduction of foreign troops deployed in Europe. We asked Gyula Horn about his evaluation of these proposals and about the prospects of Hungarian-Soviet negotiations.

[Horn] I think that President Bush's proposal is definitely positive. I would like to add that it coincides with the Hungarian ideas in many respects; it starts from the premise that the presence of foreign troops in Europe should be minimal. The proposal is also very important because it stipulates radical troop reductions in Western Europe as well. Previously, there was hardly any mention of such reductions in Western Europe. I would like to remind you that our state secretary recently made similar proposals in Vienna.

I am convinced that, after more than 40 years, the time has come to begin the genuine withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe because political, military, and other aspects no longer justify their presence. We start from the premise that nuclear deterrence remains on both sides, and therefore there is no need to also deploy conventional forces either here or in Western Europe. Naturally, this cannot be done overnight, but we must start on this road, and, in my view, the starting point is good. Thus, I can only welcome President Bush's proposal, and I am convinced that the Soviet side will also react positively to this proposal.

As for the Hungarian-Soviet negotiations, I am confident that these negotiations will end in a constructive agreement. Although various opinions appeared in the Soviet

press prior to these negotiations, I think these are one-sided opinions that do not take the realities properly into consideration. For example, it is not true that the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary is justified by military factors. I agree that we must consider the Vienna talks in the current negotiations, but these are not so closely related as was previously considered. Therefore, in my view, there is no military obstacle to a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. I also understand that this is no easy thing, but if we are serious about the need to create a common European home, this also requires the elimination of the remnants of World War II.

[Lengyel] How do you regard the rumors on Gorbachev's possible resignation? In your view, what is the background of such rumors?

[Horn] For me, everything that appears in the West is of secondary importance. We consider the news coming from the Soviet Union to be of utmost importance. The Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership are confronted by extremely serious problems. Naturally, we are rooting for Gorabchev to remain in office. His personality could be the guarantee for the continuation of the restructuring process in the Soviet Union. At the same time, I think that the time has come to embark on genuine changes at long last. I am thinking primarily about the fact that the Soviet Union cannot avoid the introduction of a multi-party system either, a system that is the essence of pluralism. This is a much more difficult process in the Soviet Union as compared with Central-Eastern Europe, but, in my opinion, it cannot be avoided because, whenever it is implemented, the one-party system is bankrupt. Therefore, eliminating the remnants of Stalinism is inconceivable without eliminating the one-party system.

The other thing is that all the countries in Central-Eastern Europe have embarked on creating the conditions of a genuine market economy. It is impossible to thoroughly change the economy without market conditions, and this also relevant for the Soviet Union. Naturally, this is a much more difficult task in a big country full of contradictions, as compared to a smaller and more homogeneous country.

[Lengyel] It has recently been announced that a Hungarian Main Consulate will again be opened in Kolozsvar [Cluj]. This is the first concrete result of the negotiations held with the new Romanian leadership. What further steps does the Hungarian Government plan for improving bilateral relations?

[Horn] When we sat down to negotiate with the new Romanian leadership in Bucharest on 29 December 1989, we discussed the tasks objectively and comprehensively, and we agreed on the required actions. The opening of the Main Consulate is only part of this agreement, just like the issue of the Hungarian Cultural Institute in Bucharest. In addition, at this meeting we

formulated several proposals and demands for multilateral development of our bilateral relations, to guarantee the rights of the Hungarian minorities in Romania, and to develop the contacts among the population. We offered our help for all these tasks.

In the past month, we have endeavored to jointly solve the aforementioned problems and to have at least a Romanian intention to act. We are aware of the serious problems facing the new Romanian Government, but we cannot waste a single day here. In this spirit, I wrote a letter to my Romanian colleague and asked him to deal with the bilateral problems in a constructive way, because it seems to me that progress in this matter is extremely slow. I think that there is primarily a need for a readiness for initiative on the Hungarian side, even more so because, in my opinion, there are still many people from the old apparatus around the current Romanian leadership, and these people are not keen on settling our bilateral relations.

[Lengyel] We are now facing elections. What major diplomatic steps and government-level visits do you plan in the period of time up to the elections?

[Horn] Naturally, we are also busy on working out how to participate in the election campaign. This primarily means ensuring the conditions for holding free elections. Consequently, we are limiting our international activity to the most urgent things. I myself will leave for Canada next week to participate in the ministerial meeting of the "23 of Vienna" and to answer the Canadian government's invitation. Premier Miklos Nemeth will visit Israel in the second half of February, and then he will visit the Netherlands. We are not planning more visits, but naturally we will receive foreign personalities visiting Hungary.

POLAND

Defense Budget Allocations Examined

PM2501115090 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
16 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Wojciech Markiewicz: "A Kilogram of Tank, or the National Defense Ministry Budget"]

[Text] Until recently anyone could, paradoxically, find out more about the Polish Army from the Western press than from our own, domestic press. Virtually everything was a secret, and if we were to judge from the numerous publications, or radio and television programs, the Army has concentrated solely on carrying out exercises, receiving instruction, attending gala swearing-in ceremonies, engaging in army ensemble singing, carrying out guard duties, offering assistance at harvest time, and working in support of the state economy—which, of course, brought the latter huge benefits. The absence of real information created an inevitable data deficiency and resulted in frequent discrepancies in the quoted figures concerning the numerical strength of our Armed

Forces and the equipment at their disposal. Because we remained silent, the world concluded that we had a disproportionately large army—third largest in Europe, no less—commanding an excess of armaments.

These allegations were denied by Deputy Minister for National Defense General Jozef Uzycki, on the pages of TRYBUNA LUDU of 17 November 1989. However, the discussion on the subject of reforms in the Armed Forces and reductions of its numerical strength and expenditure began even earlier, in the Sejm, when, seeking to rescue the collapsing state budget, deputies and senators began, among other things, to point to the national defense sector as a possible source of economies, and to recommend cuts in the National Defense Ministry [MON] budget.

Billions Grow as Percentages Decrease

So how much does it cost us, the taxpayers, to keep the Armed Forces? How many soldiers serve in them and how many civilians work for them? How much do they earn and what privileges are they entitled to? Are the Armed Forces not overequipped in view of today's international situation,

and is society not forced to carry an excessive burden in financing too high a proportion of that overequipment? How much would a professional army cost the taxpayer? Given the three-figure inflation, is a reduction in expenditure at all possible?

At the beginning of the year the parliamentary state budget act allocated to the MON the sum of 1,007 billion Polish Zloty [Z]. Soon afterward, however, it became obvious that, owing to inflation, that amount would be insufficient. In October, after the act was accordingly amended, the MON budget amounted to almost Z1,982 billion. These inflationary rises reflect, for example, the costs of feeding national servicemen. In January the so-called basic daily "z" ration amounted to Z440. By mid-October, having been increased on three occasions, it reached Z2,972, and by early November it rose to Z4,050 (while the ration for servicemen in training was Z5,580). The costs of the provision of uniforms, medical treatment, quartering, and transport had also gone up, albeit less. But if we look at the percentage share of MON expenditure in the state budget over the last 3 years (see Box 1), the curve has gone down by nearly 3 percent.

Box 1. MON BUDGET IN BILLION ZLOTYS

	Polish Army General Staff data					
	1970	1980	1982	1987	1988	1989
Projected MON budget expenditure	35.4		70.4	193.4	453.9	545.8
by MON	35.7		71.6	186.3	506.0	767.6
by the state	379.3		1,246.3	2,434.2	5,973.2	10,001.3
MON's percentage share in state budget expenditure	9.7		5.7	7.6	8.5	7.7
						5.7

* After the October 1989 amendments to the Budget Act

A study of the table will reveal one rather astonishing entry. In 1982, a year of martial law—that is, a period of intensified military activity—and of drastic price increases imposed in February, the expenditure was lower than planned by more than Z7 billion.

Unrecorded Expenditure

Thus, this year we will have spent nearly Z2 trillion on the national defense sector. But it is doubtful whether this figure indeed reflects the true costs borne by the state in maintaining the sector—just as was the case with the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] budget, which I discussed in issue 36 of POLITYKA. Enterprises whose production is designated for the Army enjoy 50-percent "special production" tax reductions. Apart from this, the sector buys many products at lower prices than those paid by other customers. For example, the Army purchases Star trucks directly from the factory with a 30-percent discount. This reduces the profits of both the factory and the state, thereby constituting another unrecorded item of budget expenditure.

However, the Ministry of Industry Special Production Department informs me that the 50-percent reduction

on tax on enterprise revenue is no longer applicable, although such a provision was indeed written into the first edition of the regulations concerning the status of defense industry enterprises. But since last February the new, third edition has been in force, which grants defense industry enterprises tax concessions on assets held and a 5-percent tax reduction on the value of special production sales. A 50-percent relief entitlement on the State Labor Incentives Fund [PFAZ] has also been withdrawn. The priority status with regard to the supply of raw materials, fuels, and power will be withdrawn next year.

Discounts on purchased goods were never true discounts. Prices of military goods are approved by the Armaments Pricing Commission [KCU], which ensures that the costs of wastage and mismanagement are not included in the price and that the price is not dictated by a monopoly holder. A Star truck sold 30 percent cheaper is a vehicle sold at a realistic price with a decent profit.

Special production for the Army is losing its attraction for enterprises—well, perhaps with the exception of export production. For example, 1 kg of tank sold abroad

is worth \$33, 1 kg of artillery \$36, and 1 kg of missile \$228. By comparison, 1 kg of Polonez automobile is worth \$1.75. But what if we were to remove all the electronics from the tank? How much would 1 kg be worth then?

Our forces have been ordering less and less equipment. There is no money, and all prices just keep going up. For example, an An-2 aircraft costs Z60.7 million, while an An-28 costs as much as Z595 million. A T 72 tank costs Z278 million. A large warship costs Z10.2 billion, and a small one Z120 million. A guided anti-tank missile costs Z1.6 million. Depending on its type and standard of equipment, an APC costs from Z37 million to Z129 million, and an AKMS assault rifle costs Z71,500. That was last year's price, since at the present time there is no demand.

But let us go back to the unrecorded expenditure. According to a 1960 act which states that servicemen are not employees as defined in the Labor Code, they do not pay Social Insurance Agency [ZUS] insurance contributions, unlike other employees of the budget-financed sector. Servicemen's contributions are paid from the state budget as a subsidy to the ZUS old-age pensions fund, and in this way they do not constitute a burden on the MON budget. Servicemen also receive an earlier old-age pension, equal to 100 percent pre-retirement pay, which includes basic pay, supplements, and so-called uniform allowance.

Another unrecorded item of state budget expenditure is the financing of the sector's housing construction. This year, in accordance with the 30 December 1988 Council of Ministers Resolution, the sum of Z37.3 billion has been allocated for this purpose outside the MON budget. But since this amount is not index-linked and there are 11,000 professional soldiers on the housing waiting list, the National Defense Minister has provided an additional Z32 billion from the sector's budget.

An additional source of the sector's revenues is the work in the national economy carried out by national servicemen. This year soldiers from operational units have worked 817,000 man-days in land recultivation and reclamation, modernization of railroad and telecommunications lines, as well as grain harvesting and potato lifting. For instance, the agriculture sector has paid the MON Z325 million (25 percent' worth of true labor costs) for the work carried out by soldiers and reimbursed the costs of the use of the forces' equipment and machinery. Telecommunications paid servicemen according to daily maintenance costs: Z4,750 per day until August and Z8,650 thereafter. In the future all work of this kind will be carried out by Civil Defense Detachments.

Europe's Seventh Army

At the beginning of the year our Armed Forces were 347,000 men strong, which placed us in seventh position in Europe, after the USSR (2,485,000), Turkey (654,000), France (547,000), the FRG (488,000), Italy

(388,000), and the U.S. forces in Europe (380,000), but ahead of Spain (325,000) and Britain (319,000). The international situation and the need for budget cuts have been responsible for the decision to reduce the forces by 33,000 men by the end of the year. But until that happens, the existing data remain valid.

At the beginning of the year there were 234,144 men doing their national service and 112,656 professional soldiers, which—when rounded up—gave the figure of 347,000. But this figure does not include the 116,000 civilian employees who work in the forces and for the forces and who are paid from the MON budget. They are remunerated in accordance with the principles applicable to the national economy as a whole, but are additionally entitled to a supplement of up to Z12,000 per month on account of special working conditions in the sector. In the fourth quarter of 1988 the average monthly pay of a civilian employee will amount to approximately Z346,000.

Nor do the statistics include the group of over 23,000 soldiers serving in the Border Protection Troops or the Vistula Troops, as these come under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The armament of the seventh largest army in Europe (ninth in a few weeks' time) is much more modest than its numerical strength. As regards the numbers of tanks, aircraft, warships, and helicopters that the Armed Forces command, we only qualify for somewhere between tenth and twentieth place. This year the expenditure on arms purchases has been cut by Z50 billion, including Z37 billion on arms imports, whereas renovation projects and the majority of investment projects have been cancelled. Compared with 1986, when 34 percent of the MON budget was allocated for the purchase of weapons and technical equipment, 23 percent for training and operational costs, and 7 percent for investment projects, this year the respective figures are 24, 18, and 2 percent. As much as 56 percent of the budget funds had to be allocated to feeding, health care, and remuneration of the servicemen.

In that case perhaps a professional army would be a better bet? A better trained army which would, consequently, be less numerous and therefore cheaper? I am told at the Ministry that in order to do that we would need to spend approximately an additional one-half billion dollars a year. We are talking in terms of dollars because these are the calculations of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). There it has been calculated that with permanent subsidies there would have to be a radical increase in wages, accompanied by a reduction in expenditure on the purchase of weapons and more modern equipment. And this would lead to a regression in the development of our armed services.

How Much Does A Soldier Cost?

On 1 November the average annual cost of maintaining one of our 234,000 national servicemen was as follows:

food	Z1,518,000
uniform	Z521,000
medical care	Z27,000
quartering	Z478,000
transportation of supplies	Z29,000

On top of that, every national serviceman receives an average monthly pay of Z28,973.

A dress uniform costs Z127,800; fatigues, Z82,600; a cloth greatcoat, Z145,000; pair of field boots, Z61,000; everyday cap, Z11,550; service shirt, Z14,200; pair of socks, Z9,600; belt, Z12,150; parade aiguillette, Z16,600.

In view of the specific and strenuous nature of the job, which involves irregular hours, on-call availability, frequent separations from the family, and no possibility of taking up additional jobs, the professional soldiers' salaries in every army are higher than the average remuneration in the economy. In Warsaw Treaty armies it is some 40-70 percent higher; in the FRG it is 40 percent higher. In Poland the factor of 1.3 is assumed. In reality this is seldom achieved—and then only over short periods of time.

Since 1 December the average salary, including the food allowance payable since 1 November, amounting to Z121,500, comes to Z540,000, inclusive of the index-linked compensation applicable since 1 October. In industry, as I have been told at the MON, the average monthly pay in December is Z550,000.

Below are some examples of monthly salaries paid. I was told at the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy that these salaries include all allowances except for the uniform allowance, which is paid annually and comes to some Z18,000 per month—higher in the case of the 156 Polish generals because of the larger amount of hand-applied braiding required for their uniforms:

The National Defense Minister—salary drawn from the Office of the Council of Ministers;

General [General Broni], after 35 years' service—Z1,466,000;

Military district commander in the rank of lieutenant-general, after 35 years' service—Z1,426,000;

Division commander in the rank of major-general [general brygady], after 26 years' service—Z1,011,500;

Regiment commander in the rank of lieutenant-colonel, after 23 years' service—Z779,000;

Battalion commander in the rank of captain, after 11 years' service—Z592,700;

Company commander in the rank of lieutenant, 8 years' service—Z544,500;

Platoon commander in the rank of second lieutenant, after 4 years' service—Z491,300;

Platoon sergeant (the lowest posting), after 2 years' service—Z395,500.

For the sake of comparison I note that a voivoda, or the Mayor of Warsaw, earns up to Z1,212,000 and a director of a large industrial enterprise earns about Z1,500,000; furthermore, they have the all-important opportunity to travel abroad and make savings [in hard currency] on their travel allowances—not to mention my informants' intelligence concerning the earnings of some company directors, which range from several to a dozen or so million Zlotys per month.

Privileges

Apart from the aforementioned entitlement to old age pensions equal to 100 percent pre-retirement earnings, under existing legislation professional soldiers are entitled to a service apartment. However, according to the authors of the study, "Social Welfare Matters in the Forces," the average waiting period for an apartment allocation is 2-3 years, and in some garrisons even as long as 5 years.

Soldiers are also entitled to use the sector's health service and receive free medicines for themselves and their families. According to the authors of the study, the fact that the average sick leave among professional soldiers comes to 9 days a year, whereas among non-military employees it is 19 days, demonstrates the effectiveness of the sector's preventive medicine system. Servicemen have been entitled to free medicines since 1920. Once a year, during the high season, a serviceman is entitled to subsidized—that is, virtually free—holidays. The charge for these is equivalent to the amount received as food allowance. From 1990 servicemen will be entitled to reduced-rate holidays once every 2 years. Family members are charged 25 percent of the full cost, which at the moment, in the winter season, is calculated at Z385,000.

Professional soldiers and members of their families are also entitled to 50-percent reductions on railroad and State Motor Transport [PKS] bus charges, as well as once-yearly free tickets to a destination of their choice and also free fares on travel connected with medical treatment and house moving.

According to the July 1988 Armed Forces Quartering Act, a professional soldier and his family are also entitled to a so-called house repairs and maintenance allowance. He can receive this in kind, as the Forces administration will carry out the necessary repairs and renovations, or in cash. In 1988 every family member was entitled to one so-called "unit entitlement" (two in the case of senior officers), equivalent to Z13,000-16,000. Once every 5 years a professional soldier is also entitled to one house redecoration allowance unit worth Z38,000, which, again, he can claim in cash or in actual work carried out.

A professional soldier can also join the Defense Studies Society, which is subsidized from the MON budget to the tune of Z70 million, or any of the military sports clubs, subsidized likewise to the tune of Z3.5 billion. And when he retires, he can join the Union of Former Professional Soldiers, financed to the tune of Z160 million.

Straight From Bygone Eras

At the beginning of the current academic year students organized a boycott of the compulsory military training courses. The Independent Union of Students [NZS] demands radical rather than "facelifting" changes in students' military training schemes, while the sector declares its readiness to discuss the possible reforms but stresses that it must comply with the relevant parliamentary act, and the Ministry of National Education, in turn, is ready to mediate in the talks. And the students themselves simply dislike military training. Why? They complain about the lack of contact with the lecturers and the compulsory military service duty for postgraduates, which they regard as a waste of time. They find the military service routine irritating, especially as in many garrisons it continues even today as if

no changes have happened in Poland during the past months. They intensely dislike the military drill, the frequently primitive sense of humor, the propagandist slogans straight from long bygone eras, the paltry rhymes of army songs, the Kolobrzeg festival [of army songs], the pomp, the mindless routines, the marching, the forced marches, the parades, and the monotony of the "Masks On!—Masks Off!"-type commands.

Therefore, whenever I hear about restructuring the Army—incidentally, the word has by now become quite devalued since we bungled the restructuring of the economy some years ago—and read about the need to "optimize the intrasectoral rationalization and economization campaign," or whenever I come across the information that the expenditure allocated to promote culture and education in the Army represents 0.52 percent of the MON budget, I begin to wonder whether, quite apart from all these perfectly rationalized and justified savings, cuts, and reductions which have been implemented throughout the sector, someone there has not overlooked the fact that this is, actually, the end of the year 1989.

Box 2.

WHO HAS WHAT

	POLAND	GDR	FRG	FRANCE	BRITAIN
Tanks	3,330	3,140	4,900	3,190	2,000
APCs	4,855	5,900	6,840	4,520	5,480
Rocket launchers, artillery pieces, and mortars	3,065	2,435	3,190	8,510	3,320
Aircraft	480	307	850	880	835
Helicopters	43	74	450	700	700
Tactical missiles	81	80	26	36	12
Submarines	3	-	-	17	28

Data according to the 30 January 1989

Statement by the Committee of Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Member States.

Konarski Calls Vienna CSCE Seminar 'Success'

LD0502201290 Warsaw PAP in English 1937 GMT
5 Feb 90

[Untitled report by PAP correspondent Andrzej Rayzacher]

[Text] Vienna, February 5—Delegates of Poland, the U.S. and the FRG have told press conferences here that a three-week seminar of the 35 CSCE states on military doctrines and concepts was a success.

The seminar, which closed today, was attended by high-ranking military officials of the participating states who discussed military doctrines and concepts combined with the possibilities of the existing armed forces in a "calm, and matter-of-fact way," head of the Polish delegation Ambassador Włodzimierz Konarski said.

He also recalled that the idea to hold the seminar originated from the Polish side plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in Europe.

Demonstrators Demand Soviet Withdrawal

LD0702185890 Warsaw Domestic Service
in Polish 1800 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Today at 1500, the Anti-Communist Federation organized yet another demonstration at the main Krakow square under the slogan "Soviets go home".

About 1,000 participants in the protest moved from the market to the Soviet General Consulate, which this time was well protected by the OPMO [Prevention Detachments of Civic Militia, successor to ZOMO riot police].

[Begin recording; sound of chants: "Soviets go home"; "Down with Yalta"]

[Unidentified reporter, to passerby] What do you think about this demonstration?

[Unidentified man] We need peace now. I don't see any students here; I see some vagrants.

[Unidentified woman] I think that the Consulate should stay; consulates of all states should remain.

[A voice through a public address system] For the good of everyone, we call on you to disperse immediately.

[Unidentified man] Young people should get down to work and stop demonstrating. [passage indistinct] [end recording]

Daily Opposes 'Early' Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD0802003590 Warsaw PAP in English
1920 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] London, February 7—"It can be said without any exaggeration that all the European states are at one with us, with our stand (on Poland's western border) but sympathy is one thing and physical force is another," wrote the *DZIENNIK POLSKI* Polish-language emigration daily published in London.

"That is why we currently should not demand an early withdrawal of the Soviet troops, just like the Americans should not at the same time pull out from Germany until the new Helsinki has finally cleared the question of our borders. Only then the Russians and Americans may furl their wings in Europe...," the daily said.

"The Great Germany may become arrogant not only towards us and that is why, despite all, a watchful eye should be constantly kept on it, and, who knows whether the presence of the superpowers' garrisons should not be a final guarantee," the paper concluded.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Deadline Viewed

*LD1202120290 Warsaw Domestic Service
in Polish 0600 GMT 12 Feb 90*

[Text] I think the Soviet troops should leave Poland in the fall of this year, said Krzysztof Krol, member of the Political Council of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] and chief editor of the KPN weekly *OPINIA*, to *TRYBUNA* [new paper that has replaced *TRYBUNA LUDU*; it begins publishing 12 February]. He went on to say that this deadline is entirely realistic and that he did not think the interests or prestige of the Soviet Union would suffer as a result of this undertaking.

In a statement for the same paper, Dr Andrzej Karkoszka, a Polish expert at the disarmament negotiations in Vienna, Geneva, and New York, said he supported the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland gradually, and not earlier than three years. This must be a well thought-out decision that takes all external and internal conditions, and primarily the interests of Poland, into consideration.

Jaruzelski Supports Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD1302094890 Warsaw Domestic Service
in Polish 0600 GMT 13 Feb 90*

[Text] Referring to the statement by the Soviet authorities on their readiness to begin talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Warsaw Pact member states, including Poland, President Wojciech Jaruzelski said in an interview with *SZTANDAR MLODYCH* that he supports the removal of Soviet armies, but, in accordance with a script and in a context which will guarantee the most favorable situation for Poland. The president added that we must also watch the events in Germany with great attention, and we must adopt a stance on this issue after careful consideration.

YUGOSLAVIA

TANJUG on Bush State of the Union Address

*LD0102095590 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0448 GMT 1 Feb 90*

[Text] Washington, February 1 (TANJUG)—U.S. President George Bush on Wednesday [31 January] evening proposed a new cut in U.S. and Soviet troops in Central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 troops in each side.

In his speech to Congress, a traditional state of the union address, Bush announced that after consulting with NATO allies and talks with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, he has given up on the to date 275,000 troop level on each side.

Bush also urged speedier conclusion of the agreement on reductions in conventional, chemical and strategic arms.

However, the U.S. President said he intended to continue modernizing U.S. strategic offensive weapons, as well as the space defence program, better known as "star wars".

ARGENTINA**Defense Minister on 'Aggressive' Weapons Sales**

PY0902203190 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES HERALD in English 9 Feb 90 p 11

[Text] (DYN)—Defence Minister Humberto Romero yesterday said Argentina will pursue an "aggressive and non-restrictive policy" in connection with the sale of weapons to foreign countries, "except for those restrictions the Foreign Ministry will determine on strict national interest grounds."

In an interview with Rosario's newspaper LA CAPITAL, Romero insisted that the rocket-vector Condor II has been built for peaceful purposes.

The official and his secretaries also analyzed the results of the different talks held last week with the Army, Navy, and Air Force Chiefs-of-Staff and noticed the forces had "urgent need" of new equipment.

For his part, President Carlos Menem sent yesterday a message to the Disarmament Conference currently being held at Geneva where he called for "the responsibility of all states to promote and strengthen the detente atmosphere and the disarmament talks."

The message was read during the conference's plenary session by the Argentine permanent representative at the Conference.

BRAZIL**Avibras Seeks Composition To Avoid Bankruptcy****Figures on Liabilities**

90WP0028A Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 6 Jan 90 p 1

[Untitled article by Roberto Godoy]

[Text] The Avibras Aerospace Industry Corporation, which manufactures rockets, bombs, warheads, and other war materiel, has asked the court for a composition [a settlement of debts by agreement through partial payments of the sums due debtors] to avoid a declaration of bankruptcy—the "only means of protecting the company's assets and giving it a breather so it can guarantee the rights of its creditors," according to the group's director of official relations, Pedro Angelo Vial. The firm's liabilities total \$200 million.

In an official communique distributed by its board of directors, Avibras says that the chief factors leading to this situation are the prolonged failure by one customer to fulfill the terms of its contract, the unfavorable rate of exchange adopted in recent years, and, above all, "the boldness of some creditors in collecting debts."

The composition marks the most acute phase of a long and eroding crisis that began in mid-1988. At the time,

Avibras had just chalked up 4 consecutive years of record exports (averaging \$300 million in sales plus \$1 billion more in unfilled orders) and was the leader of the sector producing war materiel. Its champion seller, the multicaliber saturation rocket launching system known as Astros-2, was widely used by Iraq's Army against Iran in the war in the Persian Gulf, and this led Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar to buy that equipment also. Beginning around July and August, however, when the contracts signed with the countries on the Arabian Peninsula had been received, the difficulties started. Around that time, the Iraqi Government suspended payment. Baghdad's Armed Forces welsched on the \$40 million owed to Avibras and, in a sense, increased that bad debt to \$110 million, considering an additional batch of rockets intended for use with Astros-2 that had been ordered and manufactured but were not delivered because of the previous failure to pay.

Over the past 18 months, the group has reduced the number of its employees from 5,500 to 1,500 and started to feel the pressure from creditors—chiefly in the banking sector—who have made every effort to deal with the problem basically in two ways: 1) by negotiating the debt through the participation of new, and possibly foreign, partners, and 2) by taking some of the company's assets. Both alternatives are totally unacceptable to the group's chairman, engineer Joao Verdi de Carvalho Leite.

Fiber Optics Not To Be Affected

90WP0028B Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 9 Jan 90 p 12

[Untitled article by Roberto Godoy]

[Text] The composition to avoid a declaration of bankruptcy that was requested by the Avibras Aerospace Industry Corporation of Sao Jose dos Campos on Friday will not jeopardize the firm's main sales effort, which is focused on negotiating a new contract with Saudi Arabia's Armed Forces. Saudi Arabia uses the Astros-2 system, which is a multiple multicaliber saturation rocket launcher. The company is not talking about that deal, saying that the secrecy clause in the supply agreement prevents it from doing so, but officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimate that the order might be worth about \$400 million.

In Brasilia yesterday, the spokesman for the Embassy of Iraq, whose renegeing on the payment of \$40 million in overdue debt contributed decisively to the crisis at Avibras, said that his diplomatic mission does not play a direct role in transactions involving military procurement. According to counselor Nabil Nasser, the current situation "is being monitored and reported to the government in Baghdad."

In Sao Jose dos Campos, the director of official relations, engineer Pedro Vial, explained that the composition would not affect the firm's plan for developing its own fiber optics technology and producing optical fibers.

"That program is the responsibility of a subsidiary not involved in this process," he explained. Actually, the Avibras Fiber Optics Corporation, which has been in existence for about 2 years, is being financed partly by the BNDES [National Bank for Economic and Social Development], which has approved the—gradual—release of about \$25 million for setting up the plant. Those funds are made available as the project progresses, and so far, according to Vial, the government has released approximately \$5 million. The undertaking is a medium-term project that should reach ideal levels in 1995.

The composition applied for by the group covers liabilities totaling \$200 million, of which \$80 million will be paid in January, with the remaining \$120 million to be paid by 1992, without monetary correction and at the constitutional interest rate of 12 percent per year. Payment of back wages, which total 37 million new cruza-dos, has been under way for the past 5 days. Avibras' creditors consist basically of 20 banks, one-third of them foreign. But most of its debt is owed to domestic government and private credit institutions, which have more than \$120 million coming to them.

None of the company's activities will be interrupted by the composition. Its partnership with the Chinese state enterprise Great Wall in the space sector—a joint venture known as Inecom—is still in the market and is preparing to participate in the international bidding on three projects (two in Asia and one in South America). The winner will supply a complete package comprising a telecommunications satellite, launch rockets, and operation of the equipment. In the military sector, the optical fiber/TV laser-guided MAC-MP [multipurpose antitank missile] is still being offered, although it is still in the testing stage—three live firing tests have been conducted to date.

In the civilian area, two products will reach consumers by March: high-resolution parabolic miniantennas for

home use and binoculars equipped with a small laser emitter that shows the speed and distance of the object being viewed.

NICARAGUA

Sandinists Deny Existence of Missile Sites

*PA0102171790 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1643 GMT
1 Feb 90*

[Text] Managua, 1 February (EFE)—Sandinist Commander Bayardo Arce has denied the existence in Nicaragua of sites that may be housing Soviet surface-to-air missiles, as reported on 31 January by U.S. newspaper THE WASHINGTON TIMES.

"That is absolutely false," said Arce, chief of the government's Sandinist National Liberation Front Party [FSLN], to the press last night following a meeting in Managua with OAS Secretary General Joao Baena Soares.

THE WASHINGTON TIMES reported that U.S. espionage services discovered Soviet surface-to-air missile sites on the outskirts of Managua, which may constitute the first step toward the introduction in this country of MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter airplanes.

Arce said that the U.S. newspaper is "owned by the Moon sect" and he described it as a "lying" newspaper and a publication "that does not usually receive information from Washington authorities because it is not serious."

The Sandinist leader said he does not believe that the reports of "false" sites are aimed at hindering the Nicaraguan electoral process that will culminate with general elections on 25 February, although he pointed out that "they come from certain reactionary sectors of the U.S. administration."

INDIA

Commentary on U.S. Defense Budget Proposals

*BK0602124590 Delhi General Overseas Service
in English 1010 GMT 6 Feb 90*

[Commentary by J. Sudhakar Nair: "U.S. Global Defense Interests"]

[Text] The proposed cut in the U.S. defense budget and the sharp new cuts of American and Soviet troops in central Europe have been widely welcomed as yet another initiative to ease tension and usher in peace. The budget, pegged at a level of \$292 billion or roughly 25 percent of the total budget of \$1,234 billion, is about 2.5 percent less than that of last year. A cut in the American military spending marks a shift from the emphasis on the risk of the possible military conflict between the U.S. and the USSR. The cut in the troops to a level of 195,000 each side is also likely to make substantial progress in the ongoing arms control talks between the two countries.

Credit should go to the American Administration for taking one of the most significant steps toward conventional arms control to more appropriate levels of military forces in Europe. In fact, the dramatic events in central Europe and the sweeping changes in the Warsaw Pact countries were the most opportune moments to usher in a new era of peace in the world. But one disturbing aspect of the troop reduction is the likelihood of strengthening American presence in the Asian region. In such an eventuality, several Third World countries might be prompted to strengthen their military buildup, which is not a good sign to ease tension in some of the hot spots in the region. In that case, the gain of Europe would be at the cost of Asia, and this should be avoided at all cost.

In line with the reduced military spending and troops reduction, one would have expected the U.S. Administration to also make some concessions in its efforts to modernize its nuclear defense system. The administration has, however, ruled out any letup in the tactical field so as to give a genuine disarmament. This attitude is despite the fact that the Soviet military threat in Europe was diminishing.

Another area of concern is the proposed increased spending on the Strategic Defense Initiative, or popularly known as the Star Wars. The increase in the allocation for this program by \$900 million to a total of \$4.65 billion for fiscal 1991 was not warranted in view of a changed situation in Eastern Europe and the stress on the need for peace. The U.S. Administration has, however, justified that increased spending on the grounds that there were third parties and non-superpowers who have ballistic missile capability that made it imperative to have the Star Wars program. It is interesting to note that the U.S. is going ahead with the program regardless of the improved relations with Moscow.

The reduction of the conventional military forces in Western Europe is expected to result in closure of at least three bases in the UK. However, this step will have its desired effect only if the military forces and equipment at these bases are not redeployed in other parts of Britain.

Another relevant area of American defense at present is in Panama, where U.S. troops were dispatched to overthrow the Manuel Noreiga regime on December 20th last year. The Bush administration has indicated that the troops will return by the end of this month, suggesting that they would not like to have an unwarranted presence in that country.

One area of concern from the Indian point of view is a grant of a hefty aid package of \$564 million including \$230 million in military contents by the U.S. for Pakistan for fiscal 1991. It would appear that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan last year did not seem to weigh in the mind of Washington while continuing the military aid to Pakistan at the same level as of last year. The massive American military aid program began after the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979. Though the American administration has tightened the grip on foreign aid, the continuing military package seems to have (?come) in view of the continuing strategic importance of Pakistan from its point of view and to keep a check on India. New Delhi, of course, has no intention to embark on a military adventure in Pakistan. Nevertheless, the peace dividend due to reduction of Soviet and American troops, closing of U.S. bases, and reduced military spending by Washington is expected to yield positive results in the last decade of the 20th Century.

'Mind-Boggling' Flow of U.S. Arms to Pakistan

*BK0802113190 Delhi General Overseas Service
in English 1010 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Commentary by PTI correspondent G.S. Srinivasan]

[Text] The Indian foreign secretary, Mr S.K. Singh's, three-day whirlwind visit to the United States which concluded on 3 February is a significant one in that it was essentially designed to counter Pakistan's disinformation campaign on Kashmir. Mr Singh went to the United States in pursuit of India's diplomatic initiative on the Kashmir issue and held discussion with Bush administration officials, including the national security adviser, Mr Brent Scowcroft. The Indian foreign secretary's visit to the United States needs to be viewed in the context of continued American aid to Pakistan militarily despite the sanctimonious denials by the U.S. Administration that such military aid would not be used against India.

Mr Singh made it clear to the Bush administration that India is committed to promoting friendly ties with all its neighbors, that India does not another war with Pakistan on Kashmir. Pakistan has been a major recipient of U.S. military aid in the 1950's and 1960's, when it was seen

by the U.S. as a major Asian bulwark against both the Soviet Union and China. After India-Pakistan war of 1971, Pakistan obtained military hardware from the U.S. through clandestine channels. Between 1981 and 1987, Pakistan obtained a \$3.02 billion aid package from the U.S. comprising both economic and military assistance. In fact, the Soviet Union has said the Symington amendment stipulating a bar on U.S. aid to any country developing nuclear weapons has been discarded, though Pakistan's penchant for developing nuclear capability has been widely known.

Astonishingly, the U.S. has earmarked a sum of \$4.02 billion aid package for Pakistan for 1988 to 1993 in which military assistance would form a major chunk. It would be pertinent to note that of the military assistance, 90 percent would be in the shape of grants and only 10 percent as loans which are not required to be repaid. It may be noted that after two decades the U.S. resumed massive arms transfer to Pakistan in 1977-78. No doubt there were exceptions and U.S. arms were transferred often most reluctantly during that interim period. Successive Indian prime ministers beginning from Jawaharlal Nehru, Gulzarilal Nanda, Lalbahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi had urged the United States not to arm Pakistan excessively to make that country take an adventurous move against India.

On 28 April 1965, India's then defense minister, Mr Krishna Menon, told the Lok Sabha that the Indian Government should tell the United States that the arms supply to Pakistan to fight communism will be used against India. He recalled that late Mr Dulles had assured him that if this happened, supplies would be reduced. The then Indian ambassador in Washington, Mr B.K. Nehru, lodged a strong protest with Mr Dean Rusk, the secretary of state, on 3 September 1965 against the use of U.S. equipment, including Patton tanks, F-86 Sabre jets, and F-104 supersonic fighters by Pakistan in Kashmir. He pointed out that this violated assurances given to the Indian Government by President Eisenhower in as far as back as 1954 that equipment supplied to Pakistan would not be used against India.

Till 1982, the Pakistan Air Force consisted of French and Chinese aircraft. Pakistan had a choice of retaining its French connection or to acquire the U.S. F-16's. Pakistan insisted upon F-16's not only as a quality aircraft, but also as a symbol of strategic ties between Pakistan and the U.S. Besides, Pakistan's naval program began to acquire a new shape after 1977-78 when it started acquiring Gearing class destroyers from U.S.

All told, it is palpably clear that over the years despite the official ban, Pakistan has been acquiring arms and ammunition from the United States. After the ban was lifted in 1970's, its pace of acquisition of sophisticated weapons from the U.S. was simply mind-boggling. No wonder India has been legitimately concerned over the pile-up of sophisticated weapons across the border.

Though the Bush administration had advised both India and Pakistan to enter into a political dialogue within the framework of the Simla Accord to resolve their outstanding issues bilaterally, the continued supply of arms and ammunition to Pakistan by the United States remains a major irritant in India-U.S. relations. Sanity demands that U.S. should desist from arming Pakistan unduly so that its persistent plea for peace with the Soviet Union and also for universal peace should stand the scrutiny of honest proclamations.

IRAN

Sources Report Large Purchase of U.S. Weapons

45000082A London AL-DUSTUR in
Arabic 15 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] Iran has recently received a large amount of American-made weapons from a non-Arab neighbor. AL-DUSTUR's sources indicate that the agreement concerning the purchase of these arms was concluded during the visit of Gholam 'Ali Rashid, deputy chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, to the country, which neighbors Iran.

LIBYA

Foreign Liaison on Chemical Weapons Statement

LD1202205690 Tripoli Television Service
in Arabic 2000 GMT 12 Feb 90

[Text] The People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation issued the following statement:

During the past two days a Soviet-U.S. statement was issued in Moscow about the agreement between the foreign ministers of both countries on the need to liquidate the chemical weapons [CW] in the world, and their intention to work toward signing and implementing a multisided agreement aimed at banning the production and use of chemical weapons and liquidating stocks worldwide.

The People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, after reading the statement, would like to stress the following:

First, the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah [GSPLAJ] welcomes this statement and hopes that it will be implemented in full.

Second, the GSPLAJ has already announced its clear stance toward this kind, and other kinds, of weapons of total destruction. GSPLAJ is calling for more far-reaching steps to destroy chemical, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons and to destroy their stocks to protect the human race from their dangers and end any possibility of their use.

Third, the GSPLAJ, and the Arab nation in general, understand completely and directly the dangers represented by these weapons of total destruction, because the Zionist enemy in occupied Palestine has these weapons, and this threatens the security of the region and affects international peace and security.

Fourth, after explaining to the world the nature of the Al-Rabitah factory, the GSPLAJ takes this opportunity to invite countries and international companies concerned with manufacturing medicines to participate with us in manufacturing medicines and medical equipment in this particular factory.

Trends in International Arms Trade Noted

*90UM0169A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Dec 89 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Ye. Mishin: "The Arms Market: What Are Its Trends?"]

[Text] "We often hear that arms trade is one of the factors destabilizing the international situation. I would like to know who controls the 'arms market'."

Major Yu. Sosunov,
Central Group of Forces

A certain decline in the rate of growth of world arms exports is now being observed. According to data of the Stockholm International Institute for World Problems Research (SIPRI), in 1988 the volume of world sales and deliveries of the principal systems of conventional arms was \$34 billion, which was \$5.5 billion less than the record figure of 1987.

However, these statistics are incomplete, inasmuch as they are not based on anywhere near the full number of deals. Direct deliveries of weapons by private firms in avoidance of state organs, black market deals, which reach major proportions, and exports of "double-purpose" goods which are registered as civilian goods but which can be used for military purposes with minimum modification remain unaccounted for. Thus the real volume of international arms trade may be a minimum of a time and a half greater than the official data.

The developed countries remain the principal exporters, supplying over 90 percent of the arms on the world market. As before, according to SIPRI's data the USA remains in first place with 84 percent of world arms exports. The Soviet Union is in second place. China comes up third, with 90 percent of its deliveries being to Arabian countries and Pakistan. France and Great Britain occupy fourth and fifth places respectively.

Practically everything except for ballistic missiles and large aircraft carriers is for sale today. Weapon systems created on the basis of the most recent technology—things which had previously been kept under lock and key by supplying countries—enjoy special demand.

Three-fourths of the arms imports are by developing countries, chiefly Near East, African and South Asian. Over 65 percent of total exported weapons reach their final destination in six countries—Iraq (which until recently spent around \$6 billion annually on arms purchases), India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria. Of course, a tendency for the proportion of Third World countries importing weapons to decrease has recently appeared in connection with the fact that their solvency has decreased due to the long-term crisis and the drop in prices on oil and other raw materials.

Commentary on U.S. Defense Budget, Military Reductions

*90WC0038A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian
3 Feb 90 p 3*

[Article by M. Nepesov: "The Springtime of Our Hopes"]

[Text] Millions of people sighed with relief when matters finally moved from a standstill and the United States and the USSR set about the destruction of nuclear missiles. And only one thought troubled and alarmed all: just do not let this beneficial process not be slowed or die down altogether, as has happened more than once in the past. But judging from everything, the warm spring winds are gathering force even though it is still winter outside. It has become known in particular that the Bush administration has been developing compromise proposals to reduce the number of military aircraft in Europe. Former U.S. Defense Secretary J. Schlesinger is suggesting openly that the White House plan radical reductions in armed forces in Western Europe.

This has now become a tradition, by the way: practically all American defense secretaries augment military muscle while in the Pentagon, but begin inveighing for reductions in the arms and troops of the United States after retiring. It seems, however, that this tradition is coming to an end. The current Pentagon master, R. Cheney, in any case declared the other day that "the cornerstone of administration policy in relation to the USSR should be an active striving for the achievement of arms-control agreements."

It seems that such statements are justified. Debate has begun in the U.S. Congress these days on a draft military budget that the administration has planned at 295.1 billion dollars for fiscal year 1991. One specific feature of it, observers feel, is that this is the first budget in a long time that signifies a reduction in military spending, 2.5 percent in real terms. The elimination of 47 military bases, both on the territory of the United States and abroad, reductions in the size of the armed forces by 38,000 men, a halt to the production of the M-1 tank and the mothballing of two battleships will be required in particular to achieve that aim. President Bush has moreover announced an administration proposal to reduce Soviet and American troops in Central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 men on each side.

Reports from the countries where American bases are located are convincing of the fact that these are far from rhetorical exercises. The decision has already been made, by way of example, to withdraw troops from two U.S. Air Force bases in Turkey. Yes, one can only welcome such measures by the American administration. As for the Soviet stance, we support any steps aimed at reinforcing peace, and are undertaking them ourselves. It is worth recalling in this regard that the Soviet Union is ready to withdraw all of its forces from Eastern Europe

over the course of the next five years if NATO, including all troops of the United States, withdraws its own armed forces from Europe.

There is no drawback to the good intentions, as we see. They should be brought to life as soon as possible.

Ottawa 'Open Skies' Conference History Described

90WC0042B Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian
10 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with F. Bild, general secretary of the "Open Skies" conference, by V. Shelkov under the rubric "On the Occasion of the International Conference in Ottawa": "Open Skies' Ahead"]

[Text] The first test flight of a NATO aircraft over the territory of a state belonging to the Warsaw Pact Organization [OVD]—Hungary—took place on 6 January. The flight was made under the so-called "Open Skies" provisions.

The goal of these provisions is to give the participants of one military-political union the opportunity to carry out flights of unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over states belonging to another alliance in order to ascertain each other's intentions and actions. And this without advance notification.

At first glance it all seems simple enough. However for NATO and the OVD to reach an appropriate agreement on "Open Skies," prolonged, intensive work is required by diplomats, military men, and experts in various fields.

Many questions will be discussed at the international conference on "Open Skies" in the capital of Canada beginning 12 February. Representatives of 23 nations will take part: The 7 member states of the OVD and the 16 members of NATO.

In Ottawa I met with Fred Bild, general secretary of the conference, and asked him to answer several questions.

[Shelkov] Mr. Bild, the idea of "Open Skies" certainly did not just fall from the skies. What is the story behind it?

[Bild] It was originally proposed by American President Eisenhower during a Geneva summit meeting between the leaders of the United States, the USSR, England, and France in July 1955. However, the condition of relations between the East and the West at that period did not permit the implementation of the idea.

In the following years both superpowers developed effective means of receiving information about one another. At first high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were used, and later complex spy satellites. As a result everyone, it seems, forgot about the Geneva proposal.

Talks on "Open Skies" were revived last year, and Canada played no small role in the rebirth of the idea. On 4 May in the course of meetings in Washington, Prime Minister B. Mulroney called upon President G. Bush to submit this proposal again. But this time it was to be addressed not only to the superpowers, as in the fifties, but to all the participants of NATO and the OVD. A few days later Bush, speaking at the University of Texas, introduced just such a proposal. And on 21 September, in the course of discussions in the state of Wyoming, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs informed the U.S. secretary of state that the USSR intended to participate in a conference on "Open Skies." Three days later Canada offered to host the forum.

[Shelkov] So how will these governments be able to make use of their rights under "Open Skies" in the near future?

[Bild] The organizers envision a couple of scenarios. Of course they are all very preliminary. "Entry and exit" points for foreign aircraft could be created in each country. In Canada, for instance, two such points are being proposed, one, let us say, in Halifax and the other in Edmonton. A few hours before arrival at the "entry" point (the time period will be determined at the conference), the inspecting party will notify the party to be inspected of its intention to "arrive for a visit." Upon arrival the crew of the aircraft produce a flight plan. While this document is being studied, the hosts carry out an examination of the aircraft itself and its equipment. Only those instruments and sensors specified by the participants of the conference can be installed on it. Representatives of the host party must be aboard the aircraft during its flight.

[Shelkov] Mr. Bild, how are "Open Skies" flights different from reconnaissance flights and the work of spy satellites?

[Bild] Under the "Open Skies" system, as opposed to a reconnaissance aircraft flight, the governments will know exactly what the flight plan is and, consequently, what is of interest to their guests along the route. The hosts will even have time to try to hide or camouflage something. They will have "their own people" on board the aircraft. They will not allow any deviation from the flight plan or the use of more refined and accurate instruments than those they have agreed to. The greatest merit of aircraft for observation as compared to satellites is the fact that the former are a more flexible resource.

Shevardnadze Leaves for 'Open Skies' Meeting

90WC0042A Moscow *IZVESTIA* in Russian
11 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by M. Yusin: "E.A. Shevardnadze Flies to Canada"]

[Text] E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, flew to Ottawa on Sunday morning, 11 February. The 5-day program for the minister's visit to the Canadian capital is divided into 2 parts.

First he will take part in an international conference on "Open Skies" along with other ministers of foreign affairs from NATO and Warsaw Pact Organization [OVD] countries. IZVESTIA has already reported in detail about the "Open Skies" concept. Its goal may be briefly stated as follows: To design an agreement that would permit unarmed aircraft of the two military blocs to fly over each other's territory for purposes of inspection and collection of data.

The heads of the foreign policy departments of all 23 countries belonging to the OVD and NATO are meeting in Ottawa. Neutral and nonaligned states of Europe will also attend the conference as observers without taking part in the discussions. They will be represented by their diplomats working in Ottawa.

The conference begins on 12 February. On the first working day speeches are expected from Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, and E.A. Shevardnadze. In their speeches Baker and Shevardnadze will touch upon problems of disarmament as well as "Open Skies" issues. Commentators predict that both ministers will in all probability offer new proposals in this area.

Joseph Clark, Canada's minister of foreign affairs, will chair the conference. A few days ago he gave a press conference and spoke in great detail about the upcoming meeting of OVD and NATO ministers. According to him, "Open Skies" issues will only be one of the items on the agenda. Clark announced that much attention will be devoted to the urgent problems of today's world: East-West relations, prospects for convening a conference on security and cooperation in Europe, and the development of economic cooperation. "I attach special significance to

the Ottawa conference in that it will be the first meeting for the heads of the diplomatic bureaus of the two blocs since the stormy events in Eastern Europe," noted the Canadian minister.

Judging by everything, the changing situation in Eastern Europe will also leave its stamp on the approaches to the "Open Skies" problem. In any event, Western newspapers and agencies do not miss the opportunity in every commentary dedicated to the upcoming meeting to stress that serious disagreements exist among the countries of the "Eastern bloc" in their approach to this issue and that they will not have a common position in Ottawa. In the Western camp at the same time, in their opinion, such problems do not arise—the members of NATO have worked out a united approach. The conference will show whether these predictions come true.

The ministers of foreign affairs will participate in the work of the conference on 12-14 February. Afterward they will depart, leaving the field to the experts. The groups of experts will meet until 28 February. The next stage in the implementation of the "Open Skies" concept will be a similar conference in Budapest designated for April-May. If the Ottawa talks go well, it is entirely possible that an agreement will be ready by that time and there will be nothing to do in Budapest but to sign it.

The first part of E.A. Shevardnadze's trip concludes on 14 February, and the second part begins immediately afterward—an official visit to Canada. The visit encompasses two rounds of talks with G. Clark and meetings with the prime minister and the governor general of the country. Plans have been made for the Soviet minister to speak to the members of Canada's parliament on 15 February. The visit will conclude on 16 February.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

WINDSOR STAR Hails Report of U.S. Naval Nuclear Cuts

51200007A *Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR*
in English 19 Dec 89 p A6

[Editorial: "U.S. Navy—The Nuclear Strip"]

[Text] A report that the United States has been dismantling its naval nuclear arsenal can only help further ease the tensions between Western democracies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Warsaw Pact, NATO's East European counterpart, led by the Soviet Union.

Relations between the two blocs improved considerably after the signing of a medium range ballistic disarmament agreement by the U.S. and the Soviet Union two years ago. Improvements accelerated with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's restructuring efforts which opened the door to new freedoms in Soviet satellite societies.

The unexpected slackening of Communist rule in most East European countries has overshadowed, to a certain extent, the disarmament negotiations between the two superpowers.

News of U.S. naval nuclear cuts comes from the Greenpeace organization, which obtained it under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act.

It shows that over the last two years the U.S. eliminated one-third of its tactical naval nuclear arms; ballistic missiles with a range of less than 2,400 km were reduced to 2,500 from 3,650; surface ships capable of firing nuclear weapons were cut to 49 from 187.

The figures may create the impression that Washington has gone on a nuclear "stripping binge," but that's not so.

Navy officials have made it clear that the "retirement" of nuclear systems should not be interpreted as "having anything to do with naval arms control."

But even if the requirement is only limited to obsolete weapons pending their replacement by new, more efficient systems, it would have not taken place had not the U.S. administration felt comfortable in its relations with Moscow. In such a case the new armaments would have been in place before any of the older systems were retired.

The U.S. initiative gives the Soviet Union a numerical advantage in naval nuclear power—but not necessarily in striking force and efficiency—and places the Soviet Union in a terrible disadvantage in the eyes of the world.

It leaves it up to Gorbachev to serve.

Belgian Defense Minister on Bush Proposals

LD0102175390 *Brussels Domestic Service*
in French 1700 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] A brief reaction by Belgian Defense Minister Guy Coeme to the U.S. proposals to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Stephane Otsena has recorded the statement by our defense minister:

[Begin recording] [Coeme] I think these proposals are very positive, and are in fact inevitable for many reasons. They are very positive because they will give an impetus to the current Vienna negotiations. I also think they offer an important lead to a future agreement, perhaps at Vienna II.

[Otsena] What role do you think the Belgians and the Europeans will have in this debate?

[Coeme] I think the cards are on the table at Vienna I now, but concerning future negotiation, I consider that the Europeans have an important responsibility at the negotiation inside NATO and at the negotiation table. I also think one can no longer avoid debate on the presence of European forces outside our territories. [end recording]

'Broad Support' for Bush Proposals Noted

AU0102101790 *Paris AFP* in English 0943 GMT
1 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Brussels, February 1 (AFP)—Washington's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have given "broad support in principle" for President George Bush's proposals for lower troop ceilings in Europe, NATO Secretary-general Manfred Woerner said Thursday [1 February].

The support was expressed by NATO ambassadors who met at NATO headquarters on Wednesday [31 January], shortly before Mr Bush's State of the Union address, he said.

"These new ideas underscore the United States' commitment both to maintain significant military forces in Europe as necessary to alliance security, and to pursue actively new opportunities for enhanced stability at lower levels of arms," he said.

Mr Woerner underscored NATO's hopes of concluding the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, where Mr Bush's proposals will be submitted, during 1990. [passage omitted]

In Bonn, a spokesman for Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg said that the proposal had much in its favour and took West Germany's defence needs into account.

In The Hague, the Netherlands Government said such reductions would be a logical development for Eastern Europe, and should be "acceptable to the Warsaw Pact and in particular Moscow."

They were in line with calls from several Warsaw Pact countries for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territory.

Woerner Rejects German Neutrality

NATO's Woerner Assesses Modrow Plan

AU0202202790 Vienna Domestic Service
in German 1700 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner by Klaus Emmerich in Brussels on 2 February—recorded]

[Text] [Emmerich] Mr Secretary General, you reject the plan of GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow on the demilitarization of all of Germany and the neutralization of both German states—which does not surprise us. What would be your counterproposal?

[Woerner] One would have to find a solution which would allow Germany to be a member in the Atlantic Alliance and would at the same time consider Soviet security interests. This would be compatible.

[Emmerich] In what way?

[Woerner] I am not going into detail now on purpose. Why should I commit myself at this point? I think that anyone presenting a fixed plan now, believing that his model will finally be accepted, risks being overtaken by the events. We must make sure that the Germans themselves have a decisive say in this process, the allies of the Germans, and certainly also the Soviet Union. We believe that we can build a security architecture by using the CSCE process which will play a significant role in this context. Perhaps it can be embedded in this CSCE process. But here, too, I do not want to commit myself either now.

[Emmerich] You are a German and were a German defense minister for many years. Asking you as a German—in the present circumstances, is there only the alternative of either reunification or ties with the West?

[Woerner] I do not see a contradiction between the two aspects. I do not think that there should be any doubt about the Germans' ties with the West. Personally, as a German who is passionately in favor of German unity, I am equally passionately opposed to a neutral and isolated Germany in the heart of Europe. That is bound to go wrong. The Soviets do not have to be concerned about Germany. This Germany will not turn against them, and they can expect to get and they will get solid guarantees in this respect.

[Emmerich] Is President Bush's proposal on a reduction in troops to a ceiling of 195,000 men on each side one of the steps that you have in mind?

[Woerner] It will, of course, be easier to achieve political agreement on a unified Germany in a landscape where military confrontation is reduced, if not even abolished,

and where stable conditions have been created that make it clear to everyone that his security is not threatened any longer.

Neutral Germany 'No Solution'

LD0402103190 Hamburg DPA in German 0952 GMT
4 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Munich (DPA)—NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner has strongly rejected the neutrality of a reunified Germany. At the Munich International Defense Forum Woerner emphasized his rejection of all thoughts of disbanding NATO.

Whoever wishes to make the disbanding of the Alliance a condition for unification would remove an element of fundamental stability from Germany and Europe. "A free-floating and neutral Germany can be no solution from the viewpoint of all partners in the Alliance, as well as in the Soviet Union's own well-understood self-interest in view of its geostrategic position and military power potential," Woerner stressed.

Woerner emphasized that there was therefore no acceptable alternative to Germany being anchored in the Western Alliance. The Soviet Union was adapting to this development toward German unity. Germany's unity and its membership in NATO were reconcilable "as a component part of a security architecture guaranteeing European stability in the interests of the USSR, too. [passage omitted]

Views Future Political Order

LD0402102490 Hamburg DPA in German 0835 GMT
4 Feb 90

[Text] Munich (DPA)—According to NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, the future political order in Europe must be built on self-determination and the process of European integration with the aim of a political union. At the International Defense Forum in Munich this morning, Woerner said that that even now the outlines of a European architecture of peace were becoming visible in the debate in the West. This would be based on those existing institutions which formed the historical aims of the post-war era and which were increasingly taking a "comprehensively European" shape. In this the CSCE system had to be extended and deepened.

Reportage on Ottawa Open Skies Conference

FRG's Genscher on Agreements

LD1402093490 Hamburg DPA in German 2306 GMT
13 Feb 90

[Text] Ottawa (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher last night described the agreements reached at Ottawa as great successes for the concerns of the Germans. Genscher underlined with great satisfaction the important date of 13 February in Ottawa, when

the decisive Four Powers clearly and in writing endorsed the two German states' intention of "restoring German unity". With this wording, taken from the German Basic Law, the process of agreement could be introduced. "Ottawa was of great importance for Germany", said Genscher.

In practical terms this meant that the details of meetings would first have to be decided. The representatives of the two German states would then meet and regularly discuss their results with the Four Powers. This process should also include security issues, while there were no preconceived ideas, said Genscher. This continuous process, based on regular exchanges, existed for their [security issues'] development.

Genscher stressed the agreement reached by the 23 foreign ministers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to endorse in principle a CSCE summit in the autumn. This forum, at which European security is to be further advanced, was thus a certainty.

Genscher, who had demanded such a summit in every speech since last autumn, also underlined his satisfaction about the decision of the 23 to pass without delay on to Vienna II after ending the Vienna I disarmament round. Not just further conventional reductions should be negotiated but the armed forces of the stationing countries—i.e. the Bundeswehr and National People's Army—should be reduced for the first time. Summing up, Genscher described the successes of Ottawa as follows: "it is a result which we hoped for."

Genscher Urges Troop Reductions

LD1302123890 Hamburg-DPA in German 0924 GMT
13 Feb 90

[Text] Ottawa (DPA)—According to Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher the troop strength of the Bundeswehr must be reduced at the next round of the conventional disarmament talks in Vienna. In his speech to the plenum of the "Open Skies" East-West disarmament conference today, Genscher pointed out in Ottawa that the construction of a quite new, cooperative security system in Europe "will have far-reaching effects on the strength of the Bundeswehr." Genscher described the conference itself as "a new dimension of confidence-building." Above and beyond this the prospect is now opening up of making 1990 the year of disarmament.

There must be negotiations immediately after the current round in Vienna. Otherwise disarmament will not keep pace with the political transformation. Genscher modified the Gorbachev quote of life punishing those who come too late, and warned the delegates: "History does not repeat its offers."

After numerous individual rounds of talks with his counterparts from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the federal foreign minister drew the balance that the decision for a CSCE summit in the fall "prevailed everywhere." In his speech Genscher repeated his guarantee of

Poland's western border, which must also be valid for all other borders. He stated that the Federal Republic intends to respect the rights and responsibilities of the four powers for Germany as a whole. Shortly before his speech Genscher had discussed the current consultations on steps toward German unity in a second round of talks with the three Western allies, without making the content public.

Italy's De Michelis Speaks

AU1302141590 Rome ANSA in English 1014 GMT
13 Feb 90

[Text] Ottawa, February 13 (ANSA)—Italy is ready to open its airspace to Eastern European nations and will apply only those essential restrictions necessary to guarantee air safety, Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis announced at the end of the first day of the Open Skies Conference here which brings together 23-nations from NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The conference, convened for work on allowing members of the two military organizations to conduct surveillance flights over each other's territory, opened Monday [12 February] with important addresses by United States Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who both reiterated their respective nations' commitments to stability in Europe and disarmament.

The meeting here also serves as sounding board on the question of German reunification. For De Michelis, German reunification "is the only possible outlet to avoid even greater destabilising factors out of central Europe".

According to the Italian diplomatic chief, although the timetable for integration may appear longer than the phenomenon pushing for German unity, "The parallelism between German unity and the unity of Western Europe remains valid".

The CSCE, De Michelis continued, "is the only institution capable of offering a political framework for German reunification which guarantees international stability. It is also in this light which Italy views the urgency of calling a Helsinki Two conference." This opinion was shared by many of those who addressed the meeting yesterday, while the representatives from the two Germanies are slated to take the floor today.

For this reason, De Michelis underscored, Italy will push for this year's CSCE summit to be extended, at its conclusion, to include the other nations which signed the 1975 Helsinki Acts in order to negotiate "the construction of peaceful coexistence, no longer dominated by military balances or unbalances, and thus create the conditions to ensure that 1990 is without surprises and the success of democracy becomes irreversible."

The Open Skies Conference, which after today's conclusion of its ministerial level will continue throughout the

month, should, according to De Michelis, "offer the decisive push" for a Helsinki Two.

It is the view of Italy's foreign minister that the reinforcement of reciprocal trust, verified by the liberalisation of airspace, can lead to "more concrete and constructive dialogue."

Initiatives like open skies, he added, constitute an "important experiment for the verification and monitoring of military activity to be used also for future disarmament accords."

For all these reasons, De Michelis pointed out, Italy has given its negotiators the mandate to work "with flexibility and dispatch" in elaborating the technical aspects which will be discussed in Ottawa and, aside from opening Italian territory to Eastern European aircraft, proposing that the open skies initiative be extended even to the nations which have not yet joined the conference.

In the immediate, he underscored, the Ottawa conference must, for Rome, "lay down the decisive impulse for the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe."

"But we must act fast," De Michelis warned, also in view of the elections slated in Eastern Europe this spring. "One must not give the impression," he said, "that an excessive gap exists between negotiations and political action." Western nations have just formulated new proposals regarding the remaining problems of military aircraft and personnel, the foreign minister concluded, and Eastern European nations "should not lose this invitation for compromise" and adopt concrete initiatives to resolve the remaining problems.

AUSTRIA

U.S., Soviet Disarmament Initiatives Praised

AU0202112590 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
2 Feb 90 p 2

[Commentary by B. B.: "Disarmament Race"]

[Text] The diplomats at the Vienna CFE negotiations really cannot complain about a lack of impulses from the outside. Now U.S. President Bush has presented the proposal to the public to reduce the U.S. and Soviet troops in central Europe to 195,000 men each and in the whole of Europe to 225,000 men each. As early as 2 weeks ago, DIE PRESSE reported on U.S. considerations to this effect and on the Soviet Union's intention to propose a reduction of the super powers' troop strength in Europe to 150,000 men each. This initiative is not yet official. However, Ambassador Grinevski, head of the Soviet delegation to the CFE negotiations, stated recently that the USSR will withdraw all its soldiers from Eastern Europe by 1995 if analogous steps are made on the Western side. It is almost too good to be true: But it seems that the former arms is replaced by a disarmament race.

BELGIUM

Defense Minister on Troop Withdrawal From FRG

LD0402191690 Brussels Domestic Service
in French 1700 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] The possibility of the withdrawal of the Belgian military in West Germany was the subject of "Facing Public Opinion" on the Belgian Television news bulletin. This issue is simply under consideration, reaffirmed Belgian Defense Minister Guy Coeme; an account by (Martina van Brassaem):

[Van Brassaem] There is no panic for our military stationed in West Germany and their families. The possibility of the withdrawal of the Belgian forces is under study, certainly in view of the political developments in Eastern Europe. This is what Guy Coeme said today during the Television program "Facing Public Opinion:"

[Begin Coeme recording] When I arrived at the department [Ministry of Defense], an increase in the duration of military service was considered for demographical reasons. We have avoided it; it will not happen. Reduction of military service? In a few years perhaps. It would be difficult to say today. Undoubtedly the number of the professional staff will tend to fall. This had already been started under the previous government. Then we had 28,000 volunteers, now we have nearly 23,000. There will be another slight reduction but we will reach the stage when we cannot reduce any more. Then we will have to work out restructuring within NATO in such a way as to respond to a threat that has diminished in the East and which is continuing in [word indistinct]. [end recording]

[Van Brassaem] Guy Coeme recalled that the reunification of the two Germanies should be achieved through the self-determination of the German people, but a broad debate on the peace order in Europe within NATO is necessary and a commitment toward a Europeanization of NATO, while the importance of what he called our American friends at the political and strategic level should be recognized.

DENMARK

Commander Cited on Armed Forces' Future

PM0102162990 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE
TIDENDE in Danish 11 Jan 90 p 7

[Untitled report on interview with Armed Forces Commander in Chief General Jorgen Lyng by Niels Eric Boesgaard; date and place not given]

[Text] "At present the Warsaw Pact does not seem to have any threatening intent. But developments in Eastern Europe are so fluid that the situation could change rapidly."

So said Armed Forces Commander in Chief General Jorgen Lyng in the light of the publication today of the Defense Commission's 1,400-page analysis of Denmark's defense and security situation, "Defenses in the Nineties."

The commander in chief attached great importance to the so-called CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] negotiations in Vienna, which are about adjustments to the balance of conventional strength between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

"If things go as we hope, agreements will be reached this year on significant strength reductions in the East, because of its great superiority, and more modest reductions in the West," he said.

"But the agreements are not yet ready, and it is the view of the Defense Commission that for a long time to come the Warsaw Pact countries will have considerable superiority. A Soviet military expert has declared directly that it will take up to 12 years to change the Soviet Union's military doctrines and at present in central Europe the balance of strength varies between 3:1 and 1.5:1 in the Warsaw Pact's favor," General Lyng said.

[Boesgaard] What will a disarmament agreement mean for the defense of Denmark?

[Lyng] In the first few years a CFE agreement is hardly likely to have any particularly far-reaching consequences for the war strength of the Danish Armed Forces. However, the promised Warsaw Pact reductions, when they are implemented, could mean that we would have more warning. That means that we will have the time to mobilize and summon reinforcements, and that we would therefore be a less attractive target for an attack.

[Boesgaard] What will be the role of the Armed Forces in a more peaceful world?

[Lyng] As hitherto, it will be to prevent war, assert the country's sovereignty, and promote peaceful developments in the world. Also the Defense Commission has to a greater degree than before linked the role of the Armed Forces with the overall goals of Danish security policy—namely the preservation of an intact and functioning Danish society. At the same time it stresses that the Armed Forces' war-preventing effect must be achieved through integrated NATO defenses and cooperation with foreign reinforcements.

[Boesgaard] How do you see the Danish Armed Forces' combat readiness in the coming years?

[Lyng] The 14 March 1988 defense bill states that readiness must be adjusted to keep pace with developments in the world around us. Of particular importance to the Army was the decision to draft more conscripts. In the longer term this will have the effect of bringing down the age of our mobilization force. We had gradually moved toward the situation that even 40-year-olds would have to be drafted to produce a full-strength army in the event of a war.

The commission supports the increased emphasis on mobilization units for two reasons—first, developments in the Baltic, and second, the prospect of a disarmament agreement which will give greater warning and the consequent possibility of adjusting readiness. I view the mobilization force as an investment, like money in the bank which you can draw on if times get bad.

[Boesgaard] When do you think there will be a result from the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Vienna?

[Lyng] There is a widespread view that the initial phase of the CFE negotiations could be wound up by the middle or the end of 1990. It is expected that the new European security conference that was planned for Helsinki in 1993 will be brought forward, and finally there are still hopes that a START agreement on a 50-percent cut in strategic nuclear arms and an agreement banning chemical weapons could be ready this year.

The negotiations on conventional forces and arms are very difficult. Once an agreement is in place it could take years before the two blocs are on an equal footing, and then there is also the very complicated and expensive process of verifying compliance with the agreement.

[Boesgaard] What will Denmark's future armed forces look like?

[Lyng] The commission's report has prepared the way for far-reaching changes to the structure of the Armed Forces' top leadership. Great importance has been attached to devolving responsibility in order to achieve greater efficiency. Only by linking competence and responsibility—including economic responsibility—can we achieve adequate job satisfaction and cost-consciousness at all levels.

The commission has dealt in great detail with what a CFE agreement will mean for Denmark's defenses—for example, the restrictions on the number of aircraft, tanks, and artillery that will be imposed on us.

The commission has proposed a three-phase plan of action which is expected to be implemented already this year. It covers, for example, a rationalization of the Armed Forces' top leadership and its construction service; a decision in principle on structural changes in the Air Force; consideration on bringing forward a third series of Standard Flex ships for the navy; and modernization of the F-16 aircraft.

The second phase covers the creation of CFE agreements on cuts in conventional arms, while the third phase covers ideas on the development of the Armed Forces from the mid-nineties to the end of the century.

For many years the Armed Forces have carried out a number of tasks for civilian society.

Examples of this are fisheries inspection, rescue services, snow emergency services, combating pollution, and other forms of emergency help. We will continue to carry

out those tasks, just as we will still be ready to place soldiers at the disposal of the United Nations.

Most recently Danish soldiers in Namibia have helped to promote the peaceful developments in the world, and we will continue to do so when we are called on.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FRG Admiral on Naval Arms Control, Disarmament Issues

90WC0028A Hamburg VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT
FUER
SICHERHEIT UND FRIEDEN in German Sep 89 pp
150-152

[Article by Rear Admiral Elmar Schmaehling: "Arms Control and Disarmament for Naval Forces"]

[Text] [Box, p 150] Rear Admiral Elmar Schmaehling is head of the Office for Studies and Training of the Federal Armed Forces. His published works have discussed issues including arms control, the naval forces, and SDI. [end box]

The more components of the present military confrontation between East and West—nuclear as well as conventional—are being considered for disarmament, the less individual armament areas will permit themselves to be excluded. Global stability between the two alliances is only obtainable if the regionally achieved military balance cannot be disturbed by rapidly added forces and means. Military options renounced through disarmament must be prevented from being replaced by new or other options. With certain air and naval forces it is possible to alter a regionally stable situation in a relatively short time.

The more drastic a reduction in land forces, the more important the roles of the air and naval forces will be. It is foreseeable that after the air forces, which are now going to be considered in the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), naval forces will also have to be included in the process of disarmament, arms control, and additional confidence-building measures. Several high-ranking Soviet politicians, military people, and diplomats have left no doubt, in repeated statements, about the future course of the Soviet Union in this field.

Technical Development and Arms Limitation at Sea

In dealing with the issue of what measures of arms control and disarmament at sea are sensible and possible in the future, the technical development must also not be left out of consideration. The naval commands of nearly all states have so far avoided the realization that in the future certain technical developments will dramatically jeopardize certain conventional means of naval warfare and operative concepts.

Principally, there are two developments which will dramatically change the situation in naval warfare:

—Modern sensor, communications, and information processing technology with the capability of gathering and immediately transmitting data and information globally.

—Far-reaching missiles with versatile sensors and transmission technology, which are able to locate their target at long range independently or through external guidance.

Due to this development, in the future it will be possible to track and attack surface targets nearly everywhere and at any time. The platforms from which comparatively cheap missiles can be launched can remain outside the defensive range of the attacked ships. To be sure, anti-missile defense will also profit from the technical progress. But it is the totally disproportionate cost for defensive systems which will decide the race against the expensive surface ship. The foreseeable cost development shows that in the end, by far the largest share of expenditure for a future surface ship will go toward ensuring its survivability. Ships which even today cost billions of dollars can no longer wait for the "first shot." In a crisis, in which they have to react to an assumed enemy intention with armed intervention, they become literal sparks that could ignite the powder keg of an unwanted war. This "forced reaction" becomes even more reinforced when nuclear weapons are on board. The case of the U.S. cruiser "Vincennes" in the Persian Gulf may serve to show how unstable ultramodern naval forces are in a crisis. This development forces us to reevaluate certain surface units. In addition to the constraints of arms control policy, the constraints of military policy and therefore conceptional constraints as well will have to be analyzed. Just as was demanded of the air forces—regarding manned aircraft—navies will have to be asked to overcome emotionally conditioned limitations regarding large and expensive ships. When the effort to defend a ship or a group of ships finally reaches almost 100 percent of their total capacity, problems of justification are likely to arise.

Nuclear Weapons in Naval Forces

The nuclear arms race between the blocs so far has led to a little-noticed nuclear "contamination" of almost all types of ships of the nuclear powers. About 16,000¹ nuclear weapons of these powers are located in their navies. Of these, about 9,500 warheads are intended for strategic ballistic missiles, 3,300 weapons are for antisubmarine warfare, and 2,000 are bombs for deployment by aircraft (including land-supported Soviet naval aviation forces). About 550 nuclear warheads are mounted on sea-launched cruise missiles and the same number on antiaircraft missiles. An additional 200 nuclear charges belong to the naval artillery and to antiship missiles stationed along coasts. More than 90 percent of all nuclear weapons are stationed on U.S. and Soviet units.² Fewer than 1,000 nuclear weapons are

found on board British, French, and Chinese naval units. About 70 percent of the U.S., 90 percent of the Soviet, 32 percent of the British, and 12 percent of the French major units are nuclear-capable. China has three submarines equipped with ballistic missiles.

The long range accuracy and destructive force of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles have given modern naval forces completely new capabilities. SSBN's [ballistic missile submarine (nuclear powered)] with their strategic nuclear role are basically no longer a part of the classic means of naval warfare. They are a part of the overall strategic potential.

At the same time the unhindered increase and modernization of sea-launched strategic and tactical nuclear options has considerably affected the expansion of conventional naval forces, in order to protect the SSBN's, held to be vital to a second (nuclear) phase in a world war, and to counter Soviet SSBN's.

Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM)³

The START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] negotiations demonstrate how difficult it will be to deal with sea-launched cruise missiles.

The introduction of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) is already well underway. The Soviet Union has about 500 cruise missiles aboard 62 attack submarines and about 400 on 58 surface ships. These can be used against land and naval targets; 400 of them are assumed to have nuclear armament. The United States has about 250 cruise missiles aboard 31 attack submarines and about 370 on surface units; 150 of the U.S. cruise missiles are nuclear-armed. The U.S. Navy plans to introduce about 4,000 naval cruise missiles on about 250 surface and underwater units by the end of the millennium.

While the ballistic missiles can relatively easily be subjected to counting and verification procedures, cruise missiles which can be deployed in both a nuclear and a conventional role apparently defy the necessary control. It is beyond question, however, that unless the latter category of nuclear weapons is included it will not be possible to reach an agreement to reduce strategic systems.

The issue of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles also becomes explosive from another point of view: After the land-supported nuclear medium-range missiles have been scrapped according to the INF accord, the desires of some politicians and military people will turn toward air and sea-launched cruise missiles—in addition to the modernized Lance—as replacements. For this reason as well, one must anticipate widespread resistance to the inclusion of these weapons in additional arms control and disarmament measures. With the introduction and rapid stationing of these new "gray-area weapons," which can replace nuclear and conventional ones, the two superpowers have done themselves a poor turn. Since this forms a decisive barrier to the disarmament process now wished for by both superpowers, it would be

desirable for a joint U.S.-Soviet commission to be appointed to study this problem.

Potential Steps for Confidence-Building, Arms Control, and Disarmament

As an initial, particularly effective confidence-building measure at sea, one might decide on a "freeze" on sea-launched cruise missiles—even unilaterally.

In the next step, a bilateral agreement on a general ban on nuclear and conventional cruise missiles from ships and submarines could be concluded. The inclusion of conventional cruise missiles should be an indispensable precondition for overcoming the verification problems. Undoubtedly, they will be brought up as the principal argument against an armaments limitation or even a total disarmament of cruise missiles. Problems with the verification of agreements should meanwhile not be used as an excuse to allow armament to proliferate in an uncontrolled fashion.

On the contrary: Sea-launched cruise missiles must be included in the disarmament process precisely because of their disturbance function. In prohibiting sea-launched cruise missiles, the experience gained regarding the importance and limits of verification in connection with the INF agreement will be helpful. The latter made it clear that: A disarmament agreement is not worthless just because the theoretical possibility of cheating cannot be totally excluded in individual cases. Isolated violations do not shift an otherwise stable balance of forces and thus also cannot destroy the advantage of a major disarmament step and the growth in confidence resulting from it.

Even so, one should of course try to achieve the most effective control system possible. Best of all would probably be production control, since control and verification on board the ships would be significantly more complicated.

In the field of sea-launched strategic ballistic missile systems, the heart of the matter is to achieve the stability desired by the two sides at the lowest possible numerical level. Stability makes it urgently necessary that all plans to counter SSBN's be abandoned, in order to break the vicious circle of armament and counter-armament. The intention of the U.S. Navy to eliminate the strategic nuclear systems of the Soviet Union at the beginning of a war is a mortal sin against the spirit and meaning of the silently accepted condition of Mutually Assured Destruction in the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty of 1972.

Until today it was the introduction of ever new strategic nuclear options to neutralize enemy nuclear options which kept the nuclear arms race going. It is only logical that this process should finally be reversed in connection with deep cuts in the present nuclear potential.

Denuclearization of Means of Naval Warfare

The nuclearization of naval weapons, meaning the introduction of nuclear weapons as effective military means with special effects, dates back to a time when nuclear arms were dealt with in a completely uninhibited manner. Today, tactical nuclear weapons have become nothing but a burden for military leaders in all branches of the military. Totally unsuited for warfare, tactical nuclear weapons are needed neither for a strategy of preventing war through deterrence nor for a concept of mutual security based on stable "defense-only structures."

Unilateral withdrawal and destruction of these weapons would therefore be possible without the slightest loss of security. To summarize, the following reasons argue for the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons from ships and submarines:⁴

1. The danger of first use, just because of the problems of controlling them. U.S. nuclear weapon systems on board ships and submarines have no electronic "permissive action links" (PAL's), which mechanically prevent weapons from being armed and launched without being released by the central political leadership on land.
2. When nuclear weapons are on board a ship, the ship is hindered in its conventional operational role. This circumstance could also contribute to the commanders being anxious to "get rid of" their nuclear weapons relatively early on.
3. Tactical nuclear weapons at sea are subject to a lesser amount of inhibition against their use than are land-based ones. No civilian population can be hit, there is no immediate effective fall-out, and their deployment cannot be determined simply and quickly.
4. Ships with nuclear weapons on board are lucrative targets for nuclear weapons.
5. There are complex problems inherent in dual-use of weapons, meaning nuclear as well as conventional.
6. Drastic reductions in the area of strategic weapons necessarily require the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons. This is a law of logic, because tactical nuclear weapons would otherwise acquire too much importance.

The development in the way we think of tactical nuclear weapons, from originally evaluating them as military systems to "political weapons," pulls the rug out from under this category of nuclear weapons—such as nuclear artillery—as well. It is possible to renounce unilaterally these weapons which have become unusable—just like giving up obsolete nuclear land mines (ADM's)⁵—without the loss of one's own security.

Keeping tactical nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the armed forces and constantly developing them for controllable, meaning militarily targeted use with controllable effect in warfare, has meanwhile become the

clearest sign that a theoretical political realization that nuclear war can no longer be waged is by no means assured.

Military planners, scientists, and politicians (who continue to appropriate budget funds for nuclear weapons ostensibly usable for military purposes) still seem to be looking for an escape route from the nuclear dilemma.

For this reason armed forces, whose plans, equipment, and exercises will always be aimed at successful waging of a "hot" war, must generally be deprived of the possession of and responsibility for nuclear weapons, which can remain nothing but numerical quantities in a hypothetical confrontation.

Tactical nuclear weapons should be completely abolished, and strategic nuclear weapons should be transferred to their own organization, strictly separated from the armed forces.

The Impossible Thought

The group of politicians, diplomats, and soldiers who want to use arms control and disarmament to further their own concealed advantages in continuing the confrontation, shrinks slowly.

The naval commands of both alliances will violently oppose any cutbacks in their naval forces, forces which they perceive as fundamental. However, the arguments for the necessity of keeping certain options must be critically questioned.

When judging the effect of far-reaching disarmament steps for one's own security, it must always be taken into consideration that the potential enemy should give up corresponding military options, meaning that the "threat" will also decrease.

Disarmament may not have any intrinsic value, but maintaining military options unnecessarily—that is to say without actual threat—neither has any worth nor makes any sense. After all, armament and counterarmament use up resources which are so urgently needed to solve much more pressing problems of humanity. The fact that the Warsaw Pact for the first time has established a link between disarmament and environmental tasks is a tremendous step forward.

Arms control and functioning disarmament agreements in a system of cooperative security improve the confidence base. Decreasing mistrust and growing cooperation in all fields will in time create a political atmosphere in which treaty violations are no longer assumed.

Footnotes

1. NEPTUNE PAPERS No. 2, "Nuclear Warships and Nuclear Weapons: a Complete Inventory," Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, May 1988.

2. The figures are taken from "The Military Balance," 1987-88 International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1987.

3. SLCM = Sea Launched Cruise Missiles

4. See also: Quester, George H: "Maritime Issues in Avoiding Nuclear War," in ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Vol. 13, No. 2, Winter 1987, pp 189-214.

5. ADM = Atomic Demolition Munition

Smaller, More Concentrated Fleet Foreseen

*90EN0173A Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German
Dec 89 pp 22-26*

[Interview with Vice Admiral Hans-Joachim Mann, naval chief of staff, conducted by Erhard Heckmann and Capt Dr Juergen Rhades (ret), date and place not given: "Fewer Funds for Investments—A Shrinking Fleet"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] What are the effects of the arms control negotiations on the Federal Navy? Have the operations of the Warsaw Pact naval forces changed? How can readiness in personnel and materiel be maintained? Why is the training ship Deutschland being decommissioned? What is going on with RAM [rolling airframe missile] and ANS [supersonic naval target missile]? These questions were answered by the chief of staff of the Navy, Vice Admiral Hans-Joachim Mann, in the following interview with chief editor Erhard Heckmann and Capt Dr Juergen Rhades (ret).

[WEHRTECHNIK] Admiral, this conversation is intended to be a retrospective of the year 1989 and a preview of the near future. What would you describe as the outstanding event of the year that is ending?

[Mann] If your question did not refer to the Navy but to political events, one could give a rather long answer, even in the form of a list.

However, the outstanding naval event of 1989 is closely connected with the political changes in Eastern Europe, which can almost be called dramatic:

Our men on the frigate Niedersachsen, the destroyer Rommel, and the supply ship Coburg, which made a visit to the Soviet Navy in Leningrad in October of this year, were thoroughly aware of the historical event of which they were a part.

Force commanders, ship captains, and crews without exception deserve great praise and our full recognition for the manner in which they mastered their by no means simple task of being "messengers in blue."

[WEHRTECHNIK] A reduction of the threat as perceived by the population, more and more wishful thinking regarding disarmament in the conventional area, affects the surrounding field as well. How do you,

as Navy chief of staff, evaluate these effects on your service branch? Are better or more public relations helpful?

[Mann] Of course, as a soldier one could wish for a somewhat more pronounced as well as more obvious security mentality and security need in our country. Above all, I would also wish for more widespread insight that everything that, happily, is taking place over there in Eastern Europe in such a gratifying manner, as we see it, was only possible because the free West has stood firm and ready to defend its values for the last 40 years.

On the other hand, it must also be understood, of course, in these times of major changes in Eastern Europe and of well-founded hopes for more security in all of Europe, that the readiness to take risks is chancy and simultaneously eliminates the willingness sufficiently to take into account the concerns which we continue to have over the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. It is not the "capabilities" but the "intentions" which enjoy a boom in such times.

I doubt that in this situation even more public relations work by the Federal Armed Forces could produce more security consciousness and a greater need for security in our society.

Our motto in the Navy for a long time has been: rationalization, belt-tightening in all areas, observing the threat development even more closely, and on the whole directing our own defense efforts toward the absolutely required minimum necessary for carrying out the task.

[WEHRTECHNIK] If it should come to concrete CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] agreements in Vienna, how should the results be interpreted for the Navy?

[Mann] Naval forces are not involved in the CFE. Accordingly, any agreements would have no effect on the Navy.

The fact is, however, that for years the scarce commodity called money has been affecting the Naval branch of the armed services particularly severely. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the modest increase in new naval resources in the coming years is accompanied, so to speak, by a particularly large number of units which have to be retired due to their age.

A development has, therefore, already begun which I have to describe—even taking into account that the Warsaw Pact is and will be retiring some older units—as a rather unilateral reduction in the German fleet. The rate of new construction in the Warsaw Pact, in particular the USSR, is considerably higher than in our country, and we must be very careful that we are not outdistanced in quality as well.

You see, I am now talking quite concretely—because that is my duty—about "capabilities." I can envision a conversation partner who now suddenly changes the subject and would like to speak with me about legitimate hopes for further disarmament steps, etc. That is the

dilemma in which we military people find ourselves at the moment. And, unfortunately, we must also conclude that our duty-bound reference to "capabilities" is often misinterpreted as a lack of readiness to achieve detente and disarmament—an accusation which lacks all foundation and hits us particularly hard.

[WEHRTECHNIK] In view of the armament limitations over the last two years, has there been any determination of a change in activities by the Soviet fleet in the Baltic Sea?

[Mann] That is precisely our problem, that we are still not rid of our concerns regarding the capabilities of the other side. The Warsaw Pact's shipbuilding program, especially in the Soviet Navy, continues, in particular in the area of submarines, which are critical to us in the alliance. And that is why at the moment the only improvement I am able to record is that they, too, have recently gotten rid of the older units in the Baltic. At the same time, however, an increase in quality in the newer units has taken place, and the fact is that the numerical superiority continues. Perhaps it would be fair to say that it is not that easy to make a spontaneous intervention in running shipbuilding programs; they run over such a long period of time. Possibly something more could still be done in future times, or such assumptions are at least justified by the swift political developments.

We have already been able to identify changes in the training activities. The Soviet Navy is apparently changing over to holding its exercises only "on its doorstep."

In so doing, the training, much more intensively than before, involves drills as well as the use of naval means under multiple threats.

[WEHRTECHNIK] Maintaining operational readiness with narrowing framework conditions for both personnel and materiel ought to become increasingly difficult and bring about a concentration to the significant tasks. What possibilities of solution do you envision here? Does fulfillment of the combat duties take priority? Is a reduction in the floating and/or supporting area contemplated? Where are there still rationalization opportunities?

[Mann] The overall rationalization of the Navy is taking place according to a series of criteria. "Concentration" is still a key word here, of course; concentration in logistics and training actually leads to more economic operation, as a rule. In some areas we are already taking the first steps toward this, and other, more complex areas are still being thoroughly studied right now with a view to this objective.

During the inevitable reduction of the fleet's combat and support units necessitated by the resources, still other factors are relevant—aimed at the yardstick of "task fulfillment."

It must principally be taken into consideration that naval operations—above and below water—by nature are subject to entirely different conditions than operations on land and that they are exposed to completely different constraints, but that they also must have and use completely different opportunities if they are to be successful in the sense of fulfilling their mission. Second, in our cutback process we naturally also include the increasingly longer warning times and certain compensation possibilities made possible through newer and better technological solutions, at least for the principal tasks of our various naval means.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The subject of overloaded duty time, so effective in the media, has an impact on the Navy as well (mainly for the floating units). Have measures been initiated by now and, if so, where?

[Mann] The new overall concept includes three steps, which are intimately connected with one another:

- The first step is to reduce the overloading of duty time by tightening up and combining tasks wherever possible.
- The second step is the release from service through planned leisure time. This step is the nucleus of the new regulation. The political as well as the military leadership have left no doubt that leisure time has absolute priority. Under the new regulations the soldier, for the first time, can claim compensatory time for overtime.
- The third step is financial compensation. Only where the two previous steps—depending on the task—do not apply, will individual financial compensation be given.

In my opinion, a couple of points need to be improved in the law, for example the amount of the compensation rates when leisure time cannot be provided, or lowering the start of compensation from the seventh month at present to the fourth month of service in the future.

Altogether, however, one can say that the new service regulation is greeted by the Navy and accepted by the troops. It is now important to practice duty tactics, that is, to give the troops time to implement the new regulation in the various fields according to the situation.

[WEHRTECHNIK] For well-known reasons, increased use of reservists is gaining more and more importance, which is surely also connected with problems. Are there consequences to be expected from this with respect to organizational changes or innovations? What happened to the idea of a "training center for floating units"?

[Mann] The shrinking fleet due to the diminishing investment funds and—commensurate with it—a smaller Navy, too, also reduces our need for reservists, of course.

In our technically demanding combat units, which because they have been cut back in size without exception have to be operational, that is to say immediately

available, the peacetime force is even today identical to that under the threat of war because of the high maintenance and training costs. Therefore, we would essentially be able to replace losses in the event of crisis and war with the normally exceptionally well-trained technicians and operators from our schools. What we need in addition here in the way of reservists we can and will—above all for reasons of motivation in our reservists—call up for individual training with “their” active units. We can no longer afford, and we no longer need, a “naval reservist training center” because of this development.

Since, as I said, even in the future there will no longer be any additional modern combat units in partial or full cadre strength for the above-mentioned reasons—and we wouldn't have any money for additional procurement of such means anyway—and since not a single unit is foreseen to reinforce the German Navy, only partial areas of our floating supply remain “capable of growth” in the actual sense: medical units for service at sea and units in the naval security area. But even the latter will obviously have to be adapted to the size and structure of a smaller Navy.

For the reasons listed, I therefore do not assume that the use of reservists will become a problem for the Navy.

[WEHRTECHNIK] How will the decommissioning of the training ship “Deutschland” affect the training of naval officers?

[Mann] We expect that the new form of training will have a positive effect. Giving up the training ship was not an easy decision, but it was the right one in balancing all the possibilities that remained. We had to take into account that there were no funds to build a training ship that would have corresponded with the conditions of the fleet. We then had to study a second alternative, a so-called “inexpensive training ship,” which would only have offered the opportunity of training in the nautical field in the broadest sense, allowed a glance at the operating facilities, and otherwise would have been a floating lecture hall. The third alternative remained training with active units of the fleet. In comparison with the second and third opportunities we very quickly came to the conclusion that the advantages of fleet training were far greater compared to training with the inexpensive training ship.

In the fleet unit the future Navy officer will be given an intensive introduction to the normal work day of the fleet, he will get to know his future place of work, and—what is very important—he will stay with “his home,” so to speak, during the period of study with this fleet unit. We will therefore demand that officers in training will repeatedly be brought back to their units on certain occasions.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The news recently circulated through the media that the city of Wilhelmshaven and the “Deutschland Naval Museum” supporting organization would like to have the ship in Wilhelmshaven as a museum ship. A parallel can be seen in the former

imperial battle cruiser Goeben, which after its tour of duty in the Turkish Navy was also offered to our Navy, but for reasons of cost we could not at that time accept. What does the Navy command staff think of the chances for the Deutschland as a museum ship in Wilhelmshaven? Has such a wish already been presented to you?

[Mann] I would be extremely pleased if it came to that, because the training ship Deutschland has a good tradition; it is a ship which has its fixed place in the history of the West German Navy, and I really couldn't think of a better future for the ship than to be used in this form in Wilhelmshaven. The Navy and the Federal Ministry of Defense cannot support this financially, of course. There are no funds for that. But we support the idea of this project without reservations, and I can only hope that a sufficient number of sponsors can be found in order to realize this project.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The modernization or fundamental renewal of the fleet has begun. Two additional type-122 frigates and type-343 mine warfare boats are being added, three new type-423 boats are in service, four type 123-frigates and minehunters of type 332 are being built. MPA-90 [Maritime Patrol Aircraft] have been added. Even so there are problems. NATO Frigate 90 is only being built with five countries, which will probably lead to cost increases. NH-90 [Nato Helicopter] is a very important matter. Are alternatives being considered?

[Mann] Naturally. I have always represented the opinion that we can and should only remain in this NATO project if our demands for a submarine hunter can be realized in a more cost-effective form than with a national solution. A foundation or starting point for such a solution would in that case be Frigate 123.

[WEHRTECHNIK] Your predecessors in office had repeatedly mentioned that the necessary savings in personnel and costs would be achieved through the decommissioning of ships/boats or their transfer to reserve status. The Amphibious Group was repeatedly mentioned as an example. Are there any new thoughts in this direction for the 1990's or are there even concrete ideas?

[Mann] With the boats you mentioned from the amphibious group and some units of the minelaying and mine-sweeping flotilla, we do in fact still have some units that are “simple” to maintain and operate in our possession, which would basically also be suitable for cadre-type operation.

We have studied this, under the aspect of “operating costs to be paid for the remainder of the duty period” and have come very quickly to the realization that such cadre-type operation would result in an unjustifiable cost/utilization relationship. Cadre operation of floating units is—as we in the Navy indeed know from experience—not cheap, and would therefore only be justifiable for a significantly longer remainder of the useful life of the platforms than the units in question still have.

[WEHRTECHNIK] In the investigation report by the Federal Audit Office we found two admonitions for the Navy: One is aimed at the Federal Office for Defense Technology and Procurement, and the other questions the procurement of the 123-type frigates.

[Mann] As for the Federal Audit Office's investigation report regarding Frigate 123, I assume that we were able to eliminate the misgivings raised in it, for otherwise the project would not have received parliamentary approval. For this ship in particular the cost-utilization ratio is balanced in a special way.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The RAM close-in antiaircraft system, long delayed, is primarily effective against missiles with radar homing heads. Is there any thought of expanding it, at least for the frigates, by a gun system?

[Mann] The U.S. Navy is presently working on a study to increase the combat effectiveness of the RAM with the goal of "infrared all-the-way." If the technical feasibility should be determined in this study, and if the upgrading of combat effectiveness could be held to a reasonable cost framework, the German Navy should commit itself to this increase in combat effectiveness at a not too distant point in time. We have no money for interim ASMD [Air-to-Surface Missile Development] solutions.

[WEHRTECHNIK] Another "problem child" is the ANS supersonic naval target missile. Its chances of survival are apparently good as a bilateral program. For how long?

[Mann] There are problems with the financing of ANS. The armament division is now studying possible solutions. One thing is certain: Toward the end of the 1990's the Navy must begin to enter a new generation of antiship missiles, primarily for the fast attack craft, whose principal duty is surface combat.

[WEHRTECHNIK] In order to tighten the organization in the area of training and support (as a result of new structural considerations), for the purpose of distinct savings in personnel (up to 4,000 positions by 1995) and in materiel equipment (not a 1:1 replacement for ships and boats), the Navy is forced to rethink its organization, as for example the Army with its Army Structure 2000. In concrete terms, in the administrative area (schools) and in the support area, will elements be dissolved or combined into so-called "system schools" in order to take this into account? If so, could you mention today some of the starting points/considerations?

[Mann] Studies have long been under way in the Navy regarding the question of how the "land service enterprises," meaning the support field and the Naval Office field might be adapted to a shrinking fleet in the most economic way. As for the training field, it must simply be taken into account that considerable investments have been undertaken in the various schools until just recently, both in the infrastructure and in the supply of equipment. It would be impossible to justify—as well as impossible to pay for—carrying out a decentralization by

force in this field. But, as I said, even if we had the money it would not be justifiable simply to write off investments made in recent times as some sort of "sunk cost." We will thus have to live with the present dislocation of the schools for some time to come. For the time being our deliberations are focused on making the training even more economical than hitherto by means of decommissioning measures and changes in the content of the training.

Stoltenberg Says GDR Troops Could Join Army

*LD3101174690 Hamburg DPA in German
1712 GMT 31 Jan 90*

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] supports, in principle, the idea that soldiers of the GDR National People's Army could serve in the Bundeswehr. Speaking today on First German Television (ARD), Stoltenberg said that it is conceivable "that we will admit young soldiers of the National People's Army if a careful individual check confirms their suitability and if we can assume that they are serving truly in accordance with the principles of our Constitution."

The Defense Ministry has confirmed that a number of officers, non-commissioned officer's and ordinary soldiers from the GDR have made verbal and written applications for entry to the Bundeswehr. Since the opening of the intra-German border, similar requests have also been addressed to Bundeswehr troop units in the federal area. [passage omitted]

NATO's Woerner Says GDR Disarmament Possible

*LD0102175590 Hamburg DPA in German 1600 GMT
1 Feb 90*

[Excerpt] Hamburg (DPA)—In connection with the discussion of the political future of a united Germany, the question of the future alliance policy has moved to the center of political discussion.

NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner sees in the demilitarization of the GDR a possibility of achieving the unification of Germany with the Federal Republic still retaining its NATO membership. In a Sueddeutscher Rundfunk television interview today Woerner said that with the guarantee of a demilitarized GDR the West could take account of the Soviet Union's security interests. A transitional solution in which U.S. troops would continue to be stationed in the Federal Republic for a period and Soviet troops in the GDR is conceivable. On Deutschlandfunk this morning he expressed the view that there would be no neutralized whole Germany. He agreed with Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that the Federal Republic must remain in NATO. A solution must be found, however, which guarantees Soviet security interests. Thoughts about a reunited Germany automatically also being a member of NATO goes "too far".

Defense Minister Stoltenberg stressed in an interview in the WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG that it is necessary to examine in what form a united Germany remains in NATO when there is a fundamental improvement in West-East relations. This must take place in a manner "that takes account of the Soviet Union's security interests". [passage omitted]

Stoltenberg, Genscher 'Welcome' Bush Proposal

AU0102104190 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1000 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] U.S. President Bush has proposed reducing the number of U.S. and Soviet troops in central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 soldiers on each side. In a speech on the state of the union to both houses of Congress in Washington, Bush has declared that the Soviet threat in Europe had decreased. Thus, in the conventional sphere the time is ripe to reduce the number of troops that are stationed to reasonable forces. At the same time, the President stressed that the United States would maintain its military commitment in Europe as long as the allies want it.

Bush's proposals were welcomed in Bonn by Defense Minister Stoltenberg and Foreign Minister Genscher. Stoltenberg emphasized the long-term character of the U.S. initiative. In this overall context, it does justice to the security needs of the FRG, he said.

Foreign Minister Genscher has described the initiative as an important step forward for the Vienna disarmament talks. Bush's proposals realistically support the dynamic developments in Europe and emphasize the necessity that one must advance resolutely in all spheres of disarmament.

Genscher Calls 'Important Step'

AU0102093190 Hamburg DPA in German 0859 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Free Democratic Party) today welcomed U.S. President Bush's proposal for a drastic reduction in the numbers of U.S. and USSR troops in central Europe. This is an "important step" forward for the Vienna disarmament negotiations, said Genscher. Bush's proposals realistically take into account the dynamic developments in Europe. They underline the need to proceed with determination in all disarmament spheres, said the federal foreign minister.

Bush has proposed that Washington and Moscow limit their soldiers stationed in Central Europe to 195,000 men. So far an upper limit of 275,000 men has been under negotiation in Vienna.

Stoltenberg Sees as Long-Term

LD0102105890 Hamburg DPA in German 0227 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—In the view of Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, U.S. President Bush's latest disarmament initiative for setting lower upper limits on the Armed Forces of the United States of America and the Soviet Union in Europe has been founded with excellent arguments.

A spokesman for the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] minister announced the night of [31 January] that it is important to Stoltenberg that the U.S. President links the consideration, being given for some time, of a limited reduction in U.S. Armed Forces, to concrete disarmament agreements in the Vienna negotiations with repercussions for Europe. This is aimed at guaranteeing a corresponding further reduction in Soviet Armed Forces.

Stoltenberg added that it was in the security interests of the FRG and the whole of Western Europe for Bush to regard the envisioned new framework for the scale of American Armed Forces in Europe as a long-term obligation.

In Stoltenberg's view, the U.S. initiative takes into account the security needs of the Federal Republic. As a whole, the initiative is a balanced combination of disarmament policy dynamism, and a clear commitment to the Western defense capability and alliance solidarity, said the minister.

Party Reactions to Gorbachev Statement

AU0202142290 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 1 Feb 90 pp 1,2

[Untitled report by U.B./D.R.]

[Text] Bonn—The FRG Government has reacted positively to Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev's statements on German unity. At the same time, it presented its own proposals for the future shaping of a European security system. Chancellor Helmut Kohl, with the agreement of the Federal Cabinet, described Gorbachev's statements as "encouraging." Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher even went one step further and stated that the future Germany could be a member of NATO if its citizens wanted it, without moving the territory of the Western Alliance closer to the USSR.

On 31 January, Genscher took advantage of a speech on German unity at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing to respond directly to Gorbachev, who had said the day before that the German questions must be solved "in a responsible way." Chancellor Kohl made a statement in the Cabinet. On the future shaping of Germany, Kohl said that what is important now is "to work with confidence toward achieving a constructive solution of

the German question together with all our neighbors in West and East, a solution that includes the justified security interests of all."

The signal of the foreign minister, namely that the process toward German state unity must not change the security situation in Europe to the disadvantage of Moscow, is based on the analysis that the GDR citizens' patience is exhausted. In the Foreign Ministry, it was stated that one would not be surprised if, in the coming weeks and months in the GDR, a consensus among the overwhelming majority would be achieved that support the immediate unification with the FRG. Thus, Genscher does not see the necessity for the other German state's independent membership in the EC. The way he sees it, the GDR ought to conclude a cooperation agreement with Brussels as a first step, while, subsequently, it ought to become part of the EC via unification with the FRG. The "unity from below is on its way," Genscher said in Tutzing. The growing together and the increasingly tighter network of political, social, and economic forces are "fully under way."

In the Cabinet, the federal chancellor said that the decision of the roundtable in East Berlin to hold early People's Chamber elections on 18 March is "a chance to stabilize the situation in the GDR." The concern of mainly the smaller opposition groups because of the early election day can only be of secondary importance, Kohl said. It becomes apparent that there is a "dramatic loss of confidence in the GDR," which must be blamed on the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. The FRG Government hopes that "a democratic new beginning as early as possible" will be able to change the prevailing mood. Only then can the conditions in the GDR be stabilized, Kohl said, and appealed to the people in the GDR, who are still considering emigration, "to have new confidence in the future in their homeland."

The federal chancellor stressed that it was to be desired that all people in the GDR "find their chance in life in their home, where they were born." Resettling must remain "the last resort." Jobs and apartments were available only to a limited degree even in the FRG, Kohl said. He then referred to GDR Government head Modrow's "remarkable Moscow declaration" on "Germany, one fatherland." At the meeting on 13 and 14 February in Bonn it will be important to agree on additional, concrete relief measures, Kohl concluded.

The Foreign Ministry interpreted Genscher's statements on the security policy of the future German state in the following way: The foreign minister does not want to anticipate through binding statements the historical processes in Europe, which are advancing at an ever faster pace. NATO, and above all the Warsaw Pact, will change within a short time. In this context, Genscher said the FRG must answer the question how it would assess its EC and NATO membership in the case of German unity. In both instances, it is a fact that "our" membership is "irrevocable." On another occasion the foreign minister stated that the Western Alliance will continue to exist

according to the will of its members. "This includes our continued membership in NATO." Genscher stressed that "whatever may happen in the Warsaw Pact, there will be no extension of the NATO territory toward the East, that is to say, nearer to the border of the USSR." NATO is called upon to declare this unequivocally. The West must respond to the understanding that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not impair Soviet security interests. The idea that the part of Germany which today makes up the GDR should be included in the military structures of NATO would obstruct the two Germanys getting closer together. The development of cooperative security structures into which the alliances might develop at a later stage must secure the path from confrontation to cooperation on the basis of treaties. Genscher predicted that at this year's CSCE summit two German governments, which were elected democratically, would sit down at the negotiating table, "and will agree in their determination to achieve unity—the two governments which are already on the road toward such unity." The night before his speech in Tutzing, Genscher met with his French counterpart Roland Dumas in Paris for talks that were held at short notice, and where he sought the guarantee for the support of the FRG by its main ally in Europe. Politically, Paris is part of NATO, but it is not included in the military integration.

Genscher said that the question of what the Germans want to unite can only be answered in a clear way: "The two German states, including Berlin. No more and no less." The first joint statement by the two freely elected parliaments and governments must involve the guarantee of safe borders to all neighbors. The intended "treaty-based community" is referred to by Genscher as a "treaty on the path toward German unity in Europe."

At the meeting in Tutzing, SPD Honorary Chairman Willy Brandt said Gorbachev's recent statements were a "new date" for Germany policy. With regard to German unity, one might say in "a somewhat sloppy way that the question is settled!" Now one need only discuss the modalities for the stages toward that objective within the framework of European understanding. Like Genscher, Brandt also emphasized that a united Germany could not be part of NATO's military alliance.

When asked to comment on Gorbachev's statements on German unity, Alfred Dregger, leader of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] Bundestag group, said Gorbachev had taken up FRG Chancellor Kohl's ideas. Moscow can only benefit from cooperation with a united Germany. The GDR must be converted to "a flourishing country" as quickly as possible, which can be achieved only together with the FRG. CSU Secretary General Erwin Huber regarded Gorbachev's statements as confirming that CSU Chairman Theo Waigel's stance on Germany policy was correct.

According to Free Democratic Party of Germany [FDP] Chairman Otto Graf Lambsdorff, one cannot achieve full NATO membership of the reunited Germany if one

wants to attain it in the context of the consent of the European neighbors, including the USSR. For the time being, the FRG must remain within NATO, Lambsdorff said on Deutschlandfunk. "For the time being does not imply a time limit that would be predictable at this moment."

Bush's Disarmament Plan, U.S. Deficit Viewed

AU0202124790 Duesseldorf *HANDELSBLATT*
in German 2-3 Feb 90 p 2

[Commentary by Ewald Stein: "Race To Catch Up"]

[Text] As he admitted himself, U.S. President George Bush was no longer able to look on as events overtook negotiations. Even though his new proposal on disarmament is a late response to the process of detente, which has been started in Eastern Europe, the contents of his initiative is all the more imposing. While so far a presence of U.S. troops in Central Europe at a strength of 275,000 soldiers was the basis for negotiations at the Vienna conference on the reduction of CFE, the offer now aims at a strength of only 195,000 men. And this means, after all, that, if the Kremlin cuts back the Red Army in Eastern Europe to the same level, about every third GI stationed in Central Europe may soon book his trip home.

Most NATO partners will have difficulties in hiding their surprise. Only 1 week ago, there was still extreme excitement in Bonn when Belgian Defense Minister Guy Coeme announced considerations to withdraw his approximately 26,000 soldiers who are stationed in the FRG and his Netherlands colleague Relus ter Beek offered 750 men. Warnings against a weakening or even the crumbling of the Alliance were voiced easily.

Now the reactions are rather moderate. When FRG Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg says that Bush's proposal takes into consideration the FRG's security requirements and constitutes a balanced link of disarmament policy dynamism and solidarity with the Alliance; this can only be based once again on the insight that the speed of disarmament is almost exclusively determined in Washington and Moscow. The partners have always had to content themselves with being—at best—informe in advance about planned measures. Compared with Bush's telephone conversations with Gorbachev, the consultations of his deputy security adviser Gates and Vice Secretary of State Eagleburger in London, Paris, Rome, and Bonn were diplomatic gestures at best.

In Europe one should not forget that U.S. security policy is largely characterized by domestic policy motives. The fact that the U.S. President announced his disarmament proposals in a state of the union speech only one day after the presentation of the new budget, was not a coincidence. He knew very well that the modest cuts of the defense budget will meet with massive displeasure in Congress. A troop reduction in Europe, which has long been called for by many deputies, does not only fit the topical global political scenery, it is also excellently suited as a diversionary maneuver. After all, Bush does not in any way intend to use

the billions that are saved by the cuts in the involvement in Europe to reduce the high budget deficit. A considerable part of this sum rather is to be used for the strategic arms programs, including SDI. Here criticism from Congress will probably be less vocal since the strategic systems mainly serve the defense of the United States.

Press Views Bush Disarmament Initiative

AU0202131890 Cologne *Deutschlandfunk Network*
in German 0605 GMT 2 Feb 90

[From the press review]

[Text] BADISCHE ZEITUNG from Freiburg discusses the initiative of the U.S. President: With his proposal to reduce the number of U.S. and Soviet soldiers in central Europe far more than he himself recommended 8 months ago, Bush is trying to link up with a development, which has become almost independent. Bush's new framework is suited to have the GDR benefit more strongly from the new development but, above all, to channel things and to make the Vienna conference again the central control organ of the disarmament process. This will probably also be in the interest of the Soviets.

Similar to BADISCHE ZEITUNG, NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG also speaks of a constructive proposal: It corresponds to the assurance given by the President to Gorbachev that Washington will not exploit the current upheavals in the East at the cost of the Soviet Union. The offer to withdraw about 50,000 U.S. troops from the FRG and of a mutual threshold of 195,000 soldiers in the heart of Europe thus is a constructive reaction to the Soviet difficulties to maintain its contingents in the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR. Moscow could thus link the unavoidable with the desirable, because Bush offers Western parity at considerably lower levels than has been envisaged in Vienna so far, NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG concludes.

RHEINPFALZ, which is published in Ludwigshafen, warns against arrogance: The Germans have to continue playing their pioneering role in the political integration of Europe with emphasis. In striving for unity, they must observe the interests of all European neighbors. They must master the consequences of a withdrawal of about 57,000 U.S. soldiers from the FRG mostly at their own expense. The national economic loss involved in a withdrawal of this dimension amounts to billions of deutsche marks. However, someone who has called for disarmament for years must not start lamenting loudly now, RHEINPFALZ stresses.

Genscher Opposes Installing GDR in NATO

LD0202120590 Hamburg *DPA* in German 0831 GMT
2 Feb 90

[Text] Cologne (DPA)—Immediately prior to his visit to the United States, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has spoken against incorporating the GDR into NATO or allocating a special position of

neutrality to the Germans. speaking in a Deutschland-funk interview this morning, Genscher spoke in favor of all-European structures. "We want to dismantle the confrontational character of the alliances and force them into cooperation, not pull a country into another alliance," Genscher said.

He strongly urged a European summit conference this year within the framework of the CSCE. Here the future structure of Europe, and with it also the position of the Germans, could be discussed, Genscher said. He added: "We want a stable partnership...with the East, and the German unification process must also be embedded in this."

Genscher spoke of agreement with French President Francois Mitterrand, who had talked of creating a kind of European confederation. This could be an important structure for Europe, into which German unification would then fit well. But consideration would also have to be taken of the fact that developments in the two German states were progressing rapidly.

Genscher spoke about a number of consultations with the Western partners. These include his visit to Washington, a meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, in Ottawa this coming weekend, and a visit to Bonn on Tuesday by the British foreign secretary.

Defense Minister on NATO Structure, Tasks

LD0302095990 Hamburg DPA in German 0832 GMT
3 Feb 90

[Text] Munich (DPA)—According to Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] NATO must change its structures and redefine its tasks in view of the historic changes in the world. At today's opening of the 27th International Defense Forum in Munich, Stoltenberg also called for a change in Western military strategies.

The principle of forward defense on the border with the Warsaw Pact and the first use of weapons have to be adopted to political and strategic framework conditions, according to the minister. However, he stressed that for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the Western strategy of deterrence.

Stoltenberg expressed the hope that it would be possible to find a formula at the disarmament talks in Vienna within the framework of a European security architecture which would only allow the first use of weapons against states whose forces invade the territory of other countries and their allies. For example, NATO's strategy envisages the first use of nuclear weapons if the West is threatened with defeat after an attack by the East.

The minister expressed his "strong interest" in talks on the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe in follow-up negotiations after the conclusion of a first treaty in Vienna. The massive Soviet superiority in this area has to be eliminated through negotiations. NATO

has to combine its foreign, security, and economic policy aims in an overall concept in order to take "the lead in political opinions" in East-West relations.

However, in Stoltenberg's opinion, the issue of the "division of responsibility" is becoming more and more important in the process of European restructuring. West Europe has to take on greater political and security policy responsibility on our continent and beyond.

In Stoltenberg's opinion, an agreement on conventional forces is the cornerstone for a new security structure in Europe. There have to be further reductions after this. According to the minister it would be a serious strategic mistake to put NATO up for debate in the event of an increasing decline of the Warsaw Pact, as a reciprocal move, as it were.

Stoltenberg said that the Alliance has to take up political tasks more and more without deferring its defense tasks. A new European security architecture is only possible on the basis of a secure defense capability within a Western alliance that is capable of acting in solidarity.

Genscher on U.S. Talks, Modrow Plan, Gorbachev

'Satisfied' With U.S. Visit

AU0502143390 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 5 Feb 90 p 1

[Untitled report by D.R.]

[Text] Bonn—After his return from Washington, Foreign Minister Genscher suggested that the West should offer a "stability partnership" to the Soviet Union. The foreign minister is in favor of furnishing a guarantee that the Western states want to draw "no unilateral advantage" from the dramatic and revolutionary developments in the East. The two German states could make a contribution to this, he stated.

In an interview with Hesse radio, Genscher took up a proposal of President Bush's. The foreign minister thinks that the German contribution might be a statement by the two German governments and parliaments, after the election to the People's Chamber and the installation of a new government in the GDR, which should guarantee the borders. It would be "an important contribution to European stability," if the Germans declared that they "have no claims on anybody in Europe concerning changes of the borders." He was clearly referring to Poland's western border, without explicitly mentioning it.

Genscher expressed satisfaction about his talks with U.S. Secretary of State Baker in Washington. He noted with satisfaction that the U.S. Administration has agreed with great elan to a European summit conference of the 35 CSCE states this year. Baker had already announced to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he would be willing to accept a corresponding offer by the Soviet

state and party leader Gorbachev, but linked this with certain conditions. One of these was the U.S. proposal that free elections must be formally stipulated in all European countries. Genscher thinks that now that all parties concerned have agreed, the path to such a conference in the fall has been cleared.

During the interview with Hesse radio, the minister did not explicitly reiterate his idea that a future Germany might be a member of NATO without the western territory moving closer to the Soviet Union. Referring to his talks with Baker, he stated that they concurred that NATO's military sphere of influence would not be extended beyond FRG territory in the case of reunification. Asked about Modrow's plan, Genscher pointed out that he does not like the term "neutralization," which is a "very glittering term" that dates back to the time before the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Meanwhile the military alliances have ceased to be blocs. The alliances' task in the foreseeable future will be to advance disarmament and to reduce confrontation. Genscher considered it necessary to talk with Baker before the U.S. secretary of state starts his tour of Eastern Europe, during which he will also meet with Gorbachev.

Views Modrow Plan, Baker Talks

LD0202140590 Hamburg DPA in German
1055 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Nuremberg (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher believes the "neutralism" on the way to German unity referred to in the political plan for Germany of GDR Premier Hans Modrow lost its significance with the start of the CSCE process in 1975. Instead of this, CSCE states were building cooperation. Genscher was speaking today in Nuremberg at a news conference following German-Czechoslovak consultations.

Genscher again stressed the urgency of holding a special CSCE summit this year. He intends to talk about this with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Washington today. At this summit the first steps toward cooperative security structures should be taken, without which, Genscher said there can be no stable framework. This also includes transforming the blocs into political, peace-securing organizations, it was stated in the Foreign Ministry.

Genscher says his talks in Washington, which were unexpectedly announced last night and which are to last only a few hours, are linked to his meetings with France's Roland Dumas, held 30 January, to be held with Britain's Douglas Hurd 6 February in Bonn, and with Soviet foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in mid-February, on the sidelines of the Ottawa Open Skies conference planned between the two military blocs.

When in Washington, Genscher will talk with Baker about security issues as well as intra-German developments and the Vienna disarmament negotiations. He welcomes the Modrow plan in principle because

"Modrow has now jumped on the train for establishing the unity of all Germans." Most important is the solution of security questions in Europe. The 18 March election in the GDR will provide the first indications.

CSSR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier and Genscher signed a protocol on regular annual consultations, and an agreement on exchanges between cultural institutes. The two foreign ministers again underlined the need for the quickest possible abolition of compulsory visas and the opening of further border crossing points. "This also applies to mountain paths, so that people can pass freely across the borders as in previous centuries," Dienstbier added.

Welcomes Gorbachev Statement

LD0202153990 Hamburg DPA in German
1147 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] Bonn/Tutting (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher emphatically welcomes the positive statement by Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev on German unity. These Soviet statements [as received] "Clear the way for a constructive Europe and German policy that aims at dynamism in stability," Genscher said today [31 January] in a speech at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing, which was prereleased in Bonn.

In it he opposed a military extension of NATO to the GDR, but also opposed a neutralized whole Germany. He hinted at a—along the French model—purely political membership in NATO of a united Germany. The territory of the GDR cannot be merged into NATO.

"Whatever happens in the Warsaw Pact there will not be an extension of NATO territory eastward, that is to say closer to the borders of the Soviet Union." This means, Genscher stressed, that also "the part of Germany that today constitutes the GDR" cannot belong to NATO's military structure, because this would block the German-German rapprochement. Here Genscher was adhering to his point of view, which was contested by Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] politicians the day before and criticized because they regard a united Germany as an automatic member of NATO.

FDP [Free Democratic Party of Germany] Chairman Otto Lambsdorff expressed similar sentiments on Tuesday [30 January]. He said that relevant statements by CDU/CSU parliamentary group chairman Alfred Dregger were "an illusion." Anyone who believes "that he can simply clap NATO over the GDR and in this way take over the GDR for NATO, send Soviet troops home from the GDR and perhaps move U.S. troops to Frankfurt/Oder is deceiving himself. The world is really not quite that simple," Lambsdorff said in a Deutschlandfunk interview.

The Foreign Ministry pointed to the emphasis on the "military" structures. Genscher regards it as self-evident

that later a government for the whole of Germany will remain a member of a political NATO alliance. The promise not to extend NATO territory must be understood to mean that under no circumstances will there be a NATO military expansion over the Elbe. How, when, and whether the alliances change themselves into political instruments cannot be estimated at all at present. Therefore, no politician could today commit himself to future structures and forms, but only comment on the framework conditions.

In his speech, which the Foreign Ministry described as "fundamental," Genscher spoke unambiguously for ties with the West and for the absolute necessity of binding the German processes into European structures. "our membership in the EC is irrevocable in the event of German unity and so is the will to progressive integration right up to political union, too. The same applies to membership in the Western alliance." On the future of a united Germany, Genscher also said in the text published in Bonn: "We don't want a neutralized whole Germany." An important step on the road to a new Europe must be a CSCE summit conference this year.

Discusses Gorbachev, NATO

AU0202145590 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Feb 90 pp 1, 2

[Untitled report by C.G.]

[Text] Bonn, 31 January—On 31 January Foreign Minister Genscher made statements on the question of NATO membership of a united Germany which permit the conclusion that, with his image of the future of a differentiated membership, Genscher wants to satisfy the security interests of the Soviet Union as well as to fulfill Washington's condition for agreeing on German unity, namely the continued existence of the Alliance. Genscher envisages that all of Germany could be a member of NATO, but only the area of today's FRG would belong to the military integration of the Western Alliance, while the area of today's GDR is not to be covered by NATO's military structure. Regarding this issue, it was heard from the Foreign Ministry that the Soviet Union need not fear that it is intended to deploy one single NATO tank on the area of today's GDR. The foreign minister, however, left it deliberately unclear how the differentiation between the two forms of membership despite state unity, which Genscher wants, are to be implemented. Genscher avoided any definite statements, but he implied that the future German partial area to the east of the Elbe River could have a status which is comparable to the political membership of France and Spain in NATO without participation in military integration. Genscher obviously intends to leave it to future development to solve the contradiction between such a concept and state unity.

After numerous telephone conversations with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and under the impression of Gorbachev's statements on German unity on 30 January, Genscher attested the Moscow leadership's

"proper analysis, realism, and farsightedness." Shevardnadze and Gorbachev's statements on the unity of the two German states, which is approved on principle, "pave the way for a constructive European and Germany policy, which is aimed at dynamism and stability." The Germans do not want unity at the cost of third parties, Genscher said in a lecture at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing. Unification applies to the two German states including Berlin, Genscher said, thus making it clear that the areas to the east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers cannot be included. "A guarantee of the borders to all our neighbors must be the first joint declaration of will by the two freely elected German parliaments and governments." Then the FRG must answer the question of how it intends to manage its membership in the EC and in the Western alliance in the case of German unity, Genscher said, without referring to the fact that the FRG cannot yet decide for a future all-German sovereign state.

Genscher said: "The answer is clear, our EC membership and the will to progressive integration, including a political union, are irrevocable; the same applies to our membership in the Western alliance." In the Warsaw Pact—in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary—the desire for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops is increasing. At present it cannot be clearly ascertained what effects this will have on the structure and the future of the Warsaw Pact. This is exclusively an affair of the Warsaw Pact. The mandate of noninterference must be taken especially seriously in this respect. Referring to the GDR and its part in a united future Germany, Genscher said: "It is NATO's task to make completely clear that, regardless of the events in the Warsaw Pact, the NATO territory will not be extended to the East, that is, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union." These security guarantees are important for the Soviet Union and its behavior. Nevertheless, the question of whether the NATO territory must be defined politically or, in contrast to this, from the military point of view, was left open by Genscher. He talked of the necessity of "European statesmanship." Genscher differentiated between political membership in a NATO with changed tasks and military integration by saying: "Ideas that the part of Germany that is today the GDR is to be included in NATO's military structures would block German-German rapprochement." The Western Alliance will continue to exist according to the will of its members because the alliances will also have the task of securing peace and stabilization in the future: "This includes our continued presence within NATO." Genscher added: "Nobody would benefit from German neutralism." In this context, the Foreign Ministry stated that Genscher's formulation on "our continued presence in NATO" can be interpreted as the answer to the case of German unity.

The United States also shares responsibility for Europe's future by its participation in the CSCE conference. The Soviet Union also thinks that the United States' participation is useful. The American role for security and stability in Europe depends on the continued existence

of the Western Alliance, while that of the Soviets is determined by the Soviet Union's position on the continent and its area which extends to Asia.

In describing the Soviet Union's position in Europe, Genscher failed to mention the Warsaw Pact. The foreign minister only said that both alliances should increasingly define their powers politically, and should push disarmament: "The development of cooperative security structures—by which the alliances could eventually be absorbed—must ensure the alliances' road from confrontation to cooperation by agreement." Genscher considers this an instrument—and the task of the CSCE—to dispel Moscow's concerns about the possible disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet border areas so that such concerns do not obstruct the way to German unity. He said that this included further disarmament: "Without resolute steps to disarmament, there can be no European unity and no German unity."

'A New Chapter'

Genscher said the conference of the heads of state and chiefs of government of the CSCE member countries—at which the Vienna negotiation results on conventional arms control and confidence-building measures will be signed before the end of this year—would be "the starting point of a new chapter in European history." At that conference—Genscher believes that Vienna or Paris will host it and that it will take place in November—two democratically elected German governments could probably take part for the first time, which would be in agreement on their desire to achieve unity, and would be moving in the direction of this goal. Genscher said that a future confederative European order developing into a "European federal system" would have to be discussed. He said that by that time the basic principles of a treaty between Bonn and East Berlin "on the road to German unity in Europe" would have to be clear. He said that European institutions for the coordination of economic cooperation between East and West, for guaranteeing human rights, and for creating a European law area with the aim of adjusting jurisdiction, as well as a European environment agency and centers for common telecommunications, transport policy, and the management of conflicts should be created. He said that a council of CSCE foreign ministers should be set up which should meet at regular intervals. If Germans in both states were resolved to make the CSCE meeting a "conference for overcoming the division of Europe and thus a conference for German unification," the concern was unfounded that the CSCE could turn into a "conference about Germany," Genscher said. He added that the idea of the Germans growing together in an organized European structure was as important for the stability of Europe as was a "stable framework" for the revolutionary developments in central and East Europe. Then nobody would have to be concerned about Germany's unification leading to a shift of forces: "We owe Gorbachev the creation of a stable framework for Europe," Genscher said, who talked about a "stable partnership" again.

SPD's Bahr Praises Bush Disarmament Proposal

*AU0502153990 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German
2 Feb 90 pp 1-2*

[Untitled report on interview with SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr by NEUE ZEIT editor Michael Albrecht in West Berlin; date not given]

[Text] West Berlin—During the symposium organized by the Forum for Germany, NEUE ZEIT had an opportunity to ask Egon Bahr, presidium member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], who is responsible for security and disarmament affairs, to give an initial assessment of the recent U.S. proposal on a rigorous troop reduction in Europe.

Egon Bahr stressed: "First, I am really happy that the U.S. President has now suggested figures for which my party would have been mocked a year ago. Second, it means, of course, that this cannot only be a decrease in the burdens for the Americans and the Soviets, but must also include the German forces. Third, I think that the Vienna negotiations on conventional force reductions should not be burdened, but accords on further troop reductions should be achieved, because in that case, the verification instruments which have so far been negotiated in Vienna could also be used for quick further reductions. On the whole, I think that President Bush's proposal is excellent, and I hope for a good response from Moscow."

Answering a question about the effects of Belgium's plan to withdraw its troops from the FRG, the disarmament expert said that this was only a study which was being prepared by order of the Belgian defense minister. However, it was clear that if the superpowers' forces were being reduced further, other NATO allies would also consider reductions in this area. Initial considerations of one partner or another on further troop reductions did not constitute a problem, not even if the other alliance partners were not consulted in advance, Bahr said.

Asked about the political ties of future Germany, Bahr said that a unified Germany would have to exist in a European framework; it could be neither neutral nor anchored in an alliance. That meant, however, that at first, a European security system would have to exist which would make the military alliances unnecessary, Bahr said. He added that this process would be started before the end of this year; it would begin with the verification process that is being negotiated in Vienna.

Foreign Minister Genscher on Disarmament, Unity

*AU0902172090 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT
in German 9-10 Feb 90 p 6*

[Report on interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by Rainer Nahrendorf and Hans Joerg Sottrup; date and place not given]

[Text] The first conventional disarmament agreement will be reached before the end of this year. That was stated by Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in an interview with HANDELSBLATT. This first conventional disarmament agreement will be signed at the CSCE summit meeting which he believes will take place in October or November 1990. Genscher also voiced the hope that a worldwide ban on chemical weapons will be achieved this year. In addition, he also hopes that the two superpowers will agree on a 50-percent reduction in their strategic nuclear weapons.

Genscher said that the year 1990 will be marked by four dynamic factors:

First, by the dynamism of integration within the European Community. Together with France, the Federal Republic must continue to be the engine in this respect. Genscher: "If we show lack of interest here, this would do considerable harm and cause a deep loss of confidence." Therefore, he urgently warned about adopting a hesitant attitude to the European economic and monetary union.

Second, by the dynamism of the CSCE process. This dynamism leads to the summit meeting which is important for embedding the German question and German unification in the European unification process.

Third, by the dynamism of the disarmament process. This dynamism will accelerate; it is currently lagging behind political dynamism.

Fourth, by the dynamism of German unification.

Genscher expressed his satisfaction with the fact that the term "Genscherism" has changed. Genscher: "Genscherism has become a real mass movement worldwide." He said that, of course, many people were still trying to slow down the process. However, he thinks that nobody will believe those who talk about German unity but are trying to slow up disarmament, no matter how much they stress the necessity of unity. Genscher: "Without disarmament, there can be no European unity; without disarmament, there can be no German unity."

The federal foreign minister made it clear in the HANDELSBLATT interview that he was convinced that the Soviet Union had made it sufficiently clear that it respects the right to self-determination of all peoples, including the German people. However, it was legitimate for the Soviet Union to expect everyone to consider its security interests, Genscher said. In this connection, the West could make an essential contribution by guaranteeing to the Soviet Union the respect for its security interests. He said that he fully understands Moscow's expectations in this respect. Genscher added that this German attitude would be expounded in detail to the Soviet partners in the talks that he and the federal chancellor will hold in Moscow on 10 February.

According to Genscher, a number of pan-European institutions could be created at the CSCE summit

meeting in the fall, which could lead to an increasing interlocking of each country's respective security interests. He said that alliances that have been antagonistic in the past would become alliances of cooperation, and such alliances would be the basic elements of pan-European security structures and would finally be absorbed by these structures.

In this connection, Genscher advocated cooperative European security structures which, while still relying on troops, would have to have stronger political functions than the old, traditional alliances. An increasing number of troops of one side would be deployed on the territory of the respective other side, so as to make sure that nothing violating valid agreements happened there, Genscher said.

Genscher believes that there will be a far-reaching exchange of data which have been strictly confidential in the past, such as the times of mobilization. A defensive structure of defense could also be achieved by limiting ammunition and fuel stocks, which would make "every surprise attack" impossible.

Such cooperative structures would basically change the "picture of the security landscape in Europe," said Genscher, and he added that this, of course, also included "far-reaching disarmament," because the more the process advanced, the less necessary it would be to maintain the big military machinery. Genscher said that generally, "much new thinking is required" on all sides.

Genscher stressed that no matter what was happening in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO has assured the Soviet Union that it would not expand the Alliance. This also holds true in the case of German unification, he said. The foreign minister said that what is being done in the GDR could not be decided by the FRG or NATO. Such decisions would have to be made by the freely elected government in the GDR and by agreement with the Soviet Union.

According to Genscher, in the area of economic cooperation, a development is increasingly taking shape in which the European CEMA members are striving for cooperation with the EC, while organizing their individual cooperation through cooperation and association agreements. In this area, cooperative structures are emerging, such as the European Development Bank, in which the Central and East European countries will take part as payers and receivers on the basis of equality. Genscher would like to see a pan-European environmental agency set up.

The federal foreign minister said that the Germans should continue to be the engine of the process of rapprochement in Europe. He said, however, that it is important for there to be no national, lone action by the Germans. He said that German neutralism would make the European process "largely unacceptable" to our neighbors.

Genscher said that by basically changing Soviet domestic and foreign policy, Gorbachev has paved the way for free and democratic reforms in the Central and East European countries. In foreign policy, he has given up the Soviet Union's hegemonic aspirations and decided to pursue a cooperative policy.

He said that it would be the task of the Federal Government and the government that would be formed on the basis of the People's Chamber elections in the GDR on 18 March to reach understanding on the road to German unity in a way that is acceptable to their European neighbors. The road to German unity would have to be embedded in the European process of overcoming the division of Europe. He said that the Soviet Union should be offered a partnership in Europe in order to have stability. Genscher said that not only people in the Federal Republic but also people outside Germany realize increasingly that the deteriorating situation in the GDR and the loss of confidence in the former rulers represents a real risk and entails a real danger of instability. He said that in reality, the road of the two German states to unification is a contribution to stability. Genscher: "German policy will have to be able to convince all our partners in East and West."

Genscher believes that the merger of the economies and societies, resulting from the economic and monetary union, is an important step to unity. One of the many questions that the Germans have to settle among themselves is that of the adjustment of jurisdiction.

Genscher said that a German answer to the German question is not enough, however. Therefore, the European summit meeting, scheduled to be held this fall, is of extraordinary importance. He said that predictably, unlike at former meetings, the two German states would take part in this summit meeting with concurrent ideas. He said that this meeting is offering a good opportunity to reach understanding on the future of Europe and on the place that a unified Germany will have in the Europe of the future.

Genscher is opposed to establishing a direct connection between the German-German economic and monetary union, on the one hand, and the European economic and monetary union, on the other. He said that the economic and monetary union within the European Community is necessary because the single European market could only be fully developed if Europe pursues a common monetary policy.

According to Genscher, agreement with the GDR on the goal of economic and monetary union would increase the dynamism of restructuring the GDR's economic and social system. Therefore, negotiations on the economic and monetary union should be started now. They could accelerate the introduction of market economy and private ownership. However, the freely elected government which would result from the elections on 18 March would have to decide on economic and monetary union. Genscher said that on 18 March, the people will vote on

the issue of unity and on the issue of their economic and social order. If the voters in the GDR were to vote for the social market economy, the two German states could work closely together. Genscher refused to go into detail about the steps on the road to an economic and monetary union. He said that the psychological effects also had to be considered. He added that no announcements producing such effects should be made. What is important is the political signal to the people in the GDR that they would get good money for good work.

Genscher said that if developments in the GDR were allowed to continue as they did in recent weeks, productivity would decrease further, and the mass exodus to the FRG would increase. He said that because the course was aimed at the unification of the two German states, difficulties resulting from the further economic decline and the mass exodus were also created for the Federal Republic. Genscher: "Resolute steps at this time for establishing an economic and monetary area of the FRG and the GDR are better for the FRG economy than continuing to maintain a hesitant wait-and-see attitude."

Genscher said that the creation of this economic area entails enormous possibilities of economic development for the GDR and the FRG. The billion-Deutsch mark investments would not be lost. Genscher: "A national investment in the future will take place, which will also bear fruit in the Federal Republic." He made it quite clear, however, that setting up a unified economic and monetary area would cost money. He said that unity could not be had for nothing. Private investments would not be enough. Public means were also required, for instance, for hospitals and social insurance in the GDR, as well as for the infrastructure and telecommunications system. However, private and public investments would at the same time also represent a positive impetus for our economy, Genscher said.

Moiseyev's Disarmament Proposal Rejected

AU0802110590 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
5 Feb 90 p 2

[Commentary by Lothar Ruehl: "Moiseyev's Attempt"]

[Text] Moscow's offer to withdraw the Soviet Army from the GDR if all allied troops deployed in the FRG are removed is unacceptable for the Atlantic Alliance and no contribution to military stability in Europe. Both the U.S. military presence and the presence of the British Rhine Army, the French Army Corps in southwestern Germany, and all the other Allied forces stationed on FRG territory are indispensable to the joint security policy of the Atlantic Alliance. They constitute a stability factor in Europe that serves all countries without which crisis-proof arms control with the states in European East would not be possible under the current situation. In addition, the military presence of the allies ensures the required stability in Germany during a phase of dynamic changes that are destabilizing the Warsaw Pact and have initiated its dissolution. This also applies to the process of the state unification of the Germans.

With his proposal aimed at the bilateral withdrawal of "troops deployed on German territory," General Moiseyev apparently wanted to beat President Bush's most recent offer to reduce Soviet troops in European countries to 195,000 and U.S. troops to 225,000, and upset the entire functioning military organization of NATO. This offer by the Soviet chief of staff is not aimed at the stability of arms control and military security in Europe between the East and West, but the Soviet Union is apparently seeking refuge in attack because it wants to get itself out of a situation created by the disintegration of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the discernible dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

In this situation characterized by Budapest's and Prague's desire to quickly remove Soviet troops from their countries, Moscow is trying to induce the West to make concessions that are unfounded. Allied troops are on German soil within a voluntary alliance to protect the country against a threat as long as it exists.

Schmaehling's Remarks at Berlin Before Ouster
90EN0265A *West Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG*
in German 8 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by Juergen Gottschlich: "Admiral Schmaehling on SED Disarmament Course: Top Man in Bundeswehr Feels Proposals Coming Out of East Berlin Are Realistic; Bundeswehr Can Be Reduced Immediately From 490,000 to 250,000 Men; Rejection of EFA [European Fighter Aircraft] and Other Modernization Steps; Discussion Session on Disarmament in West Berlin"]

[Text] In the view of Bundeswehr Admiral Elmar Schmaehling, the German-German disarmament plan proposed by SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] chief Gregor Gysi is realistic, and parts of it can be implemented immediately. On Saturday, Gysi put forth an initiative by his party comprising four points:

- Halving the troop strength of the National People's Army [NVA] and the Bundeswehr;
- Reducing compulsory military service to 12 months on both sides;
- Withdrawal of all foreign troops by no later than 1990; and
- Immediate halt to modernization of all weapon systems.

Schmaehling, who commented on these proposals during a discussion session called "What Will Happen to the Bundeswehr and the National People's Army?" in Berlin on Saturday, especially supported an immediate, drastic reduction of troops on both sides. In his view, the Bundeswehr can immediately reduce its so-called peacetime strength from 490,000 to 300,000, or even 250,000 soldiers. In this way, according to Schmaehling, planning for "active defense," whereby the Bundeswehr could mobilize 1.34 million men, would not be affected. "Only the mobilization phase would take a correspondingly longer time." However, that is no problem whatsoever, he said, since no one is assuming that there might be a

surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact nations any longer. "The Warsaw Pact is politically incapable of action."

Shortening compulsory service to 12 months, which the Council of Ministers of the GDR has already decided to do for the NVA, is immediately possible for the Bundeswehr for the same reasons, Schmaehling said. Currently, he said, the length of military service is not based on the necessary training time, but rather on the target of keeping the nominal strength of the Bundeswehr at no fewer than 420,000 men.

Right now, in the admiral's view, "the fundamental problem with the Bundeswehr" is particularly clear. "Ever since its founding, the Bundeswehr has been nothing more than a building block in the anti-Warsaw Pact coalition. With the end of the cold war, the Bundeswehr loses legitimization in its current form." Thus, it is necessary for a different frame of reference to be created, he said, and the same is true of the question of stationing foreign troops in the FRG and the GDR. Under the changed political conditions, according to Schmaehling, the withdrawal of troops stationed in both countries should be pursued as a goal. "Their withdrawal by 1990 is also realistic." The FRG government simply has to get started on genuine negotiations with the Allies, he said. "Up to now, no chancellor has ever done that."

Schmaehling also conceded that in their current configuration, NATO troops are very much deployable as an attacking army, regardless of political declarations to the contrary. This is why a halt to modernization of "highly mobile"—and thus offensive—weapon systems is "reasonable," he said. This applies to the planned EFA as well. The issue at hand right now is not to develop new anti-aircraft systems, but rather to negotiate away the offensive aircraft on both sides, Schmaehling said.

In the discussion that followed, the representative of the National People's Army, Prof. Gonnermann from Humboldt University in East Berlin, put the emphasis on this: A halt to modernization is practically the most important question, since the effect of a troop reduction accompanied by implementation of the weapon systems is make-believe disarmament. Gonnermann spoke out in favor of a rethinking of military policy, in both the GDR and the FRG. We must disassociate ourselves from the tutelage of our two "big brothers" and send out long-term signals independent of the negotiations in Vienna on reducing conventional arms. Only in this way can a demilitarization of Europe be achieved in the next 10 years, he said.

The speaker originally invited for Gonnermann, Maj Gen Rolf Lehmann of the National People's Army, did not show up, allegedly because the Western Allies refused to allow a GDR general to appear in West Berlin. This was denied by a spokeswoman for the British, who are currently in command.

Genscher Briefs Counterparts in Ottawa**Genscher Arrives in Ottawa for 'Open Skies' Meet**

LD1102212990 Hamburg DPA in German 2049 GMT 11 Feb 90

[Text] Ottawa (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher this evening (Central European time) arrived direct from Moscow in Ottawa, where he will take part from tomorrow in the "Open Skies" conference of foreign ministers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Soon after his arrival in the Canadian capital, a meeting between Genscher and his counterparts James Baker (United States), Roland Dumas (France), and Douglas Hurd (Great Britain) began. Genscher intends to make use of this meeting of these four, arranged at short notice, to report on the results of his visit to Moscow. Subsequently, a meeting of all the NATO foreign ministers was on the agenda, followed by a joint dinner for the ministers of the two defense blocks in the Canadian parliament.

The conference proper, at which the foreign ministers of 16 NATO and seven Warsaw Pact states are to discuss a treaty on reciprocal air inspection, begins tomorrow and is scheduled to last two days. Even before the start of the conference it was clear that the question of German unity and that of conventional disarmament in Europe will push the "Open Skies" theme into the background.

Briefs Counterparts on Moscow Talks

LD1202083190 Hamburg DPA in German 0450 GMT 12 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Ottawa (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher briefed his colleagues from the United States, France, and Great Britain about the Moscow talks on German unity yesterday in Ottawa. Shortly after his arrival in the Canadian capital, where NATO and the Warsaw Pact are starting consultations on confidence-building measures in the military sphere today, Genscher met James Baker, Douglas Hurd, and Roland Dumas. Baker himself had come in from Moscow after stops in Bulgaria and Romania.

In the four-man round Genscher's report was received "in an exceptionally friendly way," according to a German report. According to this information the basis was so the so-called Genscher plan, by which in the case of a German unification NATO would not be expanded into the territory of the present-day GDR and a conference with the four victorious powers and the two German states should take place on the unification process. Such a conference could take place as soon as this summer, it was said.

At a session afterwards the foreign ministers of all 16 NATO states approved the German proposal to set up a special working group to prepare for the CSCE summit, still planned for 1990. The German side said that the ministers had given their "broad approval" to the goal of

German unity in a European framework while preserving the security interests of all parties involved. [passage omitted]

Numerous bilateral meetings were planned on the sidelines of the plenary session that begins today. Genscher intended to see all his colleagues from the former East bloc, including GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer. [passage omitted]

Engineers in 'Secret' Saudi Missile Projects

AU1202151490 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 12 Feb 90 p 14

[Text] FRG engineers are currently developing secret missile projects in Saudi Arabia. According to an alarm warning from the Pullach Federal Intelligence Service to the Chancellor's Office in Bonn, an FRG citizen is the head of the development center near Jeddah, which is disguised as "Field Agency of Riyadh University." Reportedly, German experts paid by the Saudis have lately tried to procure "material" for the construction of missiles in the FRG. According to the confidential Federal Intelligence Service report, the Saudis also recruited experts from the arms industry in other West European countries with "lucrative" offers. A cover firm, which purports to deal with environmental data and statistics ("Saud Consultants for Environmental Data and Statistics"—C.E.D.), acts as the official contracting party. A surface-to-surface missile with an unknown range and a variant of the German-French "Hot" antitank missile are being developed. In addition to an attractive salary, the Saudis provide furnished rooms free of charge. The holiday pay for married missile technicians alone amounts to almost 7,000 West German marks, and DM8,000 are provided as "educational allowance" for every child.

FRANCE**French Laud Bush Troop Cut Proposal**

Dumas Calls Bush Proposal 'Important Step'
LD0102131590 Paris Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] There have been positive reactions to George Bush's initiative: The American President proposes a mutual reduction of American and Soviet soldiers on the old continent [Europe]. Moscow is in agreement, as are the NATO allies. London gives total support to this idea, as does Paris. Roland Dumas even stated that this proposal was an important step on the path of disarmament.

Country Approves Withdrawal

AU0102181890 Paris AFP in English 1733 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Paris, February 1 (AFP)—President George Bush's proposal for U.S. and Soviet troop withdrawals

from Europe "comes at an opportune moment", a French government spokesman said Thursday [1 February].

"France approves President Bush's proposal to reduce substantially the American and Soviet forces stationed in central Europe, which comes at an opportune moment," presidential spokesman Hubert Vedrine said.

On Wednesday Mr Bush suggested limiting the U.S. and Soviet presence to 195,000 troops apiece in "central and eastern Europe". The previous Saturday he had telephoned Paris to inform French President Francois Mitterrand of the proposal.

"Trends in eastern Europe mean it is necessary to speed up the negotiations in Vienna on conventional arms reductions so that European security can be based on as low a balance of forces as possible," Mr Vedrine said.

Paris Paper Reports on Plan

PM0202115290 Paris *LE MONDE* in French
2 Feb 90 pp 1, 4

[Untitled report by Jan Krauze]

[Text] Washington—Mr Bush has done it again. After favorably surprising the world last spring when he proposed a reduction in conventional forces in Europe which was considered rather bold at the time, the U.S. President has improved on his own proposal although there is still no agreement with the USSR on his initial suggestion. The avowed aim is to speed up the withdrawal of Soviet troops from central Europe, especially from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and to reduce their presence in the GDR. In May, Mr Bush suggested a ceiling of 275,000 men for U.S. (and Soviet) troops in Europe, a reduction of 30,000 men on the current U.S. forces.

He is now proposing a ceiling of 195,000 men "in central and Eastern Europe." In practice, that would amount to withdrawing another 50,000 U.S. soldiers from the FRG. (The Americans would keep a total of 225,000 men in Europe, considering the 30,000 soldiers deployed in countries situated outside the area under consideration—like Britain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. And Mr Bush specified that this is not a stage on the way to a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, whose presence in Europe is "essential.") All the ingredients of the "Bush recipe," which is now fairly well known, were used to give maximum impact to this proposal. First, there was a good measure of surprise: The U.S. President launched his initiative in the "State of the Union message"—an exercise which traditionally does not contain any major announcement, and the White House had taken delight in stressing that it would not contain anything very new....

Then there were secret consultations. Robert Gates and Laurence Eagleburger, two White House and State Department officials, were sent secretly to Europe on the evening of 28 January for talks with the British, French,

Italian, and West German leaders who had already been personally informed by Mr Bush. Finally, there was a telephone call to Mr Gorbachev in the early hours of 31 January—a call which, according to the U.S. spokesmen, was greatly "appreciated" by its recipient who naturally added that he would study the new U.S. proposals.

The affair seems to have been skilfully handled, and Mr Bush already seems to have scored a fine victory even on the domestic scene where he has placed the Democrats in an uncomfortable position because they had accused him of being too timid in the arms reduction sphere.

According to clarifications provided by top White House officials, Mr Bush thought it was necessary to launch this new initiative "because events (in Eastern Europe) had progressed further than the negotiations" (on conventional disarmament). The aim was to prevent the ceiling of 275,000 men—suggested last May—from "being used as a pretext" for maintaining (Soviet) troops in Eastern Europe who are no longer wanted by the new governments in the countries concerned.

This does not fully explain why, at the beginning of December, Mr Bush was still asserting that it was appropriate to secure an agreement on the proposals he made last May before making any new ones, or why his aides publicly maintained that position until the past few days. But, for the U.S. President, this is an excellent way of asserting his new image as a bold man of initiative—an image which he seems to be carefully trying to "steal" from Mr Gorbachev: For some time now, it is from Washington rather than from Moscow that new suggestions have been coming, at least in the disarmament sphere.

Was Mr Bush obeying other considerations than that of updating his proposals to keep up with the considerably faster pace of events in Eastern Europe? In any event, White House officials state that the desire "to help Mr Gorbachev" (which they have done) played no role in this matter. And they add that the possibility of making additional savings in the defense sphere did not influence the decision either.

Indeed—given that the troop reductions have to be negotiated, which will certainly not happen overnight—it is unlikely that the Pentagon will find this to be a source of savings in the short term. But it is at least an excellent political reply to all those, especially the Democrats in Congress, who strongly criticized the President for not seizing the historic opportunity to make clearer cuts in defense spending: It is certainly no coincidence that, following an entirely unusual timetable, the 1991 budget was only presented to Congress 2 days before the "State of the Union message."

A Warm Welcome

Whereas the Capitol had for 48 hours been ringing with cries of indignation and with particularly violent attacks on Richard Darman, director of the Office of Management and Budget, the American public was able to see

the Congressmen giving a resounding standing ovation on 31 January to Mr Bush's proposals. Of course, the "State of the Union message" which the President addresses every year to the two Houses solemnly assembled, is a ritual celebrating U.S. democracy during which the executive and legislature congratulate each other.

The fact remains that Mr Bush received a particularly warm welcome, and the speaker of the house who traditionally gives the "reply" and hence voice the criticisms of the Democrats had to revise his speech at the last minute to eliminate the passages devoted to the defense budget.

Mr Bush naturally devoted a good part of his speech to the internal situation of the United States which must be "improved." He did not repeat the expression of "gentler and kinder" with which he placed his stamp on his inauguration speech, but he confirmed that his concerns had not changed: creches (whose scarceness and high prices present a serious problem in the United States), education, the environment, equal opportunities (for the handicapped among others) the quality of American products, aid to the homeless and the fight against drugs—all these objectives were listed at random and without giving any details, which will justify the critics who maintain that Mr Bush still has excellent intentions and is still just as slow in putting them into practice.

The President also mentioned—this time with applause from only some congressmen—his favorite project, namely the reduction of capital gains tax. And he openly attacked the idea, put forward by some Democrats, of reducing the contribution of wage-earners to the retirement system because the latter has a large surplus and serves to conceal the scale of the budget deficit. That gave rise to a comical scene because, when Mr Bush said severely that "the last thing we need to do is mess with social security," Senator Moynihan—who is the author of the incriminated proposal—was seen standing and applauding more loudly than all the others....

Mr Bush has still not shown any sign of having been touched with the art of oratory, but his speech had a certain human warmth, especially when he added a personal touch by talking about his children and grandchildren, his and those of others, in America and elsewhere, or when he discussed one of the points in his personal code: "Of all the gifts one can give, the greatest is to help others."

In addition to disarmament proposals, the President did not forget to talk about foreign policy. But he did so very succinctly, refraining from making any mention of questions and regions ranging from the Near East to China and including Afghanistan. On the other hand, he naturally did not forget to mention Panama's return to the "free" nations—an event which he even placed at the head of the great changes which transformed the world in 1989, ahead of Solidarity's accession to power in Poland, Vaclav Havel's election as president in Prague, or the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, it was in relation

to Panama that Mr Bush announced the other practical decision contained in his speech which also relates to the reduction of U.S. forces. The last invasion troops still there will be brought home by the end of February, and U.S. forces in Panama will then return to the level they had before the December intervention—in other words around 13,000 men.

Defense Minister Rejects Unilateral Disarmament

AU0302091490 Paris AFP in English
0348 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Paris, February 3 (AFP)—France's Defence Ministry ruled out Friday [2 February] a withdrawal of its troops in West Germany, after U.S. President George Bush called for Washington and Moscow to each cut troop levels to 195,000 in central Europe.

A withdrawal of France's 50,000 troops stationed in West Germany and West Berlin "is not on the agenda", either at a political or a military level, the ministry told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE.

The statement followed the call from Mr Bush issued Wednesday.

Defence Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement said Wednesday that "the predictable American withdrawal, whose importance is often under-estimated, obliges us to maintain a posture of minimal defence.

"France is ready to take part in reductions which result from a disarmament agreement", but "we are not in favour of a unilateral disarmament", he said.

Chevenement Calls for United European Defense

LD0402095190 Hamburg DPA in German
0850 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Munich (DPA)—France has appealed for an independent European defense. French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement said at the International Defense Forum in Munich today that as "certain aspects of the American presence is force being called into question we must show that Europe is making efforts to secure its own defense."

Chevenement however stressed that the aim should not be to make a superpower out of Western Europe. A Europe responsible for its own defense can only be a peaceful power which works for the stability of the European continent "and carries out a policy of deterrence which is nonaggressive by its very nature." Such an independent power would prevent "a military vacuum" or a region subject to certain restraints from arising.

The minister said that this "Europe without fear could integrate the regained power, Germany." The idea of common European unity in the area of defense should not be taken as an attempt to increase military confrontation again or bring about a new balance of power on the European continent.

Dumas Asks U.S. To Avoid Polarized Arms Talks

*AU0602185890 Paris AFP in English
1803 GMT 6 Feb 90*

[Excerpts] Paris, February 6 (AFP)—French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas called on the United States Tuesday [6 February] to forego any “bloc-to-bloc approach” in future disarmament talks to account for the recent sweeping changes in Europe. A polarized approach to negotiations involving the two military alliances would be “a total anachronism in view of a Europe free of its yoke,” he said. Commenting on the upcoming Ottawa conference on “Open Skies” which is to seek an agreement on reciprocal aerial surveillance by signatory nations, Mr Dumas said the gathering was one of those initiatives “that falls back on outdated patterns in bloc-to-bloc relations.” [passage omitted]

Speaking before a Paris defence studies institute, Mr Dumas advocated a second round of talks on conventional arms cuts as soon as a first agreement was reached in the Vienna negotiations, possibly before the end of the year. Future talks must cover “various security aspects” rather than merely bring about “proportional armament cuts,” he added. Mr Dumas urged a rethink over the future of the military alliances in the face of possible German unity. He cautioned however not to question existing alliances as it was “up to the member states to freely decide on this issue.” In the case of NATO there was “no need to cut ties that were freely established” and which continued to be justified for the benefit of a geostrategic balance, he said.

Chevenement Discusses Arms Talks in Vienna

*PM0802122490 Paris LE MONDE in French
2 Feb 90 p 3*

[Text] “An agreement in Vienna on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe should not make any substantial change in the equipment of the French Armed Forces as a result of the recently adopted programming law.” This is the assertion of Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement who addressed the Military Academy on 31 January on the prospects for the Vienna negotiations and their effects on the French military forces. The defense minister expressed the view that “the French forces’ missions remain unchanged” because “nobody knows what the future holds” in a world which “is still dangerous.”

After reaffirming that there is still deadlock in Vienna on the definition of the equipment concerned (tanks, armored vehicles, planes, and helicopters), with the exception of artillery, the defense minister explained: “It is still too soon to accurately predict the volume of reductions to which France may have to agree when the agreement is signed.” This is particularly true, Mr. Chevenement added, because “the volume of the inevitable withdrawal of some U.S. forces deployed in Europe has a direct influence on the reductions which the West European countries will be forced to make.”

If there was to be another agreement after the conclusion of an initial arms reduction agreement, Mr Chevenement thinks that “in addition to its concept of defense based on sufficiency and the independence of its forces, France will be guided by the need to fulfill its overseas and world obligations which require the maintenance of a large capability for remote action and the non-inclusion of naval forces.” This new negotiation must, according to him, relate to all countries, in other words the whole of the United States and the USSR, from San Francisco to Vladivostok, because Europe must not become “a sphere of special restrictions” under the superpowers’ protection. Mr Chevenement also reiterated that “our nuclear weapons are not open to negotiation until the two superpowers reduce their strategic forces to a level comparable with ours.” With regard to the Hades and medium-range air-to-surface missiles, he explained that “the final warning prestrategic nuclear weapon is vital to our deterrence of the strong by the weak” and concluded that, in these conditions, France cannot take part in any negotiations without running the risk of distorting its concept, which is “not waging war and ruling out the graduated response.”

Regarding nuclear tests, he added: “You would have to be culpably naive and ignorant of history to believe that France can be defended without a deterrent constantly maintained at a credible level” thanks to the Polynesian test sites.

NORWAY

New Commission to Decide on F-16 Purchase

*90EN0172B Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
28 Dec 89 p 2*

[Untitled article by John Berg]

[Text] Due to tight economic limits the Armed Forces supreme command has advised against Norway’s purchasing four F-16 fighter planes with an option to buy four more to replace planes lost in accidents. The Defense Ministry will probably follow the advice and refer the question of our air defense capacity to the new defense commission. This means that for the foreseeable future we will have at least 10 fewer planes than the minimum of 72 modern fighter planes called for in the so-called combat plane study.

Support for SV

It is unlikely that there will be a debate about that. The Socialist Left Party [SV] proposal to take 10 percent of the defense budget for environmental protection seems to have won a response outside the ranks of the party. An even greater response was probably inspired by the thought that the large amounts of money new fighter planes would cost could serve peace better in the form of economic aid to Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia in their difficult economic situation.

WEST EUROPE

JPRS-TAC-90-005
23 February 1990

Now the fact is that these three East European countries feel they have enough money to acquire new modern and very expensive fighter planes of the Soviet MiG-29 type, called Fulcrum by NATO. East Germany has received a steady stream of airplanes since spring, Poland got its first seven MiG-29's in June and Czechoslovakia got its first planes this fall. If we put ourselves on the same debate level as SV and others with bright ideas, we might ask if Norway should give up its new F-16's in order to help the three countries pay for their new MiG-29's.

Important Questions

The problem requires a more serious approach than that. Aid to East European countries should not simply depend on whether the wave of democratization continues. Why are the countries buying MiG-29's? How many do they plan to buy? Would they consider reducing the number and using the money for civilian purposes instead—such as environmental protection? The answers to such questions will hardly influence SV and their supporters, but they will help show the rest of us whether the old power structures are still maintaining their grip behind the scenes.

Economic development in the East will be decisive for whether the remnants of the power structures from the old regimes are eventually overpowered by a healthy democratic development. For obviously it was the old regimes that ordered the new fighter planes in the past.

New Regimes Must Answer

But it is the new regimes that must answer whether they will go through with the acquisitions. It will be a good lesson in realism for many participants in the Norwegian defense debate if Norway asks a number of questions about these new airplanes. We can come back to the questions we should ask the Soviet Union later.

Defense Chief Recommends Caution on Disarming
90EN0172C *Oslo AFTENPOSTEN* in Norwegian
22 Dec 89 p 2

[Editorial: "Worth Considering"]

[Text] There has been a gap between our defense needs and the funds the authorities have made available to the Armed Forces for far too long. This imbalance represents a national problem that will not necessarily diminish even if a new era also calls for new thinking in the area of defense and security policy. The military realities in our own local security vicinity clearly indicate a continued buildup of the Soviet Union's naval forces. Gorbachev has not cancelled any of his ambitious building programs. Other elements of the Soviet forces in the northern region are also the target of continual improvements in quality. It goes without saying that neither our political nor our military leaders can close their eyes to this.

The new defense commission that is expected to be appointed soon will have good reason to reflect over

what a new period of detente could involve for Norway's security. They should take the time that is needed for studying the situation and giving it careful consideration and not give way to the temptation to reach conclusions that could prove rash later on.

With respect to the present situation and current defense needs, Defense Chief Admiral Torolf Rein has attempted to dampen the wishful thinking that we have seen some signs of lately. The fact is that while Norwegian defense is still being cut back the opposite is the case on the part of the Soviets in the north. Consequently, we must rely even more on the NATO collective defense system, but this idea will not be credible unless we do our part of the job. It is not very reassuring in this context that our own defense is being scaled down. The reduced volume increase in defense budgets of roughly half a percent annually could pay for the modernization of five to six field brigades to 1990 standards or the purchase of five to six new submarines plus 25-30 F-16 fighter planes, including weapons, ammunition, and technical cost increases, over a period of 15 years.

That is certainly worth considering.

SPAIN

Foreign Minister on U.S. Troop Reduction Plan

PA0102154190 Madrid EFE in Spanish
1348 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Madrid, 1 February (EFE)—Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez today told EFE that U.S. President George Bush's proposals for an arms and troops reduction are "in line with the process taking place in Eastern Europe."

Fernandez Ordonez recalled that "the Spanish Government has said on various occasions in recent months that NATO's security policy should be closely related to general political evolutions in Europe."

In the minister's opinion, "the Open Skies meeting that will begin in Ottawa (Canada) on 11 February will give the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries the opportunity to hold a general discussion on these issues."

SWEDEN

Bofors, Hagglund Still Vying for Tank Contract

90EN0154A Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 18 Dec 89 p 6

[Untitled article by Hans Kronbrink]

[Text] Bofors and Hagglund want to stay in the competition for a new Swedish tank. After Tank 2000 failed to meet the requirements, they decided to take a new run at the problem and are now working on an as yet secret but

decidedly cheaper version that will be presented to the FMV (Defense Materiel Administration) just before Christmas.

"We want to join in and compete with the foreign tanks that the Armed Forces have shown an interest in," says Borje Johansson, information chief at Bofors.

But HB Development, Inc., the joint venture by Hagglund and Bofors that is producing the new tank, is getting off to a late start.

A year from now, the government is supposed to decide which tank the Swedish Army is going to have in the future, the reason being that there must be a realistic recommendation for the 1991 defense budget.

But there is also the question of whether there will even be a decision on a new tank. The minister of defense has hinted that he wants to wait until 1996.

The rumor is that Swedish tank manufacturers might as well not go to the trouble. The OB [commander in chief of the Armed Forces] has said that a Swedish-made tank will be too expensive and take too long to develop. Tank 2000, which HB Development proposed earlier, did not strike the fancy of the Swedish Armed Forces.

"The tank was intended to enter service with the Army after the year 2000, but now they have moved that up and are talking about the mid-1990's. And since the OB is willing to consider foreign-made tanks, we want to join in and compete with our new product, although for the moment it exists only on paper," says Borje Johansson.

Instead of developing a Swedish tank, the OB has taken an interest in buying ready-made foreign designs.

Since last spring, the Army has been testing the West German Leopard-2 tank, a 55-ton armored champion that can move over the ground at 70 km/hour while scoring hits with its 12-cm gun. The price stands at between 20 million and 40 million kronor, depending in part on how many are ordered.

Outclasses Swedish Tanks

The Leopard outclasses the two old Swedish tanks—the S-tank and the Centurion—on all counts. The 700 tanks now existing in the Army's five armored brigades are from 20 to 40 years old. They are slow, and the caliber of their guns is too small.

Another serious competitor is the U.S. Abrams M1A1, which has been in Skovde since November and will be tested this spring. Other foreign alternatives in the picture are the French Le Clerc and Great Britain's Challenger-2. The Le Clerc is designed for three men, while all the others have a crew of four.

One of those is going to be the Swedish tank of the 1990's and the following decade if the Army gets its way.

One objection to Tank 2000 was that it was too expensive at about 35 million kronor per unit. The price of the latest version will be between 25 million and 30 million kronor.

Is the new tank a cheaper and simpler version of Tank 2000?

"It will be able to compete with the Leopard and the Abrams and will be decidedly cheaper. We took the basic data we had when we were working on Tank 2000 and are using it again, but I can't reveal how the new tank will differ from Tank 2000," says Borje Johansson.

"The design of the new tank, which does not yet have a name, is a compromise between cost and performance."

Three Seats

It will be a tank for three crewmen, compared to today's tanks, which carry a crew of four. The advantage to this is that the tank is smaller and lighter, making it possible to concentrate more on protection.

To begin with, the OB wants to buy 150 foreign tanks for two armored brigades in southern Sweden. When it comes to replacing the remaining 500 tanks, the OB has said he is open to other alternatives. But in quickly coming up with a new alternative, HB Development wants to be in on things from the beginning.

A possible advantage from its standpoint is that by all indications, the Armed Forces are going to order Combat Vehicle 90 next year. This vehicle, which is an armored personnel carrier also known as Vargen [Wolf], has already been developed. Plans call for buying 400 vehicles at about 10 million kronor each before this century is out.

"Combat Vehicle 90 will be a good reference product," says Borje Johansson. "Our new tank can be seen as a natural continuation of that."

A possible disadvantage is that so far, the Swedish tank exists only on paper but is competing with already existing tanks that can start rolling off the production line on short notice.

Missile Cooperation Plan Aborted

90EN0154B Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 19 Dec 89 p 12

[Text] Goteborg (TT)—The cooperation on the Swedish defensive missile that OB [Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces] Bengt Gustafsson recommended is probably going to come to nothing. The companies involved—Saab Missiles and Bofors—have been discussing the matter since October. But now Saab has written to the Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) to say that it is turning thumbs down on cooperation.

That being the case, the next step may be that the OB and the FMV will decide to order weapons and equipment from only one of the companies.

Armed Forces Undertake Extensive Arms Buying

*90EN0161B Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 22 Dec 89 pp 1, 8*

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Despite Defense Complaints About Worn-Out Materiel, New Purchases For 10 Billion", first five paragraphs are DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Hiding behind the debates about the JAS aircraft, ASW craft and a new tank, the Swedish Armed Forces are spending billions of kronor on new materiel.

During the fiscal year 1989-90 and with a budget of 25 billion, the Armed Forces spent 10 billion kronor on materiel: everything from shorts and rucksacks to antitank missiles and antitank helicopters.

Most of it was purchased from the Swedish defense industry.

The DAGENS NYHETER (DN) has looked more closely at some of the items that were hiding behind the billion-kronor projects. For instance, the Army is introducing a new field uniform system with marching boots, combat outfits, rain gear, and field shirts and each regiment will also receive a laser firing simulator for antitank missiles.

From the standpoint of foreign observers, the new materiel is quite important for judging the security-political credibility of the Swedish Armed Forces.

Shorts, antitank missiles, rucksacks, coastal corvettes, combat harnesses, antitank helicopters, and a new coastal missile.

The new materiel for the defense not only consists of the JAS 39 "Gripen" aircraft, ASW craft, or a new tank.

The 30 billion kronor received by the Armed Forces is also being used for new materiel that is never or hardly ever noticed.

When the military whines about the economic crisis and the worn-out defense materiel, often nothing is said about these investments in new materiel.

During the fiscal year 1989-90 and within a total budget of more than 25 billion kronor, the Armed Forces purchased materiel for more than 10 billion kronor. The new materiel is important to the foreign assessment of the security-political credibility of Swedish Armed Forces.

Price Increases

Modern weapons systems are expensive. The costs for a new weapons system could rise 20 percent during a 10-year period from the planning stage to delivery. All countries have trouble guarding against these price increases. The money is not there for as many weapons as previously.

The Swedish defense industry, which employs about 27,000 people, handles about 75 percent of all materiel

delivered to the defense. Sales during the last couple of years have averaged about 15 billion kronor.

12 Companies

Twelve companies dominate the defense industry: Bofors, Inc. (guns, missile ammunition systems, tele- and radio communications systems), Bofors Electronics, Inc. (command and fire-control systems, fire-control systems for antiaircraft defense and artillery), Ericsson Radar Electronics, Inc. (air, sea, and land radar systems, electronics, microwave communications, and command and fire-control systems), FFV Aerotech (aircraft maintenance, testing equipment, optics), FFV Ordnance (antitank systems, torpedoes, mines, handguns, ammunition), Hagglunds Vehicle, Inc. (tracked and armored vehicles), Karlskrona Shipyard, Inc. (warships and patrol ships), Kockums Marine, Inc. (submarines, underwater technology), Saab Scania, Inc. (aircraft systems), Saab-Scania Combitech, Inc. (missile systems, training systems, sights), SATech Communications, Inc. (tele-warfare systems), Volvo Flygmotor, Inc. (aircraft engines, engines for rockets and missiles).

DAGENS NYHETER has chosen some current materiel projects which were overshadowed by the JAS project and a possible new tank—two billion-kronor projects that are dominating the debate.

New Field Uniform

The Army is introducing a new field uniform system that includes marching boots, a combat uniform, rain gear, and field shirts. The first camouflage-patterned field uniforms, model 90, have appeared at the regiments.

More than 40,000 pairs of shoes and 300,000 shorts will be delivered by the FMV (Defense Materiel Administration), the state purchaser of everything from socks to JAS aircraft. Gratifying for sore military backsides should be a new rucksack from Haglof, as well as a new combat belt.

The Army units will receive (AK 5) assault rifles. The FFV Ordnance has developed armor-piercing ammunition, 7.62-mm caliber, for model 58 machine guns. Three kinds of sniper guns are being tested, AK5.B with telescopic sight, 7.62-mm PSK Lano (Finnish), and 7.62-mm PSG Accuracy International (English). Final troop tests will be performed at I 21 (infantry regiment) in Solleftea during 1988-89. A decision about the weapons will be made in the spring of 1990.

The 'Bill' Missile

Two antitank weapon deliveries of immediate interest are the antitank "Bill" missile from Bofors and the armor-piercing projectile AT4 from FFV Ordnance. "Bill" is a unique missile that pierces the most unprotected part of the tank, the turret, from above. The AT4 projectile is available with delayed firing [capability].

Military authorities feel that it is both effective and inexpensive to train draftees with firing simulators and they are investing in a new laser firing simulator, Saab

BT 46, for portable antitank weapons. The simulator is adapted to the new, shorter training period of five months. Each regiment is supposed to have a simulator in order to train a reinforced company during realistic manoeuvres.

The antitank helicopter, 9 A, is going out in stages to the Army air battalions. HKP 9, manufactured by Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm in West Germany, is armed with four antitank "Tow" 33 missiles with a range of 3,700 meters. The missile can pierce armor that is 1.2 meters thick.

New Tracked Vehicle

"Combat Vehicle 90" is a heavy-duty, armored, tracked vehicle, equipped with a Bofors 40-mm automatic cannon, which, according to plans, will be delivered primarily to the six Norrland brigades beginning in 1994. The combat vehicle is supposed to handle tactical mobility, to have antitank capabilities, and to give its crew maximum protection. Three to eight fully armed soldiers can be transported. The cannon can fire high-explosive shells at aerial targets, [armor] piercing projectiles at armored targets as well as a general-target projectiles. It is being built by Bofors and Hagglund.

The final-phase-aimed "fire-and-forget" "Strix" projectile is one of the Swedish weapons against enemy tanks of the 1990's. The grenade is launched and, towards the end of its flight, it aims itself towards the target with the aid of a passive IR-detector.

Infrared Camera

The antiaircraft "RBS 90" missile system is a further development of the much-discussed "Missile 70" (RBS70) which has been used by the Army since 1977. The missile can be used in the dark because of an infrared camera (IRV) which has been mounted in the sight. The missile has been ordered from Bofors for 770 million kronor and from Ericsson for 600 million kronor. The system includes central and localized radar PS-90 and PS-91, respectively. The system can fight all kinds of attack aircraft, attack helicopters, and transport aircraft in both daylight and darkness. Deliveries will commence 1990-91. "RBS 90" reinforces the ground-based antiaircraft system which also includes Missile 69 and Missile 70.

The most important item on the Air Force agenda going into the 1990's is the JAS 39 "Gripen" fighter plane. The government's decision last December to allow FMV to negotiate bids on series two of 110 aircraft probably means that the purchase of foreign fighters has been cancelled.

So far the JAS project has cost about 10 billion kronor. Price increases are estimated at 16 percent, more than 7 billion kronor. The JAS parameter is 52 billion in 1989 kronor, including price increases. The aircraft industry estimates that the total development costs of the JAS 39 "Gripen" will be about 20 billion kronor, of which 13

billion kronor will go to the companies in the IG-JAS group. Because of the crash in February 1989, the JAS project has suffered a delay of at least a year. First delivery at the earliest 1993.

Airborne Radar

Airborne radar is part of the airforce plans. A Fairchild C-26 A, airborne early warning, is being tested in cooperation between the manufacturer Fairchild and Ericsson Radar Electronics, Inc. The cost is estimated at about 80 million kronor each. The radar can detect and identify enemy aircraft and cruise missiles in Swedish airspace at an early stage. Expansion and modernization of the basic system continues. New vertically adjustable radar stations are being installed.

The Navy is the branch of the Armed Forces that received most of the defense billions in the 1980's. The submarine violations of the Swedish coasts required a strong improvement in the submarine defense in order to recapture lost security-political credibility. The naval ASW force now consists of one ASW craft, three submarines, two smaller coastal corvettes, the "Stockholm" and the "Malmo," three destroyers equipped with depth charges, six patrol boats and six heavy helicopters. Mobile and fixed submarine defense units are also part of the submarine defense. They have boats and instruments for surveillance of important channels in the archipelago.

Corvettes

The new coastal corvettes constitute the largest project and will cost a total of 1.2 billion kronor. The first corvette, the "Goteborg," has been launched and is now undergoing tests in order to become operative in 1992.

Four modern submarines of the Västergötland series have been delivered to the Coastal Fleet during the last couple of years. An older model, the submarine "Nacken," has been lengthened by eight meters and provided with Stirling engines which can operate without air, in a project the aim of which is to extend the operative ability of submarines under water.

The sixth of seven planned minesweepers for the Coastal Fleet is called the "Ven." The seventh and last of the series will be delivered in 1991. The command ship for the minesweeping division, the "Uto," was purchased in Singapore for 15 million kronor and sailed from there to Sweden.

The Coastal Commandos' new boat, which is going to reinforce the amphibious battalions of the archipelago defense in the 1990's, is called "Combat Boat 90." A partial first series of 15 boats at 50 million kronor each will be ordered by the FMV if the tests are satisfactory. The Coastal Artillery will receive its first combat boat in the fall of 1990. The goal is to replace the older 200-series boats.

Light Coastal Missile

A new light coastal missile, Missile system 17 "Hellfire," was delivered to the Coastal Artillery this past year. The missile will replace the French missile SSII—called Missile System 52—which was acquired during the 1950's and 1960's. Field tests with the "Hellfire" last September gave good results, according to the FMV. Contracts have been signed with Rockwell International, Varo-Electro Optics, and Kollsman in the United States as well as with Bofors, Inc. in Karlskoga. The contract amount is 500 million kronor.

Last December, the FMV signed contracts with Saab Missiles, Inc. for a heavy-duty missile system, RBS 15 KA, for the Coastal Artillery. The order means that the Swedish Missile 15 can now be found in the Navy, in the Air Force as well as in the Coastal Artillery. The contract amounts to about 400 million kronor and includes both missiles and ground support. The system consists of a number of launch vehicles, each with four missiles, as well as a command vehicle for fire direction and liaison. The missile has a turbojet engine and a radar target seeker, it travels at low altitudes above the surface of the water and it is very accurate. During tests, the Missile 15 surpassed the American naval target missile, the "Harpoon," for instance and it has a range of 70 km.

Army Chief Notices Interest in Defense Model

*LD0502142690 Stockholm Domestic Service
in Swedish 1030 GMT 5 Feb 90*

[Text] [Announcer] Now, last of all, up to Jämtland province. In Storlien at the moment the annual Defense Conference is being held, arranged by Folk och Försvar [People and Defense]. One of the first speakers was Commander in Chief Bengt Gustafsson. He says he believes in the dissolution of the big military alliances, the Warsaw pact and NATO. But he has also noticed an increased interest in the East in the Swedish defense model—an interest clearly expressed when he recently met defense chiefs from the 35 nations in the European Security Conference in Vienna. Bengt Gustafsson:

[Begin recording] [Gustafsson] Yes, I got a very strong impression, both in the surveys they had and in the conversations we had alongside them, that countries like Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland now see the world as they saw it before 1939; that is, the need to have a chance to defend themselves in all directions, so to speak. If one seeks a new solution for the building up of defense, and starts wondering at one's poor economic resources, there is a strong interest in the solutions we have chosen in Finland and Sweden, that is, a mobilization defense, with general conscription and relatively low preparedness in normal situations. In this way, with a reasonable budget, one can maintain a relatively big defense, to be mobilized when needed.

[Reporter Ulla Lindskog] They seem to be interested in some sort of Swedish model for defense?

[Gustafsson] Yes. The Hungarian chief of staff asked for a special account from me of how we had built up our defenses—which he got.

[Lindskog] And what is now happening in the Eastern states has also meant that the military exchanges between Sweden and the Eastern countries are rapidly increasing.

[Gustafsson] Yes, if we take Poland as an example, we cancelled visits between chiefs and units with the oppression of Solidarity about 1980, and we have resumed those.

[Lindskog] And there is also a plan for exchanges with the Soviet Union?

[Gustafsson] Yes, a plan is now to be drawn up, in collaboration with the Defense Ministry's international department and the Soviet Defense Attaché in Stockholm. It will be a two-year plan which [two words indistinct].

[Lindskog] This belief of yours in a dissolution of the pacts being likely—several of the eastern countries are clearly now freeing themselves from the Soviet defense. These seem positive signs, yet you are pessimistic in your assessment of the future, and you believe in a quite strong scenario of threat—of crisis, anyway.

[Gustafsson] Yes, basically I am an optimistic person. But there is a sort of—I think, in discussion—a sort of belief, just as we had after World War I so to speak, a belief in no more war. And when I brought this up I meant it is just that the emotional questions that in history have always led to the ability to gather people under banners to reach some visionary power, some political goal, I think that still exists in humanity and the nations. And now, in this situation, there are a large number of these old conflicts built in, not the least in what we call Central Europe. The links between Central Europe and the Soviet Union might very well lead, in the long term, to new complications for war in Europe, and therefore one cannot abrogate freedom of action in the future.

[Lindskog] These are national conflicts between different peoples. How could they possibly affect Sweden?

[Gustafsson] Well, it might be hard to see, but if you look at World Wars I and II, we were able to keep out of such big wars, and what we are now talking about are perhaps smaller conflicts. So hopefully they won't affect Sweden either; so in the short term I don't believe in a big war.

[Lindskog] You don't believe in disarmament for Sweden either?

[Gustafsson] I think we should wait and see—the same opinion as the Committee—wait and see the future course of events. I think then we will have a clear basis for the things we were discussing earlier, that is, how will things really turn out for the power blocs? How will Europe change? How far will integration go in Europe,

with economy and trade and so forth? And that pattern, exactly how it will look, is very hard to predict. [end recording]

[Announcer] Yes, that was Ulla Lindskog, who met Commander in Chief Bengt Gustafsson at the People and Defense Conference in Storlien. The conference will continue for a few more days, and we will no doubt have reason to go back to it.

UNITED KINGDOM

Thatcher Backs Bush Proposal on Troop Cuts

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[Untitled report by Chris Moncrieff, PRESS ASSOCIATION chief political correspondent]

[Text] The British Government swiftly made known its support for President Bush's proposals on further reductions in US and Soviet forces stationed in Europe.

The President, in his State of the Union address early today, spoke of the reductions as part of an agreement being negotiated in Vienna. He said: "I agree with our European allies that an American military presence in Europe is essential—and that it should not be tied solely to the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe. But troop levels can still be lower. So tonight, I am announcing a major new step—for a further reduction in US and Soviet manpower in Central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 on each side. This number reflects the advice of our senior military advisors. It is designed to protect American and European interests—and sustain NATO's

defence strategy. A swift conclusion to our arms control talks—conventional, chemical and strategic—must now be our goal. That time has come."

His proposals were discussed with the British Government in advance and Mrs Thatcher had no hesitation in indicating Britain's backing. It was being pointed out that the United States spends a higher proportion of its national income on defence than any major European country and naturally wants to make some reductions. What Britain is saying is that this will still leave a strong American presence in Europe.

President Bush's words uncannily echo almost every statement Mrs Thatcher has issued on defence in the past few years. Like her, he underlines the need—despite the relaxation of tension between the Soviet bloc and the West—to continue modernising weaponry. And he, too, makes the point that the prime minister has herself continually made—that peace is maintained through strength and that not for a moment must the West drop its guard.

Implicit through the President's speech can be heard Mrs Thatcher's own view of danger of trying to hasten reform in Eastern European countries moving towards democracy.

Mrs Thatcher will almost certainly take the opportunity in the Commons later today to praise President Bush for what she regards as a prudent and realistic assessment of the defence needs of the West. This entails cutting back within Europe to conform with the spirit of the disarmament talks but not below a level which would make Europe vulnerable to attack—a threat, however, which is gradually receding.

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